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Introduction  
 
The struggle to define the Paris Commune’s place in history began only two days after 
the last barricades fell at a small gathering in London.  On May 30, 1871, Karl Marx 
stood before the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association and 
read an address that combined in equal parts analysis, critique, indictment, and memorial.  
This stirring polemic, published soon after as The Civil War in France, rapidly 
established itself (and remains) the starting point for all inquiry into the Commune’s 
significance. Perhaps most poignant is its rhetorical crescendo, which serves both as the 
Commune epitaph and a celebration of its achievement: 
Working men’s Paris, with its Commune, will be forever celebrated as the 
glorious harbinger of a new society.  Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of 
the working class.  Its exterminators’ history has already been nailed to that 
eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem 
them.
1
 
 
 This marked the beginning of the Paris Commune’s elevation to the sacred for the 
Left.  Only nine years after the Commune’s defeat, Parisian radicals held their first 
annual pilgrimage to the Mur des Fédérés in Père Lachaise cemetery.  Friedrich Engels, 
in his 1891 preface to The Civil War in France, asserted that the Paris Commune 
constituted the prototype for the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus establishing the 
Commune as a central element in the Marxist ideological canon.  Lenin, building upon 
this, employed the Commune as both a model and cautionary tale in planning and 
                                                 
1Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France,” in Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, Civil War in France: The Paris 
Commune, ed. Nikita Fedorovsky, (New York: International, 1993): 9-85, at 81–82. 
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realizing the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.
2
  This so firmly established the Commune’s 
place in the Soviet/Communist mythos that when Yuri Gagarin became the first human in 
space in April 1961 he carried aboard Vostok 1 one of the red flags of the Commune, 
thus bringing Marx’s analogy of the Communards “storming the heavens” to fruition.  
From Marx’s initial intervention onward, radicals framed the Commune within a 
discourse focused upon the future.  Thus, 1871 marked a departure point toward realizing 
the political and social vision articulated but not achieved by the Communards. 
 While this discourse continued well into the twentieth century, the decades 
immediately following the Commune saw several surviving participants contribute their 
reflections and conclusions.  Among those writing of their experiences was the 
Hungarian Leo Frankel.  During the Commune, despite his foreign origins, Frankel 
participated actively within the highest circles of leadership and served as the 
Commune’s Commissioner of Labor and Exchange until its violent demise at the hands 
of the French Army.  Writing in 1877 while serving as the editor of the Hungarian 
workers’ journal Munkas Heti-Kronika, Frankel characterized the Commune in terms 
very similar to Marx, asserting that “the revolution whose birth was commemorated in 
Montmartre on March 18th, 1871 was not just one more revolution coming after so many 
others; it was a new kind of revolution.”  Continuing in a similar vein, Frankel 
proclaimed “the great ideal that animated the defenders of Paris will continue to spread 
                                                 
2So great was Lenin’s emphasis on learning from the failures of the Paris Commune that a popular tale, 
almost certainly apocryphal, developed that describes him dancing in the Moscow snow when the 
Bolshevik government outlasted the Commune’s duration.   
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until the day when it will lead the oppressed to final victory…for us, March 18th signals 
the dawn of a new world, a new society.”3   
 While Frankel’s words aimed at furthering the discourse on the Commune’s 
significance to the international socialist movement’s future trajectory, the prominence of 
his participation serves to highlight a transitional moment in Paris’s history as the 
“revolutionary capital” of Europe.  The Paris Commune of 1871, viewed by Marx and 
subsequent generations of revolutionary socialists as the prototype for the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, also marked the apex of Paris’s tenure as the revolutionary center for 
international radicals.  While inaugurating “a new dawn” for the transnational 
radical/socialist movement, May 1871 also served as a fini for those movements’ active 
ties to Paris.  Frankel’s participation in the Commune, alongside Elisabeth Dmitrieff, 
Jaroslav Dombrowski, and other non-French radicals, represented the culmination of a 
process of ideological evolution, exchange, and formulation that began with the Great 
Revolution in 1789 and continued throughout all of Paris’s nineteenth-century 
revolutionary manifestations prior to 1871. 
 By focusing on these three non-French radicals as case studies, this dissertation 
demonstrates how the Paris Commune, by building on ideological, political, and social 
developments within Paris since the French Revolution, marked a pivotal moment in 
Europe’s transnational radical discourse, particularly for foreign radicals operating within 
the French capital.  While the cosmopolitan and universalistic language that characterized 
the French Revolution initially drew international adherents to Paris, the realities of the 
                                                 
3Reproduced in Tibor Ereny, “La Commune de Paris et le Mouvement Ouvrier Hongrois,” Europe 29 (Apr. 
1, 1951): 180. 
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Revolution, particularly after the nationalist shift in 1792, undercut the promise of a true 
transnational discourse.  However, Paris’s nineteenth-century revolutionary cycle, 
beginning in 1830, once again drew international radicals with the promise of providing a 
site capable of fostering their own ideological goals.  The ensuing period between 1830 
and 1848 saw émigré radicals, drawn at first by Paris’s revolutionary legacy, engage in a 
process of interaction and negotiation that began fusing Paris’s revolutionary potency 
with new transnational discourses, particularly that of socialism.  Thus, when Paris’s 
February uprising inaugurated the Revolutions of 1848, non-French radicals viewed the 
city’s revolution as transnational, adaptable to particular national conditions and 
aspirations, and thus exportable, either ideologically or by means of direct military 
action.  While both of these efforts, along with the Revolution within France itself, 
ultimately fell to reactionary response, 1848 demonstrated to non-French radicals Paris’s 
capacity to foster transnational revolutionary ideology.  It also further illustrated the need 
to first see revolution in the French capital consolidated before attempting to spread 
revolution to their respective homelands.   
 The 1864 founding of the International Workingman’s Association further 
bolstered Paris’s longue durée development as a revolutionary center for non-French 
radicals prior to the Commune’s establishment.  This organization deepened transnational 
ties between European radicals and reinforced the perceived interconnectedness of 
seemingly national-specific revolutionary events.  The International would count nearly 
all of the Commune’s non-French participants among its members, including both Leo 
Frankel and Elisabeth Dmitrieff, while most non-members, like Jaroslav Dombrowski, 
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possessed both personal and ideological ties to its associates.  Inspired by this 
transnational discourse and influenced by Paris’s powerful revolutionary legacy, these 
three émigré radicals’ participation in the Paris Commune was characterized by balancing 
their personal ideological goals with the realities of operating within a diverse political 
community.  In the three cases examined in this dissertation, negotiation and compromise 
constituted an essential part of Leo Frankel’s, Elisabeth Dmitrieff’s, and Jaroslav 
Dombrowski’s experiences operating within the Paris Commune’s various networks, 
which were characterized by divergent and often competing interests.  Building on the 
model of earlier generations of revolutionary émigrés, these non-French radicals devoted 
themselves to the cause of the Commune hoping that its success would ignite a 
transformative revolutionary tide, fired by Paris’s revolutionary tradition transcending its 
national boundaries, which would enable them to realize their respective ideological 
aspirations. 
Émigré Radicals in the Literature of the Commune and Revolutionary Paris 
In the Paris Commune’s historiography, foreign radicals despite their prominent 
participation garner only brief and sporadic attention.  Moreover, little of this focus deals 
with the question of their nationality and motivation in relation to their contributions.  
Stuart Edwards, whose excellent The Paris Commune, 1871 constitutes one of the 
standard workers on the subject, addresses this issue in only a few brief sentences; he 
cites the Communards’ internationalism or, in the case of Dombrowski and his fellow 
Polish officers, patriotism as fully accounting for the foreign presence within their ranks.  
Other works follow a similar approach, focusing primarily on the involvement of these 
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individuals in the context of the Commune’s development and operation.4  The only 
monograph that directly addresses the question of non-French radicals’ contributions to 
the Commune is Woodford McClellan’s Revolutionary Exiles: The Russians in the First 
International and the Paris Commune.  However, as the title indicates, McClellan 
focuses primarily on Russians with some attention given to other Slavic (specifically 
Polish) exiles.  Moreover, though providing an excellent synthesis of the Russian radical 
diaspora in the years before the Commune, the bulk of his account concentrates on their 
participation and interactions with the First International, with only one of ten chapters 
devoted exclusively to the Russian/Slavic Communards.
5
  Beyond McClellan’s work, the 
only other study devoted to the Commune’s foreign participants is contained in a special 
issue of the journal Cahiers Internationaux, Revue Internationale du Monde du Travail, 
published in May 1950.  This consists of a series of articles focused on Russian 
participants, Polish participants, and one piece specifically devoted to Leo Frankel.  
While containing useful background materials drawn from the Soviet archives, these 
articles present narrative rather than analysis.
6
 
 This omission within the literature on the Paris Commune becomes even starker 
when viewed in the context of the historiography of foreign radicals in Paris since 1789.  
                                                 
4
Stuart Edwards, The Paris Commune, 1871 (New York: Quadrangle, 1971), 204, 233.  For other examples 
of this rather brief treatment of foreign Communards and their motivations, see Pierre Milza, L'Année 
terrible: La Commune mars-juin 1871 (Paris: Perrin, 2009), 221–27; Jacques Rougerie, Paris insurgé: la 
Commune de 1871 (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 97; Robert Tombs, The Paris Commune, 1871 (London: 
Longman, 1999), 81, 156; David A. Shafer, The Paris Commune: French Politics, Culture and Society at 
the Crossroads of the Revolutionary Tradition and Revolutionary Socialism (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 
124; and Martin Johnson, The Paradise of Association: Political Culture and Popular Organizations in the 
Paris Commune of 1871 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 66. 
5
See Woodford McClellan, Revolutionary Exiles: The Russians in the First International and the Paris 
Commune (London: Frank Cass, 1979), 150–78. 
6
Jean Bruhat, Emile Tersen, Hélène Gosset, and Vassili Soukomline, “Le Mouvement Ouvrier International 
et la Commune de Paris,” Cahiers Internationaux, Revue Internationale du Monde du Travail 16 (May 
1950): 35–62. 
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Several works focus specifically on the question during the Great Revolution, most 
notably Albert Mathiez’s La Révolution et les Etrangers: cosmopolitisme et défense 
nationale.  While devoted to foreign radicals during the French Revolution, Mathiez’s 
analysis highlights the tensions between internationalism and patriotism that 
characterized all of Paris’s uprisings during its century of revolutions, including the 
Commune.
7
  Paris’s resurgence as Europe’s revolutionary center for international radicals 
between 1830 and 1848 also receives treatment in several works, including Lloyd 
Kramer’s case study approach Threshold of a New World: Intellectuals and the Exile 
Experience in Paris, 1830–1848, which inspired in part the approach of this dissertation.8  
The lack of any comparable studies on the Paris Commune’s non-French radicals clearly 
indicates the need for an intervention of the sort intended by this project. 
 Beyond the broader place of émigré radicals in the literatures of the Commune 
and Paris’s revolutionary tradition, none of the three specific subjects of this study have 
been examined with emphasis on their histories and motivations in relation to their 
participation in the Commune.  More strikingly, despite serving in key positions of 
authority in Europe’s bloodiest civil uprising of the nineteenth century, two of the three 
individuals addressed in this dissertation have scarcely been researched by scholars in 
                                                 
7
Albert Mathiez, La Révolution et les Etrangers: cosmopolitisme et défense nationale (Paris: La 
Renaissance du livre, 1918).  Other works addressing the question of foreigners, both as radical participants 
and common citizens, during the French Revolution include Sophie Wahnich, L’impossible Citoyen: 
L’étranger dans le discours de la Révolution française (Paris: Albin Michel, 1997) and Michael Rapport, 
Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: The Treatment of Foreigners 1789–1799 (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2000). 
8
Lloyd S. Kramer, Threshold of a New World: Intellectuals and the Exile Experience in Paris, 1830–1848 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988).  Though not focused exclusively on the question of non-French radicals, Mark 
Traugott, The Insurgent Barricade (Berkley: University of California Press, 2010) contains a highly 
valuable section focused on the contributions and actions of émigré radicals in 1848, organized by 
nationality.  See also Georges Bourgin, “1848 en Europe,” in 1848: Le livre du centenaire, ed. Charles 
Moulin, 81-108 (Paris: Atlas, 1948). 
8 
 
any context.  Despite being both the Commune’s Commissioner of Labor and Exchange 
(largely considered its most effective department) and the highest ranking foreigner 
within its ranks, not a single scholarly work in French focuses on Leo Frankel other than 
the eleven page article mentioned above.  Indeed, only scholars in Frankel’s native 
Hungary have engaged in any serious historical inquiries, all of which were conducted 
under Communism and thus bear the burden of its influences.  Of these, Magda 
Aranyossi’s 1956 book and János Jemnitz’s 1972 article, with their access to the archives 
in Budapest, provide accounts both useful and showing only a limited taint of Soviet 
dogma.
9
  However, both also understandably focus substantial portions of their accounts 
on Frankel’s post-Commune activities for the International and in his homeland.  Thus, 
no modern account of Leo Frankel, particularly one with an emphasis on his role in the 
Commune, exists. 
 A similar lacuna exists in terms of the scholarship on Jaroslav Dombrowski.  
There are two monographs, one Polish and one Soviet, both written under Communism.  
The latter, written by Daniil Alexandrovich Granin, was published in a French translation 
in 1956.
10
  Like the works on Frankel, Granin’s benefits from access to Polish and Soviet 
archives.  Interestingly, no Polish scholars have written on Dombrowski since 1989, a 
fact likely stemming in part from the Communist regime’s heavy symbolic use of the 
Communard, including placing his likeness on the 200-Złoty banknote during the 1970s.  
                                                 
9
Magda Aranyossi, Leo Frankel (Berlin, Dietz, 1957) and János Jemnitz, “Leo Frankel,” International 
Review of Social History 17 (April 1972): 391–94.  While Aranyossi’s work makes the requisite references 
to the works of Lenin and other prominent Communists within the text, his account makes extensive use of 
the archives in Budapest and the holdings of Paris’s Archives Nationales, as well as published primary 
sources on the Commune. 
10
Daniel Granine, Dombrowsky, trans. Georges Arout (Paris: Les Éditeurs Français Réunis, 1956) and 
Włodzimierz Rożałowski, Wspomnienia o generale Jarosławie Dąbrowskim (Wydawn: Ministerstwa 
Obrony Narodowej, 1951) 
9 
 
Despite being hailed as the “most able soldier”11 of a government locked in combat for 
the entirety of its existence, Dombrowski, like Frankel, remains largely context-less and 
confined to a few brief paragraphs in the literatures of both the Commune and Paris’s 
émigré radicals. 
 Elisabeth Dmitrieff constitutes the one exception in terms of the treatment of non-
French radicals in the existing literature.  Two major French studies, Yvonne Singer-
Lecocq’s Rouge Elisabeth and Sylvie Braibant’s Elisabeth Dmitrieff: aristocrate et 
pétroleuses, provide extensive and well-researched biographies of the Russian feminist 
radical.  Edith Thomas’s groundbreaking 1963 study of women and the Commune, The 
Women Incendiaries, devotes almost as much attention to Dmitrieff as it does to the 
Commune’s renowned “Red Virgin” Louise Michel.  More recently, Carolyn Eichner 
chose Dmitrieff, along with André Léo and Paule Mink, as part of her case study 
Surmounting the Barricades: Women in the Paris Commune.  Gay L. Gullickson also 
touches on Dmitrieff’s contributions in his study of women’s role in the Commune, 
Unruly Women of Paris: Images of the Paris Commune.
12
  However, while these works 
collectively present a substantial picture of Dmitrieff’s life and work during the 
Commune, their analysis focuses primarily on her role as a radical/socialist feminist.  The 
question of her nationality in relation to her work for the Commune receives little 
                                                 
11
Edwards, 382. 
12
Yvonne Singer-Lecocq, Rouge Elisabeth (Paris: Editions Stock, 1977); Sylvie Braibant, Elisabeth 
Dmitrieff: aristocrate et pétroleuses (Paris: Belfond, 1993); Edith Thomas, The Women Incendiaries (New 
York: George Braziller, 1966); Carolyn J. Eichner, Surmounting the Barricades: Women in the Paris 
Commune (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2004); and  Gay L. Gullickson, Unruly Women of Paris: Images of 
the Commune (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).  In addition to these works Ivan Knizhnik-Vetrov, 
Russkie deiatel’nitsky Pervogo Internatsionala I Parizhskoi Kummuny (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka, 1964) 
contains several pieces of biographical information not found in other sources despite its heavy use of 
Marxist-Leninist dogma in the text. 
10 
 
attention.  These accounts present her membership in the International as the sole reason 
for her presence in Paris.  While not neglected in existing scholarship like her fellow 
foreign Communards Frankel and Dombrowski, the question of Elisabeth Dmitrieff’s role 
in the Paris Commune in terms of her identity as an émigré radical remains open for 
examination and will be addressed in this study. 
 Given this limited treatment of foreign Communards, both in the Paris 
Commune’s scholarly canon and the larger literature of Paris’s radical émigrés during its 
Age of Revolutions, this project aims to provide a place and a voice in the existing 
historiography for these foreign radicals.  By presenting these three case studies, this 
dissertation examines these non-French Communards from a new perspective that 
accounts for their motivations and aspirations in serving the Commune, rather than just 
recounting their direct contributions.  Moreover, it places them and the other non-French 
radicals present in 1871 within the larger context of revolutionary émigrés drawn to Paris 
since 1789, rather than presenting them in relative chronological isolation.  This allows 
for a more comprehensive understanding of the Paris Commune, as well as Paris’s multi-
decade role as a lodestone of attraction for Europe’s radical community. 
Paris, the Commune and European Transnational Radicalism 
In his book Transnational Urbanism, Michael Peter Smith asserts that “research on 
transnational processes depicts transnational social relations as ‘anchored in’ while also 
transcending one or more nation-states…transnationalist discourse insists on the 
continuing significance of borders, state policies, and national identities even as these are 
11 
 
often transgressed by transnational communication circuits and social practices.”13  While 
Smith’s purpose with this statement is to distinguish transnationalism from globalization, 
his description perfectly fits the discourse that characterized the experience of non-
French radicals in Paris both during the Commune and stretching back to 1789.  From the 
outset, the French revolutionary tradition (centered and embodied in Paris) presented a 
discourse that emphasized a universalistic and cosmopolitan set of shared values 
applicable to all peoples regardless of nationality.  This discourse inaugurated the influx 
of foreign radicals to Paris that began in 1789 and, with ebbs and flows, paralleled every 
major revolutionary manifestation within the city up to the Commune.  However, this 
repeatedly came into tension with the national parameters and nationalistic impulses of 
revolution in both Paris and in France as a whole.  While this tension eased to a certain 
degree with the spread of socialist discourse among European radicals (particularly 
following 1848), it remained a key facet of the environment foreign radicals, particularly 
those in position of authority such as Frankel, Dmitrieff, and Dombrowski, had to 
negotiate during the Commune. 
 Indeed, in some ways the Commune presented a greater challenge than those 
faced by émigré radicals in 1848, given the intense resurgence of nationalism within 
Parisian radical discourse in the wake of the Prussian Siege and the French capitulation in 
January 1871.  For these so-called Jacobins or neo-Jacobins, which held the majority of 
positions within the Communard leadership, the Commune’s struggle “was also a 
patriotic struggle,” aimed at restoring France’s 1789 status as “the leader of world 
                                                 
13
Michael Peter Smith, Transnational Urbanism: Locating Globalization (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2001), 3. 
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progress with a mission to enlighten less advanced peoples.”14  This of course represents 
a discourse far removed from the more inclusive, cosmopolitan conception of Paris’s 
revolutionary potential held by both émigré radicals and their more internationalist 
minded Parisian comrades.  Thus, the discussions, debates, and negotiations engaged in 
by émigré radicals and their colleagues against this ideological view represent an attempt 
to make the Commune the moment where Paris’s revolutionary tradition finally fully 
transcended its national boundaries and became a universalistic model for liberation.  
This effort presents a clear example of a transnational discourse, firmly rooted in an 
understanding of revolution and ideology without any national mooring.  For these 
international radicals, Paris and its revolution belonged to, and therefore could transform, 
the world. 
 The transnational approach, or “turn” as some have styled it (others, less 
enthusiastic, have referred to it as a “pandemic”), has its origins in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.
15
  Michel Espagne and Michael Warner first posited the idea of “cultural 
transfer” as a better category of analysis than focusing on individual nation-states in 
terms of understanding cultural connections between France and Germany.
16
  Other 
scholars, recognizing this approach in their own research, began engaging in an oft-
                                                 
14
Shafer, 118. 
15
However, it should be noted that scholars critical of the recent emphasis on the transnational approach 
argue that its methodology has long been a key element of historical research, prior to its “discovery” over 
the last few decades.  Pierre-Yves Saunier, though a proponent of the transnational approach, argues that an 
examination of historical scholarship going back to the late nineteenth century reveals the application of the 
transnational approach even during a period of fairly intense nationalism.  He states in this regard that it is 
“just not possible to claim to have reinvented the wheel.”  See Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Learning by Doing: 
Notes about the Making of the Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History,” Journal of Modern 
European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 159-180, at 161–62. 
16
Michel Espagne and Michel Werner, Les Relations interculturelles dans l'espace franco-allemand (XVIIIe 
et XIXe siecle) (Paris: Editions Recherche sur les civilisations, 1988). 
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contentious discussion of the utility of a new “transnational” approach to studying 
phenomenon that transcend the bounds of nation-states or national-centered analysis.  
Though some early works, such as those of Espange and Werner, focused on inter-
European cultural exchanges,
17
 most of the work thus far conducted from the 
transnational perspective has focused on questions of immigration, migration, 
colonialism, and post-colonialism.   
 However, the basic transnational methodology utilized in these fields of study 
proves highly applicable to examining the intersection in Paris between non-French 
radicals and the city’s revolutionary potential and legacy, primarily during the Commune 
but earlier as well.  Michael Werner’s and Bénédicte Zimmermann’s concept of “histoire 
croisée,” developed primarily as an alternative to traditional comparative history, 
contains elements highly useful in understanding the experience of Paris’s émigré 
radicals.  They propose a methodology emphasizing “a multidimensional approach that 
acknowledges plurality and the complex configurations that result from it…accordingly, 
entities and objects of research are not merely considered in relation to one another but 
also through one another, in terms of relationships, interactions and circulations.”18  This 
model of analysis applies quite well to the multilayered networks in Paris during the 
Commune, where ideology, nationality, international organizations, gender, local 
groupings, and local concerns all intersected among non-French radicals in their attempts 
                                                 
17
One other notable example of transnational exchanges in Europe is Johannes Paulmann’s work on 
transfers of “high culture.” See Johannes Paulmann, “Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller 
Transfer: Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts,” Historische 
Zeitschrift 267, no. 3 (1998): 649–85. 
18
Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and 
the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45, no. 1 (2006): 30-50, at 38. 
14 
 
to realize a vision capable of going beyond the limits of national discourse.  Further, 
interventions made by these émigré radicals, particularly Leo Frankel through his 
position on the Communal Council, provide examples of the “histoire croisée” concept of 
“entangled” histories and illustrate the intermixing and contention between universalistic 
revolutionary ideas and more French-centric visions of a République Universelle.
19
  Put 
more succinctly by Patricia Clavin, this approach establishes transnational connections 
among Paris’s non-French Communards at the level of “the social spaces they inhabit, the 
networks they form and the ideas they exchange.”20 
 In addition to the “histoire croisée” concept, the idea of transnational “shared 
history” also applies to this study.  As discussed by Werner and Zimmerman, this concept 
originated in ethnic studies but also has been applied in transnational works on gender 
and in post-colonial studies.
21
  This methodology reverberates quite strongly with the 
perceptions of those émigré radicals drawn to Paris by their belief that the city’s 
revolutionary tradition constituted the common property of all peoples.  Though 
ostensibly French, the cosmopolitan rhetoric employed early in the Great Revolution had 
resonance and continued to resonant even as nationalism and xenophobia replaced this 
discourse.  It would be this legacy of the revolution, offering the promise of universalistic 
emancipation, which non-French radicals viewed as a common heritage.  This conception 
of Paris’s revolutionary portent provided the impetus for new generations of international 
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radicals to flock to the city when the revolutionary cycle began anew in 1830.  Thus, for 
those who came to Paris just prior to and during the Commune, this revolutionary 
inheritance constituted a shared history centered on a promised République Universelle 
that offered the potential realization of their individual political and ideological aims.  
 Beyond shared history, this international perspective on Paris’s revolutionary 
tradition, informed in part by the differing formative national experiences of émigré 
radicals, corresponds quite closely to Michel Espagne’s conception of “hybrid forms” in 
transnational exchanges.  This proposition holds that “foreign” components within a 
given national culture often play a pivotal but under-recognized role in the formation of 
key cultural elements.  Even if their influence is only minor, their contributions still 
constitute a factor that must be “included in one’s own creation dynamics.”22  Adapted to 
this study’s context by including the political and ideological as well as the cultural, the 
interventions made by non-French radicals during the Commune, though often contested 
and at times outright rejected, influenced the general conception of the Commune’s 
revolutionary significance and mission on an international scale.  This manifested in 
several ways, such as in the internationalist language employed by Leo Frankel 
repeatedly in official statements made in his capacity as Labor and Exchange 
Commissioner.
23
  Given these demonstrated applications, the transnational approach 
lends itself quite effectively to examining the relationship between émigré radicals in 
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Paris, the Commune, and the larger question of Paris’s revolutionary tradition in the 
context of trans-European (and in some cases, trans-Atlantic) radicalism. 
Foreign Radicals in the Commune: A Case Study Approach 
Though Paris, as the center of the Enlightenment, served as a site of transnational 
intellectual discourse for much of the eighteenth century, the events of 1789 transformed 
the French capital into Europe’s new center of radical and revolutionary thought.  While 
earlier generations of foreign philosophes traveled to the city to challenge existing 
metaphysical conceptions of the world, those radicals who journeyed to Paris were 
inspired by a more materialist vision of revolutionary change.  These émigré radical 
sojourners, inspired by the vision of Paris’s revolution portent transforming all existing 
political and social relations, inaugurated a process of transnational radical discourse 
within the French capital that reached its apex with the experiences of non-French 
radicals such as Leo Frankel, Elisabeth Dmitrieff, and Jaroslav Dombrowski during the 
Paris Commune of 1871.  The following chapters will chronicle this process and 
demonstrate how the Commune thus constituted a pivotal moment in the transnational 
radical movement. 
 Before delving into the specific experiences of these foreign Communards, it is 
first necessary to analyze Paris’s post-1789 history as Europe’s revolutionary nucleus and 
establish why 1871 represented such a key moment in the city’s history as a site of 
radical migration.  Chapter One, “The Promethean City: Paris’s Revolutionary Émigrés 
(1789–1870)” examines Paris’s non-French radical community from the French 
Revolution to the eve of the Franco-Prussian War.  Emphasis is placed on the relationship 
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between émigré radicals and the city’s revolutionary manifestations, particularly those in 
1789, 1830, and 1848, in the light of their potential significance for Europe and the 
broader world.  A detailed accounting of these radical immigrants’ motivations and 
aspirations provides perspective on how they attempted, by their support of Parisian 
radicals and service on the barricades at different revolutionary moments, to evolve the 
understanding of Paris’s revolutionary capacity toward a more universalistic conception.  
This chapter also highlights moments where the cosmopolitan ideas of these foreign 
radicals collided with specifically French revolutionary ideas, establishing a pattern of 
compromise, negotiation, and, at times, confrontation.  First manifesting during the 
French Revolution’s radical phase,24 this tension created a legacy that persisted to the 
Commune and thus presented its émigré Communards with a serious challenge.  Finally, 
this chapter also analyzes how the development of new ideologies, particularly that of 
socialism, came to play a role in transforming perceptions of Paris’s revolutionary 
significance within larger frameworks, thus setting the groundwork by the late 1860s for 
the city’s potential “universal moment” during the Commune.   
 Chapter Two, “Walking the Ideological Tightrope: Leo Frankel, the Commune, 
and the République Universelle,” inaugurates the dissertation’s case study approach by 
examining the Hungarian Leo Frankel, the most prominent and highly placed non-French 
radical within the Commune’s leadership.  Beginning with his ideologically formative 
experiences in the German lands, with Marx in London, and in Paris, this chapter 
establishes his initial fierce commitment to the International, very much a product of his 
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transnational experiences, and his commitment to a universalistic model of revolutionary 
change.  However, his efforts in Paris for the International would bring him into contact 
with the politically diverse Parisian radical community, many of whom, despite their 
membership in the International’s French branch, held views of revolution and Paris’s 
revolutionary tradition steeped in the French national context and thus highly divergent 
from Frankel’s principles.  Informed by his experience, the chapter then examines 
Frankel’s effort following the Revolution of September 4, 1870, and the onset of the 
Prussian Siege, which demonstrate his growing capacity to balance his own 
internationalist goals with the growing patriotic sentiments held by many French 
comrades.  With the establishment of the Commune, Frankel’s balancing act became 
more complex, with him using his position at the Commission of Labor and Exchange to 
push for broad socialist programs while at the same time recognizing the limits placed 
upon him by the contending social visions held by other Communards.  As the Commune 
adopted a more openly patriotic, neo-Jacobin agenda, Frankel, though holding deep 
reservations, recognized that the success of Paris’s revolution still offered the best chance 
to realize the République Universelle and thus he continued a policy of compromise up 
until the Commune’s last hours.  Thus, this chapter illustrates how Leo Frankel, as an 
émigré radical, negotiated and compromised his ideological principles in the short term in 
the hopes that a victory for Paris’s revolution would eventually facilitate the realization 
of his own goals. 
 Shifting genders and nationalities, Chapter Three, “A Russian de Gouges: 
Elisabeth Dmitrieff and the Citoyennes of Paris,” focuses on Elisabeth Dmitrieff, the 
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organizer of the Commune’s most active and influential women’s organization, the Union 
des Femmes.  This chapter analyzes how Dmitrieff came to view Paris’s 1871 revolution 
as the best means for facilitating both the spread of Internationalist socialism and the 
reordering of women’s social and economic relationships on a transnational scale.  Like 
Frankel, Dmitrieff’s ideological education spanned nations and discourses, including time 
in St. Petersburg, in Geneva, and in London with Marx and thus produced a decidedly 
cosmopolitan view of revolution.  Charged by the International’s General Council with 
providing information on the Commune, Dmitrieff arrived in Paris in late March and 
immediately immersed herself in political activity.  Aided by existing personal networks 
among the city’s radicals, she soon developed the idea of establishing a women’s 
organization aimed at representing their interests to the Commune.  With Dmitrieff’s 
founding of the Union des Femmes, the chapter then focuses on the challenges she faced 
in attempting to push a universalistic view of reordering social and economic gender 
relations.  Much like Frankel, Dmitrieff discovered the constraints that other ideological 
models operating within the Commune, particularly those coming from the Proudhon and 
neo-Jacobin positions, imposed on her particular agenda.  Ultimately, the chapter 
demonstrates how Elisabeth Dmitrieff, recognizing the limits of the political community 
under the Commune, concluded that making ideological concession and focusing on 
providing all possible support for the Commune’s success presented the best option for 
seeing a revolutionary model supportive of her vision for gender relations continue.   
 The Fourth Chapter, “A Son of Poland: Jaroslav Dombrowski, Revolutionary 
Paris and Polish Liberation,” centers on Jaroslav Dombrowski, the most prominent of 
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several Polish officers who provided the Commune with its most able military leadership.  
Though trained and commissioned by the Russian Imperial Army, Dombrowski quickly 
became involved in the cause of Polish independence and actively supported the efforts 
that culminated in the unsuccessful January Uprising of 1863.  Driven into exile in Paris, 
Dombrowski soon established connections with both fellow Polish exiles and members of 
the Paris radical community opposed to the Second Empire.  This chapter asserts that 
these connections in Paris transformed Dombrowski’s conception of Polish liberation, 
tying its success to the establishment of a new Poland governed by a democratic and 
social republic.  During the Siege of Paris, Dombrowski’s radicalization deepened as a 
result of his and his fellow Poles dismissive treatment by the Provisional Government.  
Following the Revolution of March 18, Dombrowski offered his services to the 
Commune and was given command of Paris’s defenses.  Despite repeated questions 
about his loyalty, Dombrowski served the Commune diligently until his death during its 
last days and saw its victory as the best means of spreading revolution that would fire 
national liberation in Poland.  Thus, this chapter presents Jaroslav Dombrowski as 
another case of an émigré radical seeking the culmination of his own political goals 
through the success of revolutionary Paris. 
 Finally, the Epilogue, “A Parisian Sunset,” provides a brief account of Leo 
Frankel’s and Elisabeth Dmitrieff’s lives following their escape from Paris.  Further, it 
briefly discusses how the Commune’s defeat marked the end of Paris’s centrality to 
European radicalism, as the momentum for both reform and revolutionary socialism 
moved eastward after 1871.  In closing, it briefly analyzes how the Commune’s violent 
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suppression ended the “romantic” vision of international radicalism that drew generations 
of foreigners to Paris in favor of a professional revolutionary model that would dominate 
the twentieth century. 
 In a tribute written for the Commune’s fortieth anniversary, Lenin proclaimed that 
“the Commune fought, not for some local or narrow national aim, but for the 
emancipation of all toiling humanity, of all downtrodden and oppressed…that is why the 
cause of the Commune is not dead…it lives to the present day in every one of us.”25  As 
this study contends, the non-French radicals who participated in the Commune, as well as 
their forbears, shared this belief that Paris’s revolutionary portent, inaugurated by 1789’s 
Great Revolution, constituted a genuine force for universal liberation.  In the process, 
they developed a discourse that envisioned Paris’s revolutionary tradition and potential in 
a truly transnational context.  Contested, resisted, and rejected at various moments 
between 1789 and 1870, the Commune marked the zenith of this discourse among émigré 
radicals, a moment where all roads of universal revolution originated in Paris.
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Chapter One  
The Promethean City: Paris’s Revolutionary Émigrés (1789–1870) 
On May 28, 1871, the French Army crushed the Paris Commune’s final pockets of 
resistance, the culminating act of a week of slaughter known afterward as “La Semaine 
Sanglante” (“The Bloody Week”).  Over the previous seven days, French Communards, 
along with comrades from Poland, Russia, Hungary, and dozens of other nations perished 
in the thousands on the barricades or were shot after surrendering to French soldiers.  
That evening, as the fusillades of firing squads still echoed through the capital, the French 
Army commander General Patrice de MacMahon proclaimed to the subjugated city 
“Paris has been delivered…At last the fighting is over; order, work and security will 
reign once more.”1  Meant only to mark an end to what became branded as Paris’s Année 
terrible, these words, though unbeknownst at the time, proved an epitaph for an epoch in 
the French capital’s history.  With the Commune’s suppression, Paris ceased to operate as 
Europe’s revolutionary epicenter.  No longer would its boulevards draw radicals from all 
corners of Europe driven by the belief that by joining the Parisians on the barricades a 
revolutionary fire would be sparked that would consume the entire continent.  Paris’s 
promise of transformation, first made at the Bastille, perished along with hundreds of 
Communards on Belleville’s barricades. 
 However, for the eighty-two years between 1789 and 1871, Paris, in addition to 
driving French politics, served as the cradle of European revolutionary aspirations.  
Victor Hugo, in his 1874 novel Quatre-Vingt-Treize, musing on the origins of the 
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capital’s transnational radical influence, reflected; “And what was the Revolution?  It was 
the victory of France over Europe, and of Paris over France.”2  This chapter, in order to 
ascertain why Leo Frankel, Elisabeth Dmitrieff, Jaroslav Dombrowski, and other non-
French revolutionaries served, fought, and, in some cases, died for the Paris Commune, 
examines Paris’s historical development as Europe’s revolutionary capital.   
From the French Revolution’s earliest phase, Paris drew foreign radicals who 
“saw in the French Revolution an event for all humanity, from which to draw 
inspiration…and in which all people, regardless of nationality, were able to participate.”3  
Surviving the Revolution’s repeated ideological shifts and periodic xenophobic policies, 
as well as the First Empire, this internationalist tradition reasserted itself in the early 
nineteenth century, as the July Revolution in 1830 once again established Paris as 
Europe’s preeminent revolutionary center.  Drawn by this aura, thousands of young 
radicals traveled to Paris during the July Monarchy and began operating within the city’s 
political networks.  Influenced by changing economic relations and the subsequent spread 
of socialist discourse, this period saw Paris’s revolutionary tradition being articulated by 
émigré radicals in a much more transnational context.  When revolution broke out once 
again in February 1848, many of Paris’s European radicals saw this as another moment to 
“export revolution” from the city to the rest of the Continent.  Though revolutionary 
aspirations in both Paris and abroad ultimately succumbed to reaction, this conception of 
the city’s transformative power remained and endured into the Second Empire.  Bolstered 
by Europe’s growing transnational socialist movements as well as the waning strength of 
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Louis Napoleon’s regime, the mid to late 1860s saw a new migration of Europe’s radicals 
to Paris.  Though possessing different political agendas, these émigrés saw the French 
capital as a potential revolutionary catalyst capable of best facilitating their specific 
ideological program.  Thus, when the Second Empire fell, non-French activists joined 
ranks with their Parisian radical counterparts in pressing for a new political and social 
order that possessed revolutionary possibilities far beyond the city’s borders. 
Radical Origins: Foreigners, Paris and the Great Revolution 
Alexis de Tocqueville, in assessing 1789 with the benefit of sixty-seven years of 
hindsight, wrote in The Old Regime and the Revolution that the French Revolution “by 
seeming to tend to the regeneration of the human race rather than to the reform of France 
alone…roused passions such as the most violent political revolutions had been incapable 
of awakening…it became itself a kind of new religion…which…has covered the world 
with its fighters, its apostles and its martyrs.”4  However, long before the Revolution’s 
“armed prophets” (traveling in the guise of French soldiers) set out to spread its 
principles throughout Europe, fervent converts from the Continent and beyond began 
making pilgrimages to its holy city of revolt: Paris.  Though long Europe’s intellectual 
and cultural center, beginning in June 1789 the French capital became the core not just of 
French revolutionary sentiment but the focal point for European (and American) radicals 
committed to a broad reinvention of the existing political and social order. 
 While the Revolution proved transformative in defining Paris’s international 
radical role, the French capital had already possessed some pull on politically active 
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foreigners prior to 1879.  Paris’s prominence during the Enlightenment provides an 
excellent example.  Projects such as the Encyclopédie drew some of Europe’s greatest 
minds to Paris, including several seeking refuge from hostile governments.
5
  However, 
while Enlightenment political thought eventually provided the Revolution with 
ideological fuel, most of these philosophes aimed their efforts at “the improvement of 
humanity” within “the moral sphere of human endeavor” in a manner “not to be 
transformed into political action.”6   
 Political exiles and fugitives from throughout Europe also resided in Paris by the 
late eighteenth century.  These groups represented a wide variety of nationalities and 
ideologies.  Those that corresponded to the French Crown’s foreign policy interests, such 
as the Catholic Jacobites from the British Isles, enjoyed both welcome and financial 
support as they arrived in waves between 1688 and 1746.  Polish exiles from various 
royal factions involved in struggles for that nation’s crown enjoyed benign toleration 
during roughly the same period.  Even Genevan and Dutch rebels escaping from failed 
attempts to overthrow their respective governments gained admittance to the capital, 
though the royal police kept them under careful surveillance.
7
  Though these examples 
demonstrate Paris’s importance to foreigners as both intellectual center and refuge, none 
of the above groups yet viewed the city as a potential crucible to facilitate broad political 
and social change.  Moreover, their presence in Paris depended completely on the 
monarchy’s tolerance and international interests; shared ideological principles with the 
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French people played little or no role.  This relationship between Paris and non-French 
exiles would, like much else in France, undergo a profound redefinition in 1789. 
 Even prior to the onset of revolution, the crisis of the French monarchy and the 
debates it inspired drew radicals and intellectuals from across Europe and beyond.  Of 
these, the German noble Anacharsis Cloots presents an excellent example.  Born to an 
aristocratic family of Dutch descent, Cloots became a devotee of the Enlightenment at a 
young age and established himself in Paris during the 1770s, where he interacted in 
salons with Rousseau and Benjamin Franklin.  However, his ardent promotion of natural 
religion over Christianity brought him into conflict with French authorities, and in 1785 
he left Paris, vowing not to return until the monarchy fell.  The debates around the 
meeting of the Estates General brought him hurrying back to Paris in early 1789 to 
participate in the growing public fervor.
8
  Other non-French intellectuals, such as Karl 
von Hesse and the Dutch feminist Etta Palm d’Aelders, also arrived in France during the 
discourse over the Estates General, drawn by the reformist spirit and open exchange it 
inspired.
9
 
 The trickle of foreign radicals into Paris prior to June 1789 rapidly became a 
stream following the National Assembly’s emergence from the Estates General and the 
storming of the Bastille.  For many of these émigrés, the Revolution represented a 
dynamic break in human history, a moment where old national and religious divisions 
would give way to a universal recognition of natural rights and laws.  This vision gained 
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greater validity in late August, when the National Constituent Assembly adopted the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.”  During the debates over its passage, 
Duke Mathieu de Montmorency encapsulated the sentiments that inspired many non-
French radicals to travel to the capital, arguing that:  
There are no doubt some truths which are in all hearts, and it is not necessary to 
prove to a man he is free… (however) many peoples are ignorant of this liberty, 
being unaware of its extent and its products…let us follow the example of the 
United States: they have set a great example in the new hemisphere; let us give on 
our example to the universe, let us offer a model worthy of admiration.”10 
  
The “Declaration” itself drew heavily on Enlightenment thought by placing sovereignty 
in the hands of the nation and establishing basic inalienable rights promised through 
natural law.  While the document’s intention was to provide the core political and 
institutional basis for the French state, the universalistic principles it espoused rapidly 
found resonance with many non-French individuals.  As Albert Soboul states, the 
“Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” laid “the foundations of a new social 
order which seemed applicable not only to France but to the entire human race.”11 
 The events of the summer of 1789 electrified many foreigners as they flocked to 
Paris.  Thomas Christie, a Scottish radical who made repeated visits to France between 
1789–1791, asserted that “there was no revolution in France in 1789” but rather an event 
of global proportions, “a closing scene of a revolution that had been the work of an 
age.”12  Over the months following the Bastille’s fall and the “Declaration’s” passage a 
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wide variety of foreign radicals arrived in Paris, drawn by the Revolution’s promise.  
Some were already experienced revolutionaries, such as Thomas Paine, hero of the 
American Revolution and famed author of Common Sense.  For Paine, the French 
Revolution represented a continuation of the assault the American Revolution had begun 
on monarchical tyranny, a global crusade in the name of natural law and republican 
government.
13
  Cloots, who deemed the Revolution “the most noble revolution in 
history,” shared Paine’s universalistic conception of its significance.14  Swiss refugees 
from the failed Fribourg uprising also hurried to Paris to give their support to the 
revolutionaries.
15
  This group established a political club in early 1790 that publically 
expressed its loyalty to the new French order and their view that all nations should 
support and follow France’s example.  For these non-French revolutionaries, 1789 
marked the inauguration of a broader revolutionary movement to be assisted and nurtured 
in France so that it might eventually spread throughout the world. 
 Other foreigners, establishing the model for subsequent generations who came to 
Paris, “viewed the Revolution in the light of their own aspirations.”16  A young Nikolai 
Karamzin, present in Paris during the second half of 1789, initially viewed the 
Revolution as offering a possible model of constitutional monarchy Russia could 
emulate.
17
  Several émigrés from the German lands, such as Georg Kerner, shared similar 
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sentiments, hoping that the Revolution’s initial support of liberal monarchy could force 
similar changes across the Rhine.
18
  More radical in sentiment, the professional soldier 
and physician François Amédée Doppet came from Savoy, hoping that the Revolution 
would provide a vehicle for spreading purely republican forms of government beyond 
France’s borders.  For many foreigners flocking to Paris, the Revolution presented a 
model that could be actualized within France and then exported to their countries of 
origin. 
 While some foreigners viewed the Revolution purely as a means of realizing 
political change only, others came to Paris due to its potential to challenge both existing 
political and social conventions.  The British novelist and poet Helen Maria Williams 
represents one of several foreign feminists drawn to the Revolution’s capital due to the 
possibilities it presented for attacking the existing order that denied women equal agency.  
First arriving in early 1790, Williams frequented salons discussing women’s issues, as 
well as attending the Fête de la Fédération held on the anniversary of the Bastille’s fall.  
Describing the experience, she related “this was not a time in which the distinctions of 
country were remembered…it was a triumph of human kind…and it required but the 
common feeling of humanity to become in that moment a citizen of the world.”19   
 Similarly attracted by the Revolution’s promise of universal emancipation was 
William’s fellow Briton and feminist activist Mary Wollstonecraft.  Though not arriving 
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in France until late 1792, Wollstonecraft became deeply engaged in advocating for the 
Revolution with her 1790 publication of A Vindication of the Rights of Man.  Publically 
responding to Edmund Burke’s critique of the Revolution and its defenders, 
Wollstonecraft asserted that the Revolution’s promotion of republican principles 
represented a huge step forward for mankind and represented the realization of the 
Enlightenment vision of just government.
20
  Influenced further by the Revolution’s 
debates regarding women’s education and natural rights, she followed with her 1792 
essay A Vindication of the Rights of Women that tied revolutionary republicanism to an 
expansion of rights for women.  Viewing the declaration of a French republic in 
September 1792 as a moment when theory might be brought into practice, Wollstonecraft 
traveled to Paris two months later.  Upon her arrival, she established contact with 
Williams and became a frequenter of her salons along with Thomas Paine, the Latin 
American revolutionary Francisco de Miranda, and other non-French radicals, as well as 
prominent members of the Girondist faction.
21
  For early European feminists, Paris and 
the Revolution presented a universalistic language that called for the political and social 
equality of all people without any reference to gender.  These early efforts established a 
model that subsequent generations of émigré feminists would emulate.  
 This migration of foreign radicals initially enjoyed widespread support from the 
revolutionary community within Paris.  Some hoped to draw upon the experience and 
expertise of these foreign radicals, hoping to benefit from the “moral and intellectual 
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cross-pollination which would result.”22  Both Mirabeau and Lafayette established groups 
of foreign intellectuals, particularly those with experience in the American Revolution, to 
help formulate laws and policies for France’s new Constituent Assembly.23  Other French 
revolutionaries took a more paternalistic and slightly condescending attitude, viewing 
their role “as the instructor of nations, as the protectors of the oppressed,” thus seeing “in 
every foreigner…a brother, a slightly inferior brother to whom they would be the 
charitable and generous tutors…all those who suffered for the cause of liberty became 
their dearest friends.”24  While this latter category of French radicals embraced the same 
universalistic elements that drew foreign adherents, they emphasized to émigrés that only 
by working for the Revolution’s success in France would they be able to see its virtues 
spread to their respective homelands.   
 This emphasis illustrates the great paradox of the Revolution in terms of its 
relationship with foreign radicals.  Without question most French revolutionaries 
believed, at least initially, their cause to be that of all mankind, hence their welcoming to 
Paris like-mind individuals from throughout Europe and the Americas.  As Rodgers 
Brubaker notes, the early Revolution took France’s pre-1789 cosmopolitanism, “recast it 
in ideological terms… (and) invested it with a missionary fervor.”  At the same time, the 
Revolution, beginning with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, vested sovereignty in 
the collective hands of the nation, thus giving birth to modern nationalism and national 
identity.  This concept of the nation, according to Brubaker, “constructed new boundaries 
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and sharpened antagonisms between nations.”  Thus while on one hand claiming to act in 
the interests of all mankind, the French revolutionaries’ political principles called upon 
them to act first in the interest of France’s body politic, composed exclusively of the 
French people.  Reconciling this definition of the nation (which lacked clear articulation 
at this historical moment) with the universalism of the Revolution’s principles created at 
times tension that could not easily be reconciled, thus complicating the status of Paris’s 
foreign radical community as the political situation became more unstable.
25
 
 The outbreak of war with Austria and Prussia in April 1792 began a 
reconfiguration of the relationship between the French revolutionaries and the 
Revolution’s non-French adherents.  As would later be the case in September 1870, 
foreign foes placed Paris, and subsequently, the Revolution, in danger.  However, in 1792 
the ideological connections between French and international radicals lacked the 
sophistication and shared history that would temper French chauvinism during the 
Prussian Siege and Commune eight decades later.  The place of non-French radicals did 
not change immediately.  Indeed, the early months of the war saw some of these foreign 
revolutionaries rise in prominence, particularly those who offered their service or 
attacked France’s enemies in writing.  The Girondists drew many of these individuals to 
their ranks, including several from Prussia and the Habsburg lands, and encouraged them 
to spread pro-Revolution propaganda and even serve in the revolutionary army.  Albert 
Mathiez, commenting on this policy, asserts that “foreigners were never more pampered, 
more exalted than in that moment of history…when (they) were engaged in a fight to the 
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death with their countries of origin.”26  While these actions kept many non-French 
radicals in the revolutionaries’ good graces, they illustrate a movement away from 
cosmopolitanism toward an emphasis on France’s national interests. 
 Further evidence of the increasing tension between the Revolution’s growing 
nationalism and the role of Paris’s non-French radicals came in late August and early 
September of 1792 when, just as France transitioned to a republic, a large group of these 
foreigners were granted naturalized French citizenship.  According to the decree issued 
on August 26, 1792, “these men, who by their writing and by their courage, have served 
the cause of liberty and prepared the liberation of peoples, cannot be regarded as 
foreigners.”27  In some cases, such as with George Washington and James Madison, this 
constituted a wholly symbolic act.  However, with those who prominently participated in 
the Revolution within France, such as Paine, Cloots, Joseph Priestly, and John Oswald, 
this represented an attempt to preserve the Revolution’s internationalist character even as 
patriotic sentiment grew.  When Paine won election to the Convention soon after, his 
supporters even began addressing him with the French surname of Penne.
28
  This growing 
political transformation, coupled with a deteriorating military situation, served to place 
Paris’s non-French radical community in a complicated and potentially precarious 
position. 
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 For foreign radicals, the moment of true crisis arrived in early 1793, as a 
combination of military defeats and domestic discord pressed the Revolution in a more 
militant, nationalistic, and xenophobic direction.  The Jacobin-dominated Convention, 
driven in part by the demands of the Parisian masses’ for more stringent security 
measures, began viewing foreigners, including those who had loyally served the 
Revolution, as enemy nationals and potential foreign agents.  While accusations of this 
sort targeting non-French radicals occurred later during the Prussian Siege in 1870 and 
the Commune in 1871, the measures taken in 1793 constituted a rather draconian policy 
shift by the revolutionary government aimed against foreigners, including many ardent 
supporters.  During the early months of 1793, non-French radicals in Paris and beyond 
were subjected to government surveillance, ordered to carry special passports, and placed 
under a separate and harsher criminal code than French citizens.  Initially, those capable 
of proving their devotion to the Revolution were exempted.
29
  Moreover, the Constitution 
of 1793, ratified in late June, contained language that appeared to confirm the 
Revolution’s cosmopolitan spirit regarding foreign radicals who adhered to its principles.  
Beyond establishing a low threshold for becoming a naturalized citizen through work or 
marriage, this Constitution also contained a provision declaring that “every alien whom 
the legislative body has declared as one well deserving of the human race, are admitted to 
exercise the rights of a French citizen.”30 
 Despite this inclusive language, within weeks of the Constitution’s passage the 
situation of non-French radicals in Paris significantly worsened as the Convention’s 
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Jacobins moved to purge the Girondist faction.  Since the Girondists’ emergence in late 
1791, many prominent émigrés allied themselves with this faction, drawn by both its 
universalistic revolutionary rhetoric and its relative moderation on questions of political 
restructuring.  Both Thomas Paine and Anacharsis Cloots actively collaborated with its 
members in the Convention on a variety of issues, while others, such as Helen Maria 
Williams and Mary Wollstonecraft, established informal connections with the faction 
through Paris’s salon network.  Driven by the Jacobins from the Convention in early 
June, the leading Girondists found themselves arrested and charged with treason in late 
July, with the majority of them going to the guillotine in late October 1793.
31
  The violent 
political discord within Paris, coupled with reverses on the battlefield and rural 
reactionary revolts, placed the Parisian pro-revolutionary émigré community in a highly 
precarious position.  In this fluid environment, “the fate of foreigners…was increasingly 
linked to their political reliability… (and) many foreigners had already become 
associated with politicians whose ideas and behavior were to be discredited by crisis and 
betrayal.”32 
 This moment of political and military crisis produced a patriotic impulse that 
rapidly transformed into outright xenophobia and ended Paris’s initial manifestation as an 
intentional revolutionary center.  The harsh policies toward foreigners introduced in early 
1793 were supplemented by outright draconian measures, such as the August 1 decree 
calling for the arrest of all subjects of nations at war with France who had arrived since 
1789.  Foreign volunteer units serving within the French military, once gladly welcomed, 
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were disbanded and saw many from their ranks arrested.
33
  Though at first exempted due 
to their prominence, leading figures within Paris’s foreign radical community soon fell 
victim to the xenophobic fervor.  Several English radicals, including Helen Maria 
Williams, were arrested in October and imprisoned in the Palais Luxembourg.  Mary 
Wollstonecraft, understanding the consequences of her Girondist connections, fled Paris 
to avoid arrest and settled in the countryside with her American lover, who protected her 
from arrest by claiming her as his wife and thus an American citizen.
34
 
Even those holding positions within the French government did not escape the 
purge of non-French nationals.  In mid-December, the Convention expelled all foreigners 
from its ranks and from any position within the government.  Soon after, the Committee 
of Public Safety ordered Thomas Paine’s arrest and imprisonment, beginning a ten month 
ordeal that brought him close to the guillotine several times and only ended when 
American intervention secured his release.
35
  Anacharsis Cloots, arrested at the same time 
as Paine, proved far less fortunate.  Confined to a dank cell at the Luxembourg, the 
“orator of the human race” found himself implicated in the false “foreign plot” that 
brought down the Hébertists and was guillotined in March 1794.  Though a handful of 
foreign radicals maintained their positions (mostly within the French Army), by early 
1794 the fate of Cloots and others drove most non-French revolutionaries out of Paris, 
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aware that xenophobic patriotism and political violence had, for the moment, 
extinguished the city’s transformative and universalist promise. 
While many non-French radicals hoped for a return to the Revolution’s more 
cosmopolitan spirit following Thermidor, a general distrust of foreigners remained 
prevalent in Paris and beyond even after the Committee of Public Safety’s removal.  
Imprisoned foreign radicals, such as Paine, found themselves excluded from the mass 
release of political prisoners following Robespierre’s overthrow.  Indeed, the French 
government did not free the final wave of émigrés taken by the Jacobins during the 
Terror until July 1795.
36
  This reality stemmed primarily from the continued pressures of 
war, which manifested themselves within Paris in the form of spiraling prices and 
periodic food shortages.  In this environment, foreigners, regardless of their sympathies, 
could only move freely in the capital with a visa issued by each district’s government.  
The Constitution of 1795 (Year III) further reinforced this move away from 
cosmopolitanism.  Dispensing with the universalistic language that characterized the 
Revolution’s early halcyon days, this document eliminated the idea of “honorary and 
political naturalization as a special reward or compensation for service to the nation” and 
thus subjected all foreigners, regardless of ideological persuasion, to the same level of 
scrutiny.
37
  While Paris endured as a revolutionary symbol, it became, in terms of day to 
day reality under the Directory, a site cool and, at times, hostile toward non-French 
radicals and foreigners in general.  The final closing of Paris’s first manifestation as a 
revolutionary center came with Napoleon Bonaparte’s seizure of power.  His Civil Code 
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introduced a model for the treatment of foreigners very close to that which had existed 
prior to 1789, where economic benefit, rather than ideology, dictated who would find 
welcome in Paris or anywhere else in France.
38
 
While events conspired to end Paris’s initial moment as an international 
revolutionary center, the legacy of that period firmly established the French capital as the 
epicenter of radicalism for Europe and beyond.  As Eric Hobsbawm states in his classic 
Age of Revolution, Paris, as the “Cockpit of the Revolution,” not only “provided the 
vocabulary and issues of liberal and radical democratic politics for most of the world,” 
but also established “the pattern for all subsequent revolutionary movements, its lessons 
being incorporated into modern socialism and communism.”39  This universalistic 
transformative promise could not fail to draw international radicals of all stripes, who 
viewed Paris as a site to negotiate and realize their own ideological projects.   
However, tension between the Revolution’s principles and the European political 
environment in which it operated served to constrain Paris’s capacity to function as a 
genuine transnational radical center.  As discussed above, war and internal division had, 
by 1792, pushed the Revolution in the direction of xenophobic policies driven by 
excessive patriotism and the perceived need for internal security.  One outcome of this 
was the eventual targeting of non-French radicals like Paine.  More fundamentally, this 
sweeping nascent nationalism produced a new political order by 1793, one no longer 
capable of promoting the inclusive model of revolutionary change foreign radicals 
envisioned in 1789.  While many of the initial expressions of universalism were genuine, 
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for the Jacobins and their allies, “French revolutionary universalism had been mainly a 
matter of rhetoric…nationalism had become dominant in the Revolution itself.”40  This 
ultimately meant that, rather than providing an origin point for radical, participatory 
liberation, Paris instead turned to France’s revolutionary armies to spread the ideals of 
Liberté, Egalité, and Fraternité under the aegis of the bayonet.  What would be required 
were new forms of identity arising from economic change, intellectual development, as 
well as the Revolution itself, for Paris to be perceived as not just the site of revolutionary 
conception but also the incubator of transnational radical change.  
The Revolution Renewed: Paris from 1830 to 1848 
Revolutionary nationalism had, by the end of the 1790s, greatly limited Paris’s 
revolutionary magnetism.  The Bourbon Restoration, coming amid a continental tide of 
reaction, further reduced the city’s pull on non-French radicals but did not extinguish it 
entirely.  Even during this reactionary period, foreign radicals from failed revolutions in 
Portugal, Naples, and Piedmont sought haven in Paris and used the French capital as a 
base for furthering their respective clandestine agendas.
41
  Moreover, this relative 
political quietude proved as short-lived as the return of the fleur-de-lis.  Institutional 
discord, economic depression, and ill-advised repression fired a new surge of rebellious 
spirit within Paris, culminating in an outbreak of revolt and brief street-fighting in July 
1830.  While debate continues over whether “The Three Glorious Days” constituted a 
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simple regime change or a genuine revolution, 1830 unquestionably inaugurated the 
resurgence of Paris’s role as Europe’s radical center.   
Already during the July Days, Paris’s émigré population played a small but 
notable role.  According to several accounts, a mixed party of Piedmontese, Italians, 
Neapolitans, Spaniards, and Poles actively participated in the fighting.  Their main body, 
under the command of General Guillaume de Vaudancourt, clashed with royalist forces 
near la Place de Grève.  “Exiled for their political opinions,” these foreign radicals, 
according to a sympathetic French observer, viewed revolution in France as spurring 
change in their respective states and were thus willing to make themselves “martyrs in the 
cause of liberty.”42  In his memoirs, the Marquis de Lafayette recognized these 
contributions and asserted that the new Orleanist regime had, as a result, “sacred duties to 
fulfil toward foreigners of several nations” that had fought alongside the Parisian 
insurgents in 1830.  These duties not only included providing financial support and 
guaranteeing “certain natural rights of which foreigners should not be deprived,” but also 
encouraging them in their efforts to promote political change in their respective countries 
on a model similar to that being realized in post-1830 France.  For Lafayette, 1830 and 
what he referred to as the “Principles of July” meant a reassertion of the universalistic 
ideals for which he had fought during both the American and French Revolutions.
43
  
Though the Orleanist Government moved rapidly to extinguish such revolutionary 
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sentiments, Lafayette’s interpretation of 1830, whether correct or not, mirrored that of a 
new wave of non-French radicals that gravitated into the French capital during the early 
1830s. 
As was the case in 1789, this new wave of political immigrants initially shared 
little in terms of ideological unity aside from holding adversarial positions toward both 
their respective national and the general European status quo.  The already-mentioned 
Spanish and Italian émigrés shared the same general liberalism and commitment to 
constitutional rule exhibited by the French Orleanists.  From the German lands, 
republican-minded nationalists flocked to the French capital, hoping to rekindle the same 
fire that had spread eastward following the Great Revolution.  Members of the Young 
Germans movement hoped to export a republican nationalism that would both liberalize 
and unify the German lands.  Exemplifying these sentiments, Heinrich Heine traveled to 
Paris in early 1831, asserting “Liberty is the new religion, the religion of our day .... The 
French are the chosen people of that religion…Paris is the new Jerusalem, and the Rhine 
is the Jordan which separates the holy land of liberty from the country of the 
Philistines."
44
  Other German activists followed, particularly as government repression of 
their activities intensified in 1832.  Many of these Germans became deeply immersed in 
Parisian radicalism in the hopes of eventually exporting a revolutionary model more in 
line with their politics. 
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Though Germans constituted a substantial number of the post-1830 influx, Paris’s 
largest expatriate community had its origins beyond both the Rhine and the Oder.  
Despite the partition and disappearance of the Polish state in 1795, the idea of a Polish 
nation endured in the aspirations of its population, which waited for a political 
opportunity to throw off their foreign, particularly Russian, yoke.  In November 1830, the 
model of the July Revolution and the rumor that Russia planned to use Polish soldiers to 
intervene in France prompted an uprising in Warsaw that quickly spread throughout 
Poland.  Despite some early Polish successes, Russia’s overwhelming manpower left the 
ultimate outcome in little doubt.  In the early fall of 1831 the Russian Army crushed the 
last vestiges of Polish resistance.  However, nearly 7500 Poles refused to accept defeat 
and renewed Russian subjugation and fled abroad.  Given the role the Parisian example 
played in prompting the uprising, over 6000 of these Polish exiles settled within the 
French capital and rapidly established an active émigré community dedicated to 
promoting Poland’s eventual liberation.45  Despite sharing this overarching purpose, 
Paris’s Polish community stood divided from the onset over the political form they 
envisioned for a free Polish state.  A small minority, primarily drawn from the old 
aristocracy, rallied behind Prince Adam Czartoryski, whom they viewed as Poland’s 
virtual king-in-exile.  The vast majority opposed establishing a monarchy and, drawing 
on the influence of both 1789 and 1830, advocated for a Poland governed on more liberal 
and republican principles.  In March 1832, these Polish émigrés founded the Polish 
Democratic Society in Paris.  Like the Young Germans, these Poles rapidly established 
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contacts among Parisian radicals and thus found themselves heavily involved in the city’s 
political upheavals stemming from dissatisfaction with the post-1830 political order.
46
 
The post-1830 émigré wave, fired by the images of the “Three Glorious Days” on 
the barricades, found a very different mood than they anticipated upon their respective 
arrivals in Paris.  The workers, young intellectuals, and republicans who viewed the July 
Revolution as marking a rekindling of the “spirit of 1789” quickly became disillusioned 
with the Louis-Phillip regime.  According to Mark Traugott, by 1831 this cooling 
developed into “simmering political discontent, especially among young republicans, 
who felt that they had spilled their blood on the 1830 barricades only to have their 
revolution stolen by a coterie of opportunists” uninterested in any real reforms in terms of 
furthering popular participation in politics.
47
  While Parisian workers also resented the 
lack of political change, their discontent primarily stemmed from the failure of the July 
Monarchy to institute measures aimed at substantially improving their material 
conditions.  Specifically, they expected their service on the barricades to translate into 
policies aimed at helping “the poor in more structured ways, such as a defense of workers 
associations” and aid in dealing with their employers.  What they witnessed was the 
Orleanist regime openly siding with employers and wealthy interests and using troops to 
break up protests and strikes.
48
  Given these realities, there developed an overwhelming 
sense among Parisian radicals that the revolution had not yet managed to achieve the 
necessary changes they believed they were fighting for on the barricades.  For many of 
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the foreign radicals coming to Paris in the hopes of exporting a model for revolutionary 
change, this required a choice: remain aloof and focus on their own particular aspirations 
or commit to supporting their Parisian comrades and hope that their victory would mark 
an international tide of change. 
On the surface these circumstances appear similar to those that first drew émigrés 
to Paris in 1789, an effort that ultimately failed as revolutionary cosmopolitanism gave 
way to the fervent patriotism and anti-foreign sentiment of 1792.  However, political 
conditions in the early 1830s differed in several important respects.  First, unlike in 1792, 
the Parisians with whom foreign radicals hoped to make common cause operated not just 
outside of government but also in direct opposition to the existing regime within France.  
Thus, the focus centered not on a perceived non-French threat but rather the political 
order within, meaning émigrés bore no stigma in the eyes of Paris’s radical opposition.  
Though the secret societies that developed immediately after 1830 were, in the words of 
Pamela Pilbeam, “self-consciously” Robespierrist and Jacobin, this only referred to their 
republican principles and not to their view of foreigners.  Indeed, one of the most 
prominent of these Parisian groups, the Society of the Rights of Man, developed 
connections with the Polish Democratic Society and other similar foreign political 
organizations within the city.
49
  Taken by itself, this inclusive spirit among Parisian 
radicals can be viewed simply as a political opposition that attempted to rally anyone 
willing to aid in realizing political change.  However, the more internationalist spirit 
uniting Parisian and foreign radicals in the early 1830s drew on a larger transnational 
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political and social discourse that to some extent drew upon Revolutionary legacies 
which eventually would redefine Paris’s broader revolutionary importance. 
This discourse centered on a language of opposition beginning to develop among 
radicals throughout Europe, one that showed signs of evolving into a transnational sense 
of identity.  In twentieth-century Communist historiography (though not in the works of 
Marx himself), this development was easily identified, with 1830 viewed as marking the 
first manifestations of the proletariat as a political force, though one still operating in 
conjunction with the lower echelons of the bourgeoisie.  This of course came about as 
industrialization transformed material conditions and developed working class 
consciousness.  However, the economic realities within both France and continental 
Europe at that time provide no support for this thesis, given the very limited degree of 
industrialization and the continued predominance of shop-level production.
50
   
This does not mean that economics played no role in the growth of a transnational 
radical consciousness.  While full-scale industrialization and true proletarianization did 
not become a general trend on the Continent until the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
artisans and small-scale workers still experienced changes that threatened both their 
positions and wages.  Growing consumer demand, as well as competition from England, 
led many European producers to turn away from making items to order and instead 
concentrate on “lower quality, standardized, ready-to-wear or ready-to-use items that 
could be produced more efficiently and sold at a lower price.”51  Given that much of this 
work could be done by workers with limited training, this new approach to production 
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threatened the status and wages of artisans.  Moreover, legal changes by the early 
nineteenth century, with their greater emphasis on individual property rights, removed 
nearly all of the protections artisans and their crafts had enjoyed under the Old Regime.  
William Sewell, summing up the situation for these artisans and small scale producers 
during the early nineteenth century, concludes that while artisans “were still proud, 
numerous, and essential to the function of the economy…they were also financially 
squeezed, threatened with a loss of skill and status, and provided with virtually no legal 
form of collective defense against…the free market.”52 
While these economic concerns account in part for the radicalism of artisans and 
other small-scale laborers, they still do not explain how Parisian workers and other non-
laboring radicals came to embrace a common cause.  Beyond the shared economic 
uncertainties, the post-1830 order also produced a shared experience of political 
exclusion which served to produce a common language for early-nineteenth-century 
European radicals.  For Parisian radicals, this discourse developed out of the resentment 
stemming from the July Revolution’s unfulfilled promise.  Tony Judt, addressing the 
origins of this identity, characterizes the process as follows: 
Given that nothing had altered overnight in the varied nature of French industrial 
life, it follows that it was specifically political experience (and lessons) of 1830 
which lay behind the rapid growth in collective identification.  It is a cliché to 
note that the events of July 1830 aroused great optimism and hope which were 
almost immediately dampened down…Yet as such clichés go, it is remarkably to 
the point…everywhere…there was a reference to the disappointments of those 
years and the realization that the working population must now act alone, and on 
its own behalf.
53
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This concept of identity formation through shared political exclusion appeared in all 
strata of Parisian radicals.  Sewell, in his study of the language of labor, states that 
workers in the aftermath of 1830 came to view political rights as fundamental to their 
efforts to associate and organize their own labor.  He further contends that demands for 
these rights to form their own associations “became compatible with a certain 
interpretation of liberty” drawn from the principles articulated during the French 
Revolution.
54
  Thus, though these workers sought the redress of economic and social ills, 
they viewed political change, given their exclusion by the Orleanist regime, as an 
essential mechanism to realizing their goals.  This emphasis united them with the radical 
Republican movement (whose primary focus had also been the political) by early 1832.  
As Sewell states, this political oppositionist identity created “a confluence of interests, 
ideas and activities that joined the most radical of the Parisian republicans to the most 
militant of the Parisian workingmen” in a unified front against the July Monarchy and the 
elite political and economic order it was viewed as representing.
55
  
 This oppositional basis of belief readily appealed to the non-French radicals, who, 
though drawn to Paris by its perceived post-1830 revolutionary potential, came with their 
own specific sets of aspirations.  However, unlike the situation in 1789, they found 
themselves operating within a Parisian radical community attempting to seize the reins of 
power rather than actively being involved in the process of transforming discourse into 
governance and policy.  This unburdened émigrés from reformulating their own 
ideological projects to correspond precisely with the goals of French radicals (who were 
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themselves by no means united).  Coupled with the removal of 1792’s intensifying 
chauvinism, this produced a unity of purpose among Parisian and foreign radicals not 
previously seen.  Moreover, while divided on the specifics, the post-1830 émigré wave, 
as demonstrated by organizations such as the Polish Democratic Society and several 
German republican organizations, shared the Parisian radicals’ adherence to 
republicanism and their related demands for greater economic opportunity for all strata of 
society.
56
  While Paris’s revolutionary legacy still exercised a substantial pull on non-
French radicals, the tensions that had existed between French and non-French radicals 
during the Great Revolution no longer existed, and thus allowed them to form much more 
substantial bonds with their French counterparts within the city. 
 This new sense of post-1830 ideological solidarity and common cause between 
Paris’s French and non-French radicals was not simply a matter of joint discussions and 
declarations in cafés and backroom meetings.  A toxic political environment existed in 
the French capital by early 1832, driven by a growing and deepening discontent aimed at 
the perceived unfulfilled promises of the Orleanist regime.  This popular discontent 
boiled over on June 5, 1832, as the funeral of the popular Bonapartist-turned-republican 
General Maximilien Lamarque transformed into a full-scale but short-lived uprising 
against Louis Phillip’s government.  Even before the first barricades were erected, non-
French radicals constituted a visible and active component within the revolt.  Heinrich 
Heine, a sympathetic but passive observer, recounts that both Polish and Italian 
expatriates spoke at the General’s funeral alongside such popular figures as Lafayette just 
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prior to the outbreak of violence.
57
  Heine later identified German radicals among those 
defending a barricade in the area of Saint-Martin, serving beside their French 
counterparts in clashes with loyal National Guardsmen and garrison soldiers.
58
  Though 
the last barricades fell to the French Army the next day, this brief uprising served to 
demonstrate both the depth of interaction between Paris’s French and non-French 
radicals, as well as the latter’s level of commitment to supporting revolution in Paris as a 
key step in realizing their own aspirations.  When two years later the barricades went up 
again (albeit on a much smaller scale) the pattern of foreign expatriate involvement 
repeated itself, demonstrating that the ties established in 1831–1832 continued to hold 
among Parisian radicals of various nationalities.
59
  Clearly, a tie of both ideology and 
shared revolutionary experience had been established between nationals and non-
nationals within the capital’s radical circles. 
 Given the failure of the 1832 and 1834 uprisings, both French and non-French 
radicals in Paris turned away (at least for the moment) from emphasizing revolt as a 
means of realizing revolutionary change.  However, this by no means limited Paris’s pull 
on revolutionary-minded individuals throughout the Continent and beyond.  The influx of 
politically-minded expatriates and exiles actually accelerated by the early 1840s, reaching 
such a degree that scholars have described Paris during the pre-1848 period as “the 
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revolutionary capital of Europe” and the “Mecca of the Malcontents.”60  While the 
revolutionary tradition and Paris’s primacy in 1789 can account for this in part, other 
factors, reflecting broader movements in radical ideological development, were also in 
play in France’s capital by the mid-1830s.    
 During the upheavals of the early 1830s, it became apparent that a shared political 
culture and set of political aspirations unified Parisian radicals from both French and 
foreign backgrounds.  Unquestionably, these common principles found expression, as 
Judt notes, within the tenets of the revolutionary “catechism” inherited from 1789 and 
1792, providing a rough model demanding “that power…be transferred at a single 
moment in time, and by a highly ritualized process of collective action.”  This model 
further asserted that the institution of an impersonal dictatorship, guided by the popular 
will, constituted an essential element of any radical seizure of power by the people.
61
  
However, this blueprint failed miserably in 1832 and 1834, leading Parisian radicals to 
examine critically their approach to imagining and realizing revolutionary change. 
 Though the model of 1789 remained highly influential among both French and 
non-French radicals, intense debates began raging over the applicability of the 
revolutionary model to conditions in the nineteenth century.  It was this discourse, 
centered primarily in Paris, that first brought the term socialism into currency, first 
defined by the Saint-Simonian Pierre Leroux in his 1834 pamphlet “Individualism and 
Socialism” as “the Doctrine which will sacrifice none of the terms of the formula: 
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Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, Unity, but which reconciles them all.”62  Though other 
prominent early socialist thinkers, including Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc, and Etienne 
Cabet, agreed with such a concept in principle, they expressed strong reservations about 
accepting the revolutionary tradition as inalterable scripture for societal transformation, 
given its emphasis on conflict and the use of violence to realize social change.  These 
thinkers “claimed to be in pursuit of harmony, association and mutualism, all to be gained 
through cooperation, not conflict.”63  Though not explicitly socialist, many republicans, 
though drawing inspiration from the Great Revolution, also questioned the use of 
revolutionary violence and advocated for political and social change by other means. 
 Others, though still viewing themselves as operating within this new socialist 
discourse, held that the French Revolution’s model still provided the surest way of 
establishing a more just order.  Guiding these individuals were the writings of Philippe 
Buonarroti, an Italian noble who as a young man had served the Jacobins and participated 
in Gracchus Babeuf’s failed “Conspiracy of Equals” in 1796.  After spending the ensuing 
decades in various European cities, Buonarroti returned to Paris only weeks after the July 
Revolution and began compiling an account of his experiences during the Great 
Revolution.  His book, widely distributed both before and following his death in 1837, 
provided a blueprint for those who viewed the Jacobins and Robespierre’s policies as a 
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revolutionary model universally applicable at all historical moments.
64
  Auguste Blanqui, 
internalizing Buonarroti’s brand of radicalism after meeting him in 1832, was obsessed 
with the Jacobin model and became the foremost advocate of organized, clandestine 
revolutionary action to realize a socialist republic.
65
   
 This growing prominence of a socialist discourse among Parisian radical circles 
marked a pivotal moment for non-French radicals within the city.  While the various 
shades of “utopian,” cooperative and revolutionary socialism contained diverse and often 
contradictory elements, all presented a revolutionary critique of the modern political 
economy.  Though Paris in the 1830s and 1840s housed few proletarians in the Marxian 
sense, the city’s numerous artisans and tradesmen, as well as its general laborers, felt 
threatened by the changing economic system prompted by the transnational capitalist 
order.  As Sewell notes, these workers found themselves “financially squeezed, 
threatened with a loss of skill and status, and provided with virtually no legal form of 
collective defense against the disordering forces of the free market.”66  Non-French 
radicals and general immigrants underwent the same experiences as many French 
workers, given that most foreigners in Paris “lacked alternative means of support and had 
to accept whatever form of employment presented itself…(thus) blending in with the 
much larger mass of…artisans.”67  By observing, interacting, or experiencing this 
economic reality, early socialists in Paris developed a critical discourse that asserted “not 
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merely that capitalism was unjust, but that it appeared to work badly and, insofar as it 
worked, to produce the opposite results to those predicted by its champions,” which 
clearly resonated with workers and radicals alike.
68
   
 This emergent socialist discourse made it possible to tie Paris’s revolutionary 
tradition to an explicitly transnational critique.  For non-French and French radicals alike, 
such discourse created space for a reimagining of the city’s revolutionary potential, 
uncoupled from both 1789’s vague internationalism or 1792’s explicitly French 
Jacobinism.  Though a substantial portion of French radicals, including many republicans 
and Robespierrians like Blanqui, continued to draw both inspiration and direction from 
the past, others began to view Paris’s revolutionary potential through a much more 
expansive ideological lens.  For these individuals, both foreign and French, Paris’s 
revolutionary symbolism established the city as the best launching point for realizing 
radical change throughout the Continent and beyond.  While socialists initially posited 
this vision of Paris’s transformative potential, the denationalizing of the French capital’s 
revolutionary tradition could and would be used by other radicals potentially to promote 
their own respective agendas. 
 Reimagining Paris’s broader revolutionary significance outside of traditional 
French parameters did not mean an end to active collaboration between non-French 
radicals and their Parisian counterparts.  Paris’s serving as an international revolutionary 
catalyst necessitated first realizing revolution within both the city and France, meaning 
that those with differing ideological visions still shared a very immediate common cause.  
Thus, throughout the 1830s and 1840s French and non-French radicals continued to 
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operate within the same Parisian radical networks, producing a vibrant exchange where 
ideas and philosophies were formed, challenged, and reformulated by virtue of a lively 
discourse. 
 Indeed, Paris during this period offered a further draw beyond its long-established 
position as Europe’s revolutionary epicenter.  For foreign radicals and intellectuals, Paris 
under the Louis Phillipe regime offered a relative oasis of official tolerance in 
comparison to the continent’s other capitals and cities, despite its troubling exclusionary 
policies on suffrage and pro-business biases.  Organizations, meetings, and publications 
that drew rapid police repression elsewhere generated much more moderate responses 
from the Orleanist police, who often (though not always) contented themselves with 
observation and note-taking.
69
  Non-French radicals of various nationalities took great 
advantage of these more relaxed policies.  For German radicals, Paris between 1834 and 
the early 1840s hosted a succession of revolutionary socialist organizations; beginning 
with Theodore Schuster’s League of the Outlaws and followed (as the police cracked 
down on each) by the League of Germans and the League of the Just.
70
  The Polish 
Democratic Society, which enjoyed the French government’s tacit support, drew even 
more Poles from through Europe during this period.  At the same time, more 
revolutionary offshoots, such as Polish People, offered more socialistic models for 
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Poland’s liberation.71  The result of this foreign influx mixing with established French 
radical networks was, according to Isaiah Berlin, a period for Paris “during which a richer 
international traffic in ideas, theories and personal sentiments was carried on…more 
striking and more articulate than at any time since the Renaissance.”72 
 This moment, combining Paris’s established revolutionary significance with its 
growing transnational potential, drew several individuals whose works would eventually 
define international radical thought and practice.  Their presence and interaction in Paris 
during the formative periods in their respective careers illustrates both the vibrancy of the 
city’s discourse as well as its centrality to the growing European socialist movement.  
The first, a twenty-five year old academic and lapsing Hegelian, arrived in October 1843 
and established himself and his wife at 23 Rue Vaneau.  Karl Marx came to Paris to 
examine French politics and economics, as well as the continued influence of the 
revolutionary tradition.  His two years within the city and its environment proved 
transformative, marking, according to Berlin, the most “decisive” moment in his life and 
his final departure from Hegelianism in favor of historical materialism, socialism, and, 
ultimately, Communism.
73
   
 In addition to facilitating his intellectual transition from “philosopher to social 
theorist,” Paris also brought Marx into contact with several other prominent French and 
non-French radicals, leading to exchanges that aided in delineating the future trajectory 
of the international socialist movement.  His work on a German émigré newspaper for 
fellow German Arnold Ruge first brought him into contact with the Russian émigré 
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Mikhail Bakunin.  Travelling in similar circles in Paris, both men enjoyed a friendly 
relationship due to shared general principles; the deep ideological differences that would 
eventually tear international socialism asunder lay in the future.
74
  During this same 
period Marx also encountered another future opponent, the mutualist/cooperative French 
socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.  However, the most significant meeting for both Marx 
and the future of international radicalism occurred in Paris on August 23, 1844, at a café 
in Palais-Royal, when Marx first met his lifetime collaborator Friedrich Engels.
75
  While 
Marx’s time in Paris proved short, as he was expelled at the request of the Prussian 
government in February 1845, his presence, interactions, and the effect Paris had upon 
his ideological development illustrate the level of non-French and French collaboration 
during this period.  Further, the attraction the French capital held for socialism’s most 
prominent thinkers demonstrates its dual importance as a hallowed site of the 
revolutionary past and a potential starting point for a transnational revolutionary future. 
 By the mid-1840s, Paris unquestionably stood unchallenged as Europe’s 
revolutionary capital.  The legacy of 1789 combined with the French capital’s 
contemporary manifestation as a forum for intellectual exchange and political discontent 
in a manner that drew international radicals from all corners of the Continent and beyond.  
As one scholar quite aptly observes, during this period “everyone interested in the theory 
or practice of revolution was bound sooner or later to come to Paris.”76  So well 
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established was Paris’s place as Europe’s radical cradle that even foreign governments 
took notice.  The Czarist government declared the city completely “off limits” to its 
subjects and various German states began using “French influence” as a litmus test for 
identifying potential political malcontents.
77
  Thus, as the midpoint of the nineteenth 
century approached, both reactionaries and radicals from Madrid to Moscow shared at 
least one common view.  If and when Europe experienced a revolutionary conflagration, 
Paris would provide both the sparks and the tinder.  
Exporting the Revolution: Paris in 1848 
“The waves of the February Revolution rose high over the whole Continent, and each 
post brought a new bulletin of revolution, now from Italy, now from Germany, now from 
the remotest part of southeastern Europe.”78  So wrote Marx on the revolutionary storm 
that first broke in Paris and then spread across Europe in 1848.  For the French capital’s 
émigré community, this outbreak seemed to confirm their faith in both the city’s 
continued revolutionary potential and, equally important, the capacity to harness that 
energy and export it throughout the Continent to address their own respective 
revolutionary aspirations.  Furthermore, the fact that Paris’s revolutionary sentiment 
spread unencumbered by the national baggage it had carried during the Great Revolution 
seemed to herald a new, genuinely transnational moment in Europe’s revolutionary 
discourse. 
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 The period between 1846 and 1848 saw a series of a series of economic and 
agricultural crises that placed increasing strain on the Orleanist regime.  The long-
simmering issue of the limited franchise, coupled with the worsening conditions 
experienced by French workers, began manifesting in open discontent.  Barred from most 
forms of association, in July 1847 middle class liberals and republicans began organizing 
banquets as thinly veiled forums for protest against the government.  In Paris, various 
émigrés showed their support by joining these gatherings.  Poles from the Democratic 
Society attended several events, believing a republican France constituted the best means 
of realizing a free and republican Poland.  In October 1847, Friedrich Engels, acting as a 
correspondent for the English Chartist newspaper The Northern Star, travelled to the city 
and appeared at several Parisian banquets.  Inspired by the political activism he 
witnessed, he asserted that each banquet “was in every respect more like a demonstration 
of the strength, both in number and intellect, of democracy at Paris, than anything else.”79  
Clearly, Paris’s non-French radicals sensed the transformative and potentially 
revolutionary sentiments within these public protests and wished to play an active role in 
the unfolding events. 
 By early 1848, the Orleanist regime came to view this expanding banquet 
movement (now drawing artisans and even workers to the events) with growing alarm.  
Alexis de Tocqueville, speaking before the Chamber of Deputies on January 27, 1848, 
cautioned, “We are sleeping together in a volcano. ... A wind of revolution blows, the 
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storm is on the horizon.”80  An attempt in mid-February 1848 to ban banquets as illegal 
political gatherings resulted in mass protests on February 22.  By that evening barricades 
appeared throughout Paris, inaugurating two days of street fighting.  Though the violence 
was brief, Parisian émigrés, sensing the potential of the moment, moved rapidly to 
participate in the uprising.  At the very onset of fighting, Polish émigrés established 
themselves as firm supporters of the revolt.  The Central Committee of the Democratic 
Society proclaimed their support of the revolutionaries, asserting that they, like their 
French counterparts, were “true representatives of republican principles,” a commitment 
they soon demonstrated on the streets.  Polish volunteers, veterans of the fighting in 
Warsaw in 1830, successfully organized the taking of a police barricade near the Palais 
Royal.  Polish doctors set up triage stations just behind the barricades to care for the 
wounded.  So notable was the Polish contribution that one French newspaper wrote of 
“the conduct of a large number of Poles” whose actions “during our beautiful days” 
added “a glorious page…to the history of that nation.”81  Germans figured prominently in 
the street fighting, gaining experience that established them (in their own assessment) as 
“barricade victors.”82  Italian and Belgian émigrés offered their services as well and 
fought beside their French comrades.
83
  While no exact figure exists, contemporary 
accounts indicate that the number of non-French participants in the street fighting 
numbered in the thousands.
84
  Interpreting the February uprising as marking a 
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transformative political moment, Paris’s non-French radicals eagerly joined the fighting 
in the hopes that revolutionary change within France would soon cascade throughout the 
Continent. 
 On February 25, 1848, a mix of liberals, moderate republicans, and radicals 
proclaimed a provisional Second Republic at Paris’s Hôtel de Ville.  Both French and 
non-French radicals initially greeted this announcement with euphoria, invoking as it did 
the Great Revolution’s legacy by indirect reference to the First Republic of 1792.  
Orleanist limits on political expression and assembly were swept away by the new 
government, leading within days to a proliferation of new organizations.  Clubs, the 
hallmark of revolutionary Parisian political culture, rapidly proliferated in the French 
capital.  Among these groups were an array of émigré political organizations; with the 
German Association of Paris, the Democratic Iberian Club, and the Club of Polish 
Emigration comprising just a few.
85
  Smaller exile communities, such as the Irish, 
Hungarians, and Greeks, also organized their own clubs.  An almost electric atmosphere 
of revolutionary possibility seemed to permeate the entire city. 
 These halcyon days of unity proved short-lived.  Despite this initial shared 
excitement, divisions rapidly arose among non-French radicals over how to maintain this 
revolutionary momentum and, more importantly, ensure its export to the rest of the 
Continent.  On the one hand, many national groups within Paris’s émigré community 
viewed events in France as a signal to organize in preparation for forcing change within 
their respective homelands by force of arms.  Drawing on the model established by 
France’s revolutionary armies in the 1790s, foreign radicals within Paris began 
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organizing military legions to export the revolution by sparking wars of national 
liberation throughout Europe.  For these men, realizing independence or unity upon 
national lines constituted a prerequisite to promoting republican, democratic, or 
socialistic principles.   
 In contrast, other non-French radicals asserted that promoting change on a 
continental scale required first establishing a successful revolutionary model within 
France.  This émigré faction, though in the minority, viewed events in Paris through a 
lens informed by the early socialist movements’ emphasis on realizing structural change 
through social, as well as political, reformulation.  Their hope was that the February 
revolt marked the beginning of revolution in permanence, which would see France 
transition rapidly through liberal/bourgeois republicanism to working class 
rule/socialism.  Marx, who would play an active role in the post-February period, 
describes this as continuing the revolutionary process “until all the more or less 
propertied classes have been driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has 
conquered state power.”86  The end product of this cycle would be a French Second 
Republic that was both democratic and social, and thus ideal for export throughout 
Europe and beyond. 
 The case of Paris’s radical German émigré community in 1848 illustrates the 
tension between these two lines of thought.  Immediately following the fighting in 
February, German veterans of the barricades began organizing themselves into volunteer 
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legions to carry the revolution across the Rhine.  These organizations shared the general 
goal of seeing the German lands unified under a model based upon France’s 1792 First 
Republic.  The exiled radical German poet Georg Herwegh, aided by his wife Emma, 
began gathering the different groups operating within Paris under the banner of the 
German Democratic Legion.  Though Germans constituted the majority of the Legion, a 
smattering of French and other non-Germans enlisted in its ranks, including Mikhail 
Bakunin.
87
  Initially popular with many Parisians due to its members’ service in 
February, the Legion enjoyed financial and logistical support, as well as permission to 
drill in public places such as the Champ de Mars.  As word arrived in early March of 
rising revolutionary sentiment in Baden, Herwegh began preparing to march his legion, 
staffed by veterans of the barricades, to spread Paris’s revolutionary model to the German 
lands.
88
 
 Not all Germans in Paris shared Herwegh’s view of exporting revolution by 
means of national-focused military interventions.  Organizations such as the Communist 
League viewed the February Revolution as marking the onset of bourgeois 
republicanism, a necessary prerequisite for pressing the social and economic demands of 
French workers.  By then winning this struggle, they hoped to produce a revolutionary 
model that would be emulated and thus challenge the capitalist order on a European-wide 
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scale.  Drawn by this possibility, Karl Marx, the leading figure within the Communist 
League, returned to Paris on March 5 at the invitation of the Provisional Government’s 
socialist minister Ferdinand Flocon.  Upon his arrival, Marx immersed himself in 
promoting a French republic deeply rooted in socialist principles by working with both 
German and French radicals within the city.  He joined Droits de l’homme, one of the 
most prominent Parisian political clubs to emerge after February, and advised its 
members to “pressure the government against bourgeois influence and push it towards the 
socialist organization of labor.”  When the Provisional Government scheduled April 
elections, Marx counselled his French comrades to petition for a delay, arguing that a 
rapid vote precluded an effective campaign among the peasants in the provinces.  Finally, 
to account for any potential duplicity by the Provisional Government, he urged French 
workers to arm themselves and prepare for the potential need to mount the barricades 
once again.
89
 
 Marx’s involvement with Paris’s French radicals did not preclude his continued 
work with German émigrés, particularly those affiliated with the Communist League.  
His first task focused on discouraging its members, as well as the larger expatriate 
community, from supporting or participating in military efforts like that proposed by 
Herwegh’s Democratic Legion.  Marx asserted that “an expedition from French soil with 
the clear backing of the French government would simply play into the hands of the 
German counterrevolution” by allowing them to frame republicanism and socialism as 
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alien concepts being forced upon the German lands by a foreign power.
90
  Instead, he 
encouraged German radicals to prepare for revolutionary outbreaks across the Rhine 
where the skills they acquired in Paris could be utilized.  This involved, rather than 
military preparation, focus upon political organization and planning: establishing contacts 
in various German states; readying pamphlets and newspapers; and assuring that groups 
like the Communist League possessed the necessary infrastructure to promote their 
ideological vision.  Marx and his comrades hoped that these steps would facilitate the 
permanent revolution model being realized each day before their eyes on the streets of 
Paris.
91
 
 Both of these revolutionary visions, however, just like those shared by French 
radicals within Paris, soon encountered serious difficulties.  Those who sought to export 
revolution by force of arms came crashing to earth first.  Herwegh’s Legion, upon 
learning of an uprising in Baden on April 12, began marching toward the border.  Despite 
receiving word of the Baden revolutionaries’ defeat on April 20, Herwegh, fired by his 
revolutionary vision, crossed the border on April 23.  Four days later, Badenese soldiers 
easily defeated the Legion near Dossenbach, leaving Herwegh and the few not killed or 
captured to flee toward the Swiss border.
92
  As Marx had predicted, not only had the 
military campaign fail but it also enabled Badenese officials to label their indigenous 
revolutionaries as foreign agents and thus undercut their efforts. 
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 Other national-based military efforts by Parisian émigrés came to similar ends.  
Belgian veterans of the February barricades also hoped to export revolution to their 
homeland and overthrow Leopold I’s regime (the son-in-law of the recently deposed 
Louis-Philippe).  Holding demonstrations in Paris to draw volunteers, the Belgian Legion 
enjoyed, unlike their German counterpart, the direct support of the French Provisional 
Government and thus had access to funds, arms, and even a special train to take them to 
the Belgian frontier in late March.  However, like Herwegh’s force, they lacked 
organization and discipline, as well as popular support, and upon crossing into Belgium 
they were easily routed by the royal army.
93
   
 A similar situation developed among Paris’s Savoyard community.  In March, 
these Savoyards petitioned the Provisional Government to annex Savoy outright to both 
liberate it from Piedmontese control and provide the virtues of republican government.  
When the French demurred, a 1500-man legion marched from Paris into Savoy in early 
April, intent on declaring a republic.  However, so ill-prepared and equipped was this 
force that an ad hoc local militia easily drove these would-be revolutionaries back across 
the border with barely a shot fired.
94
  In all three cases, despite their experiences in 
Paris’s February revolt, these armed émigré prophets failed to export revolution by means 
of military intervention.  Poor and hasty planning, coupled with limited popular support 
in their respective homelands, served to doom these efforts and thus discredit this model 
for spreading Paris’s revolutionary spirit.   
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 However, one case involving this intervention-based revolutionary template 
among Paris’s émigré communities warrants special attention, that of the Poles.  Unlike 
the Germans and Belgians, the Polish exiles enjoyed an existing organizational 
infrastructure through groups like the Democratic Society.  Since their arrival in the early 
1830s, these organizations had planned for the possibility of using France as a launching 
point for an armed effort to free their homeland.  Rather than depending on starry-eyed 
romantics like Herwegh for leadership, the Polish émigrés could draw on a cadre of 
military veterans.  Given this preparation, immediately following the February fighting 
Poles began raising armed legions throughout the French capital.  Prominent Polish 
émigrés like Adam Mickiewicz aided in rallying men to the colors.  French radicals also 
provided substantial aid in these efforts.  Political clubs, such as the Club fraternel des 
Quinze-Vingts and the Club Républicain de Batignolles, held collections and provided 
substantial financial backing to arm and equip these men.  More importantly, the 
Provisional Government appeared in full support of the Polish legions, even promising 
pensions for the wives and children of Polish patriots left behind in Paris.  Inspired by 
these events, the first Polish volunteers began marching out of Paris at the end of March, 
confident that they carried the full support of revolutionary Paris and France in their 
campaign of liberation.
95
 
 As these Polish revolutionaries began their march eastward, political currents 
within Paris shifted, threatening the revolutionary momentum necessary for the Poles and 
other non-French radicals to realize their respective goals.  Marx and other socialist 
activists held, as opposed to the military interventionists, that Paris’s revolution must be 
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won prior to its export beyond France’s borders.  When Marx and several of his émigré 
comrades left Paris in early April for the German lands, this process seemed to be moving 
forward admirably.  Prompted by socialist Louis Blanc, the Provisional Government 
established a labor commission at the Luxembourg palace.  Led by Blanc, this 
commission created a system of national workshops both to address the immediate crisis 
of unemployment and to set the groundwork for establishing government-supported 
workers’ cooperatives.  This created an autonomous institution within a government 
dominated completely by radicals and workers, thus producing, along with the clubs, an 
alternative power structure capable of challenging the existing economic and political 
order.
96
  In addition, the Provisional Government also limited working hours, created 
public employment agencies, and outlawed production using convict labor.
97
  Sewell 
characterizes this flurry of political activity, a constant dialogue of demands and 
responses between the workers and the Provisional Government, as “adding up to the 
launching of a genuine social revolution.”98  The groundwork for permanent revolution, 
characterized by the shift from bourgeois to worker control, seemed to be prepared.   
 However, the situation shifted in April as the Provisional Government prepared 
for elections.  Despite the advances being made by Parisian workers, the large rural 
majority within France experienced few benefits from the revolution and had little 
contact with its proponents or culture.  As a result, the elections held on April 23 
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produced an assembly dominated by conservatives and moderate republicans.  These new 
representatives began taking measures to curtail the economic and social reordering 
favored by Paris’s radical circles.  They rejected Blanc’s call for the creation of a 
Ministry of Labor and Progress and began expressing concerns over the costs being 
incurred by the Luxembourg Commission’s national workshops.99  These actions greatly 
alarmed both French and non-French radicals, who viewed these measures as aimed at 
preventing the revolutionary restructuring of the economic and social order.  To combat 
these efforts, the Paris clubs, in conjunction with several émigré organizations, planned a 
large pro-Polish demonstration for May 15.  Their goals were two-fold: to press the 
National Assembly to take action against Prussia and Russia on Poland’s behalf and, 
more importantly, to demonstrate forcefully that the Revolution would not be halted in its 
transformation of both France and Europe.
100
 
 On May 15, both the Paris clubs and Polish émigré organizations, including the 
Democratic Society, turned out in strength on the streets.  They timed their actions to 
coincide with a major debate in the Assembly over potentially aiding Polish 
revolutionaries attempting to assert control in Prussia’s Posen province.101  Drawing 
nearly 40,000 demonstrators to the Place de la Bastille, the demonstrators then marched 
upon the National Assembly, meeting in the Palais Bourbon.  Initially demanding the 
floor to petition on behalf of the Poles, the crowd eventually forced its way into the 
National Assembly and declared it dissolved, thus beginning a half-hearted journée 
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against the new government.  Following their taking of the Palais Bourbon, the crowd 
proceeded to occupy the Hôtel de Ville as well, until the arrival of loyal National Guard 
troops led to their rapid dispersal.
102
 
 May 15 proved a turning point for both Paris’s French and non-French radicals.  
For the non-French, particularly the Poles, the attempted journée explicitly tied their 
causes to that of the city’s radicals.103  Correspondingly, support within the new 
government for any effort to export the revolution rapidly dwindled. Furthermore, foreign 
radicals still active within Paris were viewed with a suspicious if not outright hostile eye 
by the government’s security forces.  For French radicals, May 15 proved both a disaster 
and watershed moment.  In the ensuing days, police arrested the majority of radical 
leaders, including Louis Blanqui and François Raspail, and placed the clubs under greater 
surveillance.  More ominously, the conservative-dominated National Assembly began 
targeting the Luxembourg Commission’s reform efforts, making clear their intention to 
bring the revolution to a quick end.  United in the effort to bring down the Orleanist 
regime, Paris bourgeois republicans and radicals, both foreign and French alike, stood on 
opposing sides of an ideological fissure rapidly growing into a chasm.   
 The struggle of Parisian French and non-French radicals to realize a revolution in 
permanence, culminating in a new economic and social order, reached an apex in June 
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1848.  The conservative-dominated government, supported by many bourgeois 
republicans, now viewed institutions like the Luxembourg Commission and the National 
Workshops as a threat to property rights and a potential launching point for a new Terror 
on the 1792 model, for which the events of May 15 were only a prelude.  To this end, on 
June 21 the government ordered the closing of the National Workshops and the removal 
of unemployed labor from the capital.  For radicals and workers, the National Workshops 
constituted the first step in realizing a new economic and social order.
104
  The closing 
provided a clear indication that the revolution was in mortal danger.  Left with little 
choice, on June 22, 1848, Paris’s workers and radicals, French and foreign alike, began 
constructing barricades throughout the city. 
 Though fewer in number than in February due to participation in their own 
respective national revolutions, émigré radicals once again joined their French comrades 
in the street fighting.  Foreign radicals recognized that just as France’s initial revolution 
spurred a continental wave of uprisings its suppression would work similarly in favor of 
reaction and understood that their own ideological aspirations were also at risk.  
Furthermore, no other national revolution produced institutions, such as the Luxembourg 
Commission and the National Workshops, which constituted the necessary foundation for 
the realization of the social republic.  Thus, for Paris’s international radicals, Europe’s 
only model for revolution in permanence hung in the balance as fighting along Paris’s 
streets commenced on June 23.   
 For three days, Paris’s workers, radicals, and émigré insurgents clashed with both 
the army and bourgeois units of the city’s National Guard.  The bulk of the fighting 
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centered in the city’s eastern and northern districts, particularly around Clichy, La 
Chapelle, and La Villette, although two other major pockets developed around the Hôtel 
de Ville and in the Latin Quarter.
105
  The majority of foreign combatants appear to have 
manned barricades in the north and west, the sites of the fiercest fighting.  The intensity 
of the fighting eclipsed anything seen in Paris during earlier nineteenth-century revolts.  
By June 26, between 1500 and 2000 of the 10,000–20,000 insurgents had been killed.  
While the exact number of émigrés engaged is unknown, their presence among those 
arrested indicates their prominence in the uprising.  Of the 11,709 arrested during the 
June Days, over 7 percent (833 in total) were foreign-born.  Belgians and Germans, 
despite the drain of the legion efforts and participation in their own national revolutions, 
constituted the majority of those foreigners arrested.  Polish émigrés, despite their active 
participation in Parisian radical circles and prominence in earlier uprisings, numbered 
fewer than 10 among those arrested.
106
  Though the number serving abroad in the 
volunteer legions accounts for this in part, it appears that many Poles, including members 
of the Democratic Society, were hedging their bets during the June Days.  Painfully 
aware of the suspicion generated by May 15, most Polish exiles, despite sympathizing 
with the insurgents, stayed away from the barricades.  In the aftermath, several Polish 
publications (somewhat sheepishly) asserted that their remaining on the sidelines during 
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the fighting left them still capable of supporting the republic in the case of a reactionary 
backlash.
107
 
 However, for the majority of Paris’s French and non-French radicals, the June 
Days marked a turning point in both the city’s revolutionary tradition and in the larger 
trajectory of Europe’s transnational radical movement.  The idea of realizing a 
democratic and social republic from above by means of cooperating with bourgeois 
republicans in government died along with the victims of the June Days.  Marx, 
analyzing this moment in The Class Struggles in France, asserts that “by making its 
burial place the birthplace of the bourgeois republic, the proletariat compelled the latter to 
come out forthwith in its pure form as the state whose admitted object it is to perpetuate 
the rule of capital, the slavery of labor.”108  Modern scholars, though not convinced that 
Marx’s characterization of class divisions within France is accurate, do agree, as Tony 
Judt notes, that the June Days provided “the impetus for a qualitative leap in political 
consciousness.”109 
 This schism between bourgeois republicanism, and the democratic and social 
agenda of radicals found strong resonance among Paris’s remaining non-French radicals, 
particularly as they viewed the French effort in the context of other European revolutions.   
Most of Paris’s radical émigré communities perceived that their respective national 
revolutions had failed either due to their bourgeoisie’s political tepidness or as a result of 
the bourgeoisie’s fears of social revolution causing “it to league itself openly with the 
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feudal monarchy against the people.”110  In the Polish case, this manifested when the 
bourgeois-dominated Frankfurt Parliament sided with the Prussian Crown against 
Poland’s call for an independent state based around Posen.  Many Poles felt betrayed by 
the Parliament’s actions, believing that their common adherence to republican principles 
should have trumped nationalist calculations.  This disillusionment culminated in armed 
clashes between the Polish legions and Prussian military in early 1849, ultimately ending 
with the Poles’ defeat and surrender in May.111   
 In the German context, the above mentioned Frankfurt Parliament, dominated by 
bourgeois republicans and liberals, initially provided hope for German radicals like Marx 
and Engels that the French model for revolution in permanence was spreading.  However, 
by September 1848 this Parliament began balking at demands for real democratic reform, 
as well as demonstrating a growing willingness to make common cause with the Prussian 
military against perceived radicals throughout the German lands.  By the early months of 
1849, many radical German veterans of Paris’s street fighting found themselves on the 
barricades once again, facing the Prussian army in a series of unsuccessful uprisings 
throughout the German lands.
112
  Paris-based émigrés from other states, such as Belgium, 
Hungary, and Ireland, saw their national efforts come to similar ends. 
 However, as Europe’s revolutionary tide began receding by early 1849, many 
foreign radicals once again looked to Paris to renew the revolution’s momentum.  Despite 
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the violence of the June Days, the Second Republic endured.  Though dominated by 
bourgeois republicans and conservatives, it still introduced a republican constitution in 
November 1848 that allowed for presidential and legislative elections via universal 
manhood suffrage.  Though the December elections swept Louis-Napoleon into the 
presidency, parliamentary elections in May 1849 showed strong returns for the leftist 
coalition led by the neo-Jacobin socialist Alexandre Ledru-Rollin.
113
  While many 
Parisian radicals remained suspicious of Ledru-Rollin due to his support of the 
government during the June Days, his démoc-socs coalition’s electoral success stood as a 
lone radical advance in a revolutionary Europe rapidly succumbing to reaction. 
 This moment of possibility produced a resurgence of émigré political activity 
within Paris.  As revolutionary movements within their respective homelands failed, 
many non-French radicals began returning to Paris, drawn to the city both by experience 
and its continued revolutionary potential in comparison to the rest of the Continent.  As 
Poles returned from the failed national liberation efforts in Posen and Galicia the 
Democratic Society once again became active.  Other national émigré groups also 
reemerged at this time and in May, bolstered by the French elections, began discussions 
of establishing a Paris-based alliance of European revolutionary movements.
114
  
Germans, particularly from Baden and the Rhineland, were well-represented in those 
discussions and in Paris as a whole by May.  Karl Marx numbered among these German 
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radical refugees.  With the German revolutionary effort waning, he travelled to the 
French capital, like many other radical activists, “to see what the prospects were for a 
French impulse to the European revolution.”115  This belief that Paris, which gave birth to 
the revolutionary surge in February 1848, might breathe second life into the international 
movement was not limited to émigrés operating with the city’s radical circles.  The 
French capital also hosted several delegations from different insurgent governments, all 
petitioning the Second Republic for military aid.  The entire European revolutionary 
effort appeared once again to hinge upon events in the Continent’s radical metropole. 
 Paris’s ideological pendulum, despite these radical hopes, arced firmly to the right 
by early June.  Under pressure from the conservative and monarchist majority in the 
Assembly and among his ministers, President Louis-Napoleon firmly declined the calls 
for France’s military intervention on behalf of the Continent’s revolutionary movements.  
Rather, he ordered French expeditionary forces into the newly established Roman 
Republic to intervene to restore Papal authority.  This action incensed the Leftist coalition 
within the Assembly, which asserted that the President’s actions violated the clause in the 
1848 Constitution that prohibited French military action against other republican 
states.
116
  Blocked from parliamentary action by the Party of Order, Ledru-Rollin and his 
parliamentary comrades called for a mass demonstration on June 13 against the 
government. 
 This crisis divided Paris’s radical community, French and non-French alike.  
While all opposed Louis-Napoleon’s intervention in Rome, many distrusted Ledru-Rollin 
                                                 
115
Nimtz, 101. 
116
Sperber, 250–51. 
76 
 
and his fellow parliamentarians, who had largely either supported the government or 
stood on the sidelines during the June Days.  German radicals, particularly those with 
connections to Marx, viewed the call for mass action as “the insurrection of the 
democratic petty bourgeoisie” and advised their ranks to avoid participating.117  Polish 
émigrés, particularly members of the Democratic Society, viewed the June 13 
demonstration as marking the French republicanism’s moment of crisis.  This, along with 
the Louis Napoleon government’s anti-republican intervention in Rome, prompted 
various Polish publications and organizations to speak openly in favor of the June 13 
demonstration and encourage its supporters to take to the streets.
118
 
 Ultimately, the demonstration of June 13, 1849 proved a debacle, as well as the 
swan song, for both revolutions in Paris and the city’s primacy for the mid-century 
European revolutionary movement.  With the memory of the June Days still fresh, most 
Parisian workers, radicals, and émigrés failed to turn out, resulting in a demonstration 
easily dispersed by a far superior number of soldiers and National Guardsmen.
119
  
Though the Second Republic clung to life for another two years, the ebbing of its 
revolutionary potent began in June 1848 rapidly declined following the June 13, 1849, 
fiasco.   
 Paris’s international radical community, demoralized by this failure, experienced 
a decline as well.  The French government accelerated this process.  Louis-Napoleon’s 
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administration, spurred by the Conservative Assembly, declared Paris was in a state of 
siege following June 13 and began moving against the Left.  Though French radicals bore 
the brunt, police heavily cracked down on the city’s émigré community.  Hundreds of 
German radicals, particularly those from Baden and the Rhineland, were expelled in the 
ensuing months.  Poles, particularly the leaders of the Democratic Society and veterans of 
revolutions abroad, experienced similar treatment.  Over eighty prominent Poles received 
expulsion orders by the end of 1849.
120
  Though expulsions likely numbered in the 
thousands, a majority of those non-French radicals leaving Paris did so of their own 
accord.  Most, like Karl Marx in August 1849, recognized that with the defeat of France’s 
revolution the larger revolutionary effort on the Continent had little to no prospects.  
Hence they abandoned Paris for less politically risky abodes, either in London or the 
United States.
121
  Tied by both ideology and actions to a revolutionary spirit viewed with 
increasing hostility by the Second Republic, émigré radicals saw Paris transformed from 
a site of political possibility to just another European city under the thrall of reaction. 
 Louis-Napoleon’s December 1851 coup d'état, like that of his uncle’s fifty-two 
years earlier, once again inaugurated a period of dormancy in Paris’s primacy as a 
transnational revolutionary center.  Nevertheless, 1848 marked a moment of evolution in 
the radical understanding of ideology, revolution, and potential approaches for the future.  
In terms of radical ideological development, Paris produced the conditions in 1848 
whereby, as Sewell notes, “socialism first took shape as a mass movement.”122  The 
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Luxembourg Commission, the National Workshops, as well as the shared experiences on 
the barricades, served to create a key moment in political identity formation.  Given its 
origins in this discourse of experience and oppression, rather than material economic 
conditions, many émigré radicals played a role in this process of ideological formation.  
Thus their perceptions of Paris’s revolutionary significance (as well as those they would 
convey to future generations of radicals) became associated with socialist tenants in at 
least a basic form.  This furthered the process, begun in the 1830s, of moving Paris’s 
revolutionary identity beyond the specific French context toward operating within a much 
more explicitly transnational discourse. 
 In terms of making revolution, events in Paris during 1848 taught several vital 
lessons to French and non-French radicals alike.  The June Days illustrated that the 
moment for radicals to make common cause with the bourgeoisie had passed.  As Roger 
Gould states, the June Days marked “when paving stones and rifles drew with such 
clarity the boundary between the bourgeois Paris of the west and the proletarian Paris of 
the east.”123  This experience echoed those of foreign radicals who left Paris in pursuit of 
their own national revolutionary goals and endured, such as in the German case, 
bourgeois republicans exhibiting meekness, duplicity, or some combination of the two.  
Members of the Polish Democratic Society, in assessing their experiences in both Paris 
and Posen from their new exile in London, concluded that “only revolutions or wars 
would bring changes to the political status quo in Europe.”124  This perspective endured 
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in Parisian radical circles and was conveyed over the ensuing years to younger native and 
émigré activists.   
 One final lesson from 1848 applied particularly to émigré radicals who, despite 
their disappointments, still viewed Paris as the most likely origin point for a successful 
revolutionary wave in the future.  Rather than waiting to assure the revolution’s 
consolidation in Paris following February’s victory, too many of the city’s émigrés had 
moved immediately to their own national projects.  By the June Days, when the 
reactionary response against the revolution’s more radical policies began in the streets, 
thousands of Poles, Germans, Belgians, and others had already marched to their 
homelands in well-meaning but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to spread the revolution 
even before it was won in Paris.  Thus, when these national revolutionary efforts reached 
their respective crisis points in late 1848 and early 1849, Paris provided, rather than a 
needed ally, the seat of a conservative republican government committed to aiding anti-
revolutionary forces abroad, as the intervention against the Roman Republican 
demonstrated.  Events would show that this experience was not lost on international 
radicals drawn by Paris’s next revolutionary manifestation in 1870–1871.  This could be 
accounted for in part due to the waning of revolutionary nationalism after 1848, with the 
ensuing twenty years seeing national projects being “accomplished by the industrial-
military-diplomatic strength of established states (such as Piedmont and Prussia) rather 
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than by romantic revolt in the name of a new national ethos.”125  However, nearly all 
foreign participants in the Commune, including the three discussed in the ensuing 
chapters of this dissertation, viewed a decisive victory in Paris as being a necessary 
prerequisite for realizing their respective revolutionary projects.  The experience of 1848 
largely informed them in this regard. 
Oppression, Reconstruction, and the International: Paris under the Second Empire 
The first decade of the Second Empire saw Paris’s international radical community (and 
foreign population in general) decline to its lowest point since the first Napoleon’s reign.  
Jacques Grandjonc’s study of French immigration between 1830 and 1851 provides 
quantitative proof of this decline.  According to his data on Paris’s immigrant population 
in December 1846 and then during the 1851 Census, the city witnessed a massive drop in 
its foreign residents.  From a total of over 168,000 prior to the revolution, by the last days 
of the Second Republic only a third, roughly 51,000, still resided in the city.  Those 
groups most heavily involved in revolutionary activities during 1848–1849 saw the most 
dramatic drop: The Polish and Belgian populations declined by half and the German 
population dropping from a height of 59,334 to a mere 13,584.
126
  An economic 
downturn beginning in 1847, which limited employment opportunities within the city, 
can account for this in part.  However, the combination of foreigners returning home in 
1848 to spread the revolution or leaving (in some cases involuntarily) when France’s 
revolutionary moment ended in favor of reaction constitutes a major factor as well, 
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particularly within radical circles.  The antisocialist measures employed following Louis 
Napoleon’s coup likely furthered this exodus.  For the bulk of the 1850s, Paris mirrored 
other European cities in being highly unfavorable to radical activity of any sort.
127
 
 Ultimately, it would be Louis-Napoleon’s grand vision of a new Paris that would 
first reopen the city to a new foreign influx.  Beginning in 1860, Georges Haussmann, 
Prefect of the Seine, undertook at his emperor’s behest a massive rebuilding and 
modernization project, aimed at making Paris the showpiece of the Second Empire.  This 
Herculean undertaking required armies of laborers, including specialists not available in 
the necessary numbers within France.  As a result, huge numbers of foreign workers 
entered the city over the course of the 1860s.  While exact figures are unknown, Germans 
clearly constituted the largest group, though immigrants from all corners of Europe 
appeared in significant numbers, attracted by a project that at its peak employed over 20 
percent of Paris exclusively in its efforts.
128
  While initially drawn by the promise of 
work, many of these foreign laborers brought with them connections to various worker’s 
and socialist organizations or experiences from 1848.  Napoleon III and Haussmann both 
recognized this potential threat but were willing to take the risk in exchange for the 
necessary labor to complete the project.  Moreover, they viewed this risk as calculated, 
since one of the major goals of Paris’s rebuilding was “to make an ungovernable city 
governable” by removing narrow streets in favor of wide boulevards unfavorable to 
barricade construction.
129
  Nevertheless, Haussmannization provided Paris with a new 
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non-French population aware of both the city’s revolutionary legacy and capable of 
becoming a revolutionary force under the correct circumstances. 
 While Louis-Napoleon’s vision of a modern French capital inaugurated a new 
wave of general immigration to the city, events in London set the stage for the next 
chapter in Paris’s history as Europe’s revolutionary center.  London (mirrored to a lesser 
degree by Geneva) had long played a complementary role to Paris’s position as a 
revolutionary center.  Unlike most major European states, Britain did not experience any 
major revolutionary upheavals during either the Great Revolution or at any time during 
the nineteenth century.  While this fact frustrated many radicals, who perceived 
industrially advanced Britain as the most logical site for a revolt of the oppressed, it also 
meant that the British government lacked the hostile policies toward political exiles that 
other European states possessed.  As Sabine Freitag notes, “Britain not only had liberal 
asylum legislation,” which prevented extradition for political offenses, “it also lacked any 
regulations that curbed the steam of refugees.”130  While Marx constitutes the most 
prominent radical who took advantage of these policies, thousands of other did as well.  
In the case of those focused on Paris, London provided a site free from reaction’s reach 
yet close enough to the French capital to return at the first shift in the political wind. 
 In 1862 London’s role as a radical refuge had a more direct effect on Parisian 
politics, as the British capital hosted an International Exhibition to promote industry and 
commerce.  Napoleon III permitted a delegation of 750 workers to attend this event, 
where they established contacts with British trade unionists (as well as Italians and 
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Poles).  This relationship deepened in 1863, as radical representatives from both countries 
advocated in favor of Poland’s uprising.  Ultimately, this produced a meeting on 
September 28, 1864, between British, French, German, Polish, and Italian representatives 
that produced the International Working Men’s Association.131  This, as Bernard Moss 
notes, marked a transitional moment in the history of both European radicalism and labor, 
an international association that “shared sentiments of class solidarity and concern for 
social justice” that “through mutual discussion and experience…became a crucible in 
which the practices of English trade socialism, French cooperation, and German 
Communism were fused into a common program.”132  Karl Marx, the three-time Paris 
émigré, served as the organizations’ de facto chief organizer and theorist.   
 The importance of the International’s founding for Paris’s future revolutionary 
trajectory, particularly in relation to non-French radicals, cannot be overstated.  The 
International synthesized the various positions of European radicals into a critique of 
capitalism that knew no borders and viewed the unity of all workers as a prerequisite for 
realizing revolutionary change.  While radical discourse since 1789 had spoken of vague 
universal values, the International provided a concrete discourse that was transnational in 
both nature and scope.  In terms of Paris’s significance, this meant that, in the case a new 
revolutionary moment arose, the city’s radicals, both French and émigré, possessed the 
language, perspective, and organization to view that event within a truly international 
context.  While specifically Parisian and French conditions would likely dictate any 
initial rupture, the existence of this internationalist radical discourse meant that Paris’s 
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revolution could be understood as “a new and important stage in the course of 
progress”133 for workers and radicals on a global scale.  Even among radicals who 
rejected the International its very existence served to redefine the general parameters of 
discourse, forcing them to view their respective radical projects within a broader, 
internationalist framework.
134
  Essentially, the International’s founding meant that non-
French radicals possessed a blueprint, a means to view Paris’s next revolution as a direct 
first step in realizing a new international order, one that would unquestionably address 
their own particular aspirations. 
 The evidence of the International’s effect on Paris’s non-French radical and 
worker population rapidly became apparent following the organization’s founding.  
Within a year of the official founding of the International’s first section in Paris, sections 
of émigrés began appearing, with the first German section in Paris founded in late 1866 
or early 1867.  Sections of Belgian, Italian, and Hungarian workers developed soon after, 
and the workers brought in by Haussmann provided a ready pool of potential recruits.
135
  
Through these sections of the International, all operating within a federated system under 
the central direction of the Paris branch, a new Parisian radical network began to emerge 
and establish new connections between French and non-French activists.  Furthermore, 
even those radicals and activists who did not directly join these sections interacted with 
their members through their interactions in shared networks.  While many from the new 
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wave of Polish exiles, arriving in the aftermath of the failed 1863 uprising, did not join 
the International, they traveled in similar circles within Paris and established both 
political and personal connections with its members.
136
   
 The International’s emergence proved an important addition to the Parisian 
political landscape for non-French radicals.  Defining factions within the Parisian radical 
community during the Second Empire’s waning years can be difficult, given that 
individuals often identified with more than one position or no position at all.  However, 
by 1870 it is possible to identify several rough groupings within the Parisian radical 
community.  While shared opposition to Louis Napoleon created a general sense of 
comradery among all Parisian radicals, some of these groups possessed tendencies that, 
particularly under circumstances of stress, made them potentially more or less amicable 
to Paris’s émigré radicals.  Obviously the International’s Paris Branch constituted the 
clique most welcoming to radicals of all nations.  Similarly the Blanquists, defined by 
adherence to their namesake’s model of revolutionary conspiracy, showed no evidence of 
possessing any biases regarding a radical’s nation of origin, though ideological 
differences with Internationalists close to Marx and the General Council were common.  
Indeed, several prominent Blanquists, including Emile Duval and Victor Jaclard, became 
active members of the International’s French Branch during the late 1860s and 
collaborated effectively with its foreign members during their shared opposition to Louis-
Napoleon’s regime.137 
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 Potentially more problematic for non-French radicals was the radical republican 
faction commonly referred to as the neo-Jacobins.  Consciously modeling themselves 
after the Jacobins of the Great Revolution, these neo-Jacobins advocated a strong 
centralized government led by a revolutionary dictatorship and a controlled economy.  
Though some its members, such as the 1848 veteran Charles Delescluze, collaborated 
effectively with foreign radicals, this group also included many adherents who deeply 
embraced, as David Shaffer notes, the “chauvinistic republican nationalism” that proved 
so problematic for émigré radicals in 1792.
138
  The Proudhonists also presented some 
potential problems, particularly for émigré female radicals.  While some conflict with 
non-French radicals (such as Leo Frankel) originated from their ideological rejection of 
Proudhon’s vision of federalist anarchism and decentralized production, female radicals 
found their very right to participate in politics and activism questioned.  As Carolyn 
Eichner states, the Proudhonian position in the years prior to the Commune “attempted to 
re-enact the ideological efforts of the 1790s to banish women from public life.”139  
However, these differences remained largely masked during the late 1860s as all radical 
factions stood united in their cobelligerency toward Louis Napoleon’s regime. 
 Facilitated by the relative tolerance of the Second Empire’s “liberal phase” in the 
late 1860s, non-French radicals, aided by the new networks established by the 
International, once again began establishing themselves as an integral part of Paris’s 
activist community.  Drawn in part by the growing cracks apparent within Louis 
Napoleon’s regime’s façade, this new generation of émigrés, including Leo Frankel and 
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Jaroslav Dombrowski, joined previous generations of non-French radicals in hoping that 
Paris would again prove the catalyst for a new revolutionary wave.  Though driven by 
different aspirations and ideological visions, like all foreign radicals coming to Paris 
since 1789, they viewed this capital of both France and revolution as the site most likely 
to produce the transformative forces necessary to realize their respective aspirations.  
This expectation would inform the city’s non-French radicals as 1870 saw a new crisis, 
with war and siege producing a new revolutionary moment in Paris culminating in the 
Commune. 
 As this chapter has demonstrated, the perspectives of this dissertation’s subjects, 
Leo Frankel, Elisabeth Dmitrieff, and Jaroslav Dombrowski, were informed by the 
experiences of earlier generations of non-French radicals in Paris, beginning with the 
Great Revolution in 1789.  From the onset, Paris drew these foreigners by its promise as 
an international revolutionary center, a site capable of both fostering revolution and 
potentially facilitating the political and ideological aspirations of individuals from other 
nations.  The initial language of the French Revolution, a discourse explicitly framed in 
universalistic and cosmopolitan terms, provided the impetus for these conclusions as non-
French radicals began engaging within the French capital’s radical circles.  While 
supporting the 1789 Revolution often called upon these émigré radicals to make political 
compromises, they still viewed events in Paris as marking the dawn of a transformative 
era in European and global politics, society, and culture. 
 However, the Great Revolution proved only a point of departure in a process of 
evolution in terms of foreign engagement with the city and its radical discourse.  Though 
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Paris’s prospects of serving as a departure point for broad change initially seemed bright, 
the inability of revolutionary discourse to break away from the French national context 
undercut its internationalist potential.  The intense nationalism and xenophobia of the 
Revolution’s radical phase reinforced this reality and largely brought to an end Paris’s 
first manifestation as Europe’s revolutionary epicenter.  Though dormant for several 
decades, Paris reemerged as Europe’s best hope of spurring revolutionary change in 
following the Revolution of 1830.  While attempts to push this revolution forward in the 
early 1830s floundered, Paris under the Orleanist regime became the gathering point for 
international radicals of all stripes.  This produced an environment where intellectual and 
philosophical exchange began reasserting Paris’s revolutionary potential, with the 
discourse around early socialism introducing a more explicitly transnational element than 
had previously existed.   
 The revolutionary wave that began in February 1848 marked a new era in Paris’s 
development as Europe’s revolutionary center.  Fired by their experiences on the 
barricades, émigré radicals attempted to export the French capital’s revolution by military 
means, launching expeditions to their respective homelands to spread its fire.  However, 
these efforts served to discredit this model, as all of these expeditions met with disaster.  
Moreover, the failure to consolidate the revolution within Paris led to its ultimate defeat 
by reaction, depriving the international radical movement of its center of support and 
demonstrating the dangers of not securing the revolution before pressing for its spread.  
The experience of 1848 also constituted a moment of realignment with both Paris’s and 
Europe’s political structure, with the bourgeoisie, once a key constituency within radicals 
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efforts, falling away and more often than not lending its support to reaction.  This, along 
with the deepening influence of socialism, served to shift radical discourse and frame 
Paris’s revolution potential in a more explicitly transnational light.  Though stymied in 
the 1850s, Paris once again emerged as a potential revolutionary center under the so-
called “liberal” Second Empire of the 1860s.  Moreover, this period saw the 
International’s introduction into the city, producing a more concrete transnational 
discourse that, in the prelude to the siege and Commune, framed Paris’s revolutionary 
potential in more explicitly internationalist terms than any previous moment since 1789.  
Thus, for the three non-French Communards examined in the following chapters, a new 
Parisian revolution in the form of the Commune, once consolidated, presented a genuine 
means to realize their respective aspirations.  
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Chapter Two 
Walking the Ideological Tightrope: Leo Frankel, the Commune, 
and the République Universelle 
“If we could bring about a radical change in the (French) social order, the Revolution of 
March 18
th
 will become the most seminal of all revolutions that history has recorded to 
this day!”1  So wrote a previously unknown Hungarian jeweler and goldsmith, Leo 
Frankel, three days after his election as a representative to the Paris Commune and only a 
day after his appointment as Commissioner of Labor and Exchange, which vested him 
with responsibility for the economic welfare of over 1.8 million souls.  However, far 
from being an aberration, Frankel’s position in the Paris Commune of 1871 is illustrative 
of the importance of the large body of ideological immigrants who offered their services 
(and lives) to Paris’s short-lived and tragic experiment in radical democracy.   
While the participation of non-French radicals built on the model established with 
the French Revolution and reinforced between 1830 and 1848, the Commune in many 
ways constitutes the apex of émigré radical participation.  This chapter will begin 
addressing why the Commune marked such a turning point by first analyzing Leo 
Frankel’s early political activities, which eventually led to his active participation in the 
Parisian radical community, with specific emphasis first on Frankel’s political and 
ideological positions between 1867 and early 1871.  It will then investigate how 
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interaction and negotiations with both international and French Communards transformed 
those initial ideals and produced an understanding of revolution that was both 
transnational and rooted in Paris’s radical realities.  By examining these factors, this 
chapter will demonstrate how Frankel, initially driven by furthering the International’s 
interests in Paris, came to embrace political and ideological compromise in order to 
facilitate the Commune’s success, which he recognized as the best means of realizing the 
République Universelle.   
Leo Frankel’s internationalist career fittingly began in a spacious one-story house 
in the Altofen-Neustift suburb
2
 of Budapest, second city of the vast multinational 
Habsburg Empire, on February 24, 1844.  The fourth of six children and the youngest 
male, Frankel was born into the comfortable middle class existence provided by his 
father, Dr. Albert Frankel, a well-established Jewish physician of German origins.
3
  
Though possessing a respected bourgeois practice, Dr. Frankel also earned a reputation 
for his work among the poor of the Danube dockyards, frequently providing pro bono 
care.  An ardent Liberal, he vigorously supported the 1848 Hungarian Revolution and, 
according to his son, continued after its suppression to keep a silk portrait of Lajos 
Kossuth close to his heart.
4
  In the years following the Revolution, he actively 
encouraged Leo and his other sons to read the subversive works of Heinrich Heine
5
 and 
Friedrich Schiller available in the vast library inherited from their grandfather.  While Dr. 
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Frankel’s middle class liberalism differed markedly from the radicalism his son later 
embraced, the experience of spending his earliest youth exposed to his father’s 
revolutionary idealism profoundly influenced Leo Frankel’s subsequent worldview.6 
Family politics marked just one of the formative experiences of Leo Frankel’s 
youth; his father’s choice for his son’s vocation also played a significant role in shaping 
young Leo’s later radicalism.  Driven in part perhaps by his political beliefs, Dr. Frankel 
chose skilled professions for his four sons rather than more conventional bourgeois career 
paths.  His three older brothers were apprenticed as a mechanic, one a joiner, and the 
third a painter.  Leo, though weak and sickly in comparison to his older brothers, 
demonstrated from an early age a remarkable capacity to undertake delicate work with 
his hands.  Recognizing this skill, Frankel’s parents apprenticed him as a goldsmith, the 
same profession as his maternal grandfather.  It was their hope that he would someday 
take over his grandfather’s shop in Vienna.  While the young Frankel displayed a 
remarkable aptitude for the work during his years as an apprentice in Prague, he bristled 
under the exploitative labor system that existed in the workshop.  Finishing his 
apprenticeship in the early 1860s, Frankel began his travels as a journeyman across the 
German lands of Central Europe.  However, this road soon diverged markedly from the 
path of middle class respectability hoped for by his parents.
7
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As Frankel crossed the German countryside, he encountered a region very much 
in transition.  With the failure of the 1848 revolution and the subsequent repression over a 
decade in the past, the long dormant spirit of political activism ignited during the 
Vormärz once again began to assert itself.  However, economic change and 
industrialization (albeit uneven at this point) prompted new political associations in 
which the working class, rather than the liberal bourgeoisie, took the lead.  While most of 
the German workers’ associations active during this period focused exclusively on 
workplace issues, by 1863 a new politically active workers’ movement was crystallizing 
around the figure of Ferdinand Lassalle.  A veteran revolutionary and uncompromising 
advocate of working class democracy, Lassalle promoted an open break with German 
liberals and the creation of an explicitly working class party, empowered by universal 
manhood suffrage and aimed at utilizing state power to acquire for the workers “an 
amount of education, power and freedom which would have been wholly unattainable by 
them as individuals.”8  With this program as a basis, Lassalle founded the Allgemeiner 
Deutscher Arbeiterverein (ADAV), the first explicitly working class political party in 
German history.  While still a mainly regional party centered in the more industrialized 
north at the time of Lassalle’s death in August 1864, the ADAV began to grow steadily in 
the ensuing years, drawing in radicals and workers discontented with the liberal, 
bourgeois approach to political and economic reform.
9
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Though sources are fragmentary, sometime during his travels in 1864 or early 
1865, Leo Frankel became an active member of the growing Lassallist movement, the 
first of his many forays into transnational European radicalism.  This political conversion 
is indicated by a poem submitted in 1865 in praise of Napoleonic era poet Theodor 
Körner when Frankel was a member of a Lassallist working-class education association 
in Munich.  In general, Frankel appears to have lived a rather transient lifestyle during his 
journeyman period, and it is not until his appointment as the Paris correspondent for the 
Sozialdemokraten, a Lassallist journal published in Switzerland, that he adopted a more 
sedentary existence.  In addition to becoming a working class activist during this period, 
Frankel also served for a brief time in the Prussian army and attained Prussian 
citizenship.
10
  According to tradition, during his military service Frankel was stationed at 
the fortress of Königschwarts, which at the time held the prominent Leftist politician 
Johann Jacoby as well as the future father of the Social Democratic Party, August Bebel.  
Fellow socialists later asserted that Frankel, through his discussions with these two 
prisoners, had been radicalized; however, no proof exists to support such a meeting and it 
seems more likely to have been an invention of colleagues attempting to enhance 
Frankel’s reputation during his political work in the Habsburg lands during the 1870s and 
1880s.
11
 
These efforts to tie Frankel to Jacoby and particularly to Bebel also likely 
stemmed from a conscious effort during his later work for the International to mask 
Frankel’s earliest documented radical political affiliations.  Based on his work for the 
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Sozialdemokraten and his own writings, Frankel began his radical career as a fierce 
supporter of Jean Baptist von Schweitzer, Lassalle’s de facto successor as leader of the 
ADAV and an intense political rival of August Bebel and his collaborator Wilhelm 
Liebknecht for the ideological leadership of the German working class movement.  
Schweitzer, editor of the Sozialdemokraten prior to Lassalle’s death, continued to 
promote a program that included collaboration with the Prussian state in the interest of 
promoting working class goals, particularly universal male suffrage.  Bebel and 
Liebknecht, radical members of the ADAV’s main political rival, the Verband Deutscher 
Arbeiter-Vereine (VDAV), opposed the closeness between Schweitzer and the Prussian 
government, particularly its Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and instead advocated 
internationalist principles promoted by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels through the 
International Workingmen’s Association.12  These debates became more vehement in 
1867 as these men competed for influence in the newly formed General Association of 
German Workers, with both parties claiming to represent “true” socialism and to enjoy 
the supported of Marx, Engels, and the International.  For their part, Marx and Engels, 
both of whom enjoyed a close friendship with Liebknecht, supported the VDAV faction 
and strongly condemned the dictatorial pretensions of Schweitzer and his continued 
support of Lassallism in general.
13
 
As these disagreements intensified, Frankel became an active participant in these 
debates as a correspondent for Schweitzer’s Sozialdemokraten.  In a piece entitled “Ein 
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Offenes Wort an Herrn W. Liebknecht,” Frankel begins by praising Schweitzer’s 
ideological conceptions and devotion to carrying out the goals for the German working 
class first advocated by Lassalle.  He then follows this mild introduction with a stinging 
attack on Liebknecht based on a speech given at a workers’ meeting in Vienna, which he 
argues demonstrates Liebknecht’s bourgeois-liberal inclinations and his lack of 
dedication to the cause of socialism.
14
  As late as April 1870, despite subsequent 
developments in Frankel’s relationship with the International and its leadership, Marx 
still referred to him as Schweitzer’s man in Paris.15  While Frankel’s positions via 
Liebknecht and other future leaders of the German Social Democrats have greater bearing 
on his post-Commune political career than his actions during the Paris Commune, his 
participation in these debates have four important consequences.  First, they provided the 
young Frankel with experience in the rough and tumble nature of political debate, 
particularly among feuding factions within the European socialist movement.  Second, 
his early work provided him with the necessary radical credentials to participate in 
Communal politics, as well as providing experience operating within a foreign political 
context.  Third, his work for the Sozialdemokraten brought him to the personal attention 
of Marx and Engels, with whom he would soon develop a working relationship.  Finally, 
and most importantly, his work as a correspondent for Schweitzer led to his posting in 
Paris sometime in mid-1867, where he soon immersed himself in the radical politics of 
the city. 
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Establishing himself at 37 Rue Saint-Sébastien in the 11
th
 Arrondissment,
16
 
Frankel spent only a short time in Paris before Liebknecht, attempting to draw Frankel 
away from Lassallism, encouraged him to visit Marx and Engels in London.
17
  While no 
accounts survive of their initial encounters, which likely involved several trips to London 
between mid-1867 and early 1868, the effect on Leo Frankel was profound, transforming 
him into an ardent supporter of the International and an enthusiastic student of Marx’s 
theories, as well as a personal friend.
18
  Evidence of this interaction appears in later 
letters between Marx and Engels praising Frankel’s capacity to understand Marx’s 
theories regarding the calculation of labor’s value, prompting Engels to quip that Frankel 
understands “la formula (Marx’s theory) in Paris and delivers good wares.”19  Further 
evidence of intimacy comes from the pet names used by both Marx and Engels for 
Frankel in several letters: “Frankelche;” “a real yiddisher lad;” and, albeit not quite as 
tasteful, “our little Jew.”  Frankel also appears to have developed a relationship with 
Marx’s daughter Jenny, demonstrated by his knowledge of her political writings 
published under a pseudonym and considered a “literary secret” among Marx’s inner 
circle.
20
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While these letters lend credence to Frankel’s political “conversion,” his 
subsequent work in both Paris and other French cities for the International demonstrates 
his devotion to furthering its ideological mission, as well as his deepening engagement 
with the Continent’s transnational radical discourse. By the late 1860s the French Section 
of the International badly needed an infusion of new blood as it faced growing 
government repression.  For the first half of the decade, the International had enjoyed the 
tacit toleration of the Second Empire, demonstrated by its willingness to allow a workers’ 
delegation to attend the 1862 London Exhibition, which led to French participation in the 
founding of the International itself in 1864.  The official French Section came into being 
on January 8, 1865, and established a small office at 44, Rue des Gravilliers in Paris with 
the Second Empire’s consent.  This new branch, still dominated by supporters of 
Proudhon’s mutualism, occasionally cooperated openly with the government, even 
utilizing Prince Jerome’s personal newspaper to publish a manifesto urging the election 
of workers to parliament.
21
  Taking advantage of the Second Empire’s new liberalism, the 
International in France underwent a rapid expansion, so that by the end of 1867 it 
numbered nearly 40,000 members in Paris and 200,000 in the country overall.  However, 
this expansion bred new confidence and led to the emergence of a younger generation of 
activists eager to end cooperation with Louis Napoleon’s government and adopt a more 
confrontational manner.  Members of the International played an integral role in the 1867 
strike held by Parisian bronze workers, an ultimately successful effort that led to a raise 
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in their wages and the right to establish a Mutual Credit Society.
22
  However, this triumph 
drew the ire of Louis Napoleon’s government and led to an enhanced effort by the police 
to stifle the International in France. 
Despite this growing threat of government repression, Frankel immediately took 
up the International’s cause upon his return from London.  In early 1868, Frankel 
travelled to Lyon to aid Albert Richard in founding and organizing a section of the 
International among the city’s workers.23  Following this successful foray, he returned to 
Paris and began making connections with prominent members of the French Branch 
within the city.  This soon led to an active and successful collaboration with Eugène 
Varlin, a bookbinder, and one of the founders of the Paris section of the International.  
Described by a fellow Internationalist as possessing “a talent for organization and an 
influence that cannot be overestimated,”24 Varlin quickly utilized Frankel to begin 
organizing the non-French workers within Paris who flooded the city during the 1850s 
and 1860s to work in Baron Haussmann’s massive reconstruction efforts.  Benoît Malon, 
another founding member of the Paris Branch, also became an active associate at this 
time, forging a partnership that would continue during their subsequent work on the 
Commune’s economic policies.  Paul Lafargue, also a devoted follower of Marx’s 
theories as well as his son-in-law, also became a fellow traveler with Frankel during their 
work for the International in Paris.
25
  Other Parisian radical luminaries, such as the 
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Blanquist Emile Duval and the Proudhonist Henri Tolain, became comrades-in-arms as 
well.
26
  In short, Frankel’s internationalist mission immersed him in Paris’s vibrant, 
diverse, and highly active radical community.  Moreover, it engaged him in a discourse 
that drew together different national and ideological conceptions of radicalism, producing 
a truly “entangled” transnational discourse within Paris.27 
The ideological diversity of Frankel’s Parisian Internationalist comrades merits 
further mention.  While Frankel, along with Lafargue, worked ardently to promote 
Marx’s political program within the International’s French Branch, they, unlike their 
mentor in London, proved much more tolerant of doctrinal divisions within the 
movement.  Though the dominance of Proudhonist ideas was waning to a degree among 
French Internationalists, it still constituted the dominant ideological bent.  Henri Tolain, 
one of the French Branch’s founders, still promoted labor mutualism, as did others.  This 
unsurprisingly brought Tolain into open conflict with the always combative Marx, as well 
as Engels and other supporters during the 1868 Brussels’s Conference, culminating with 
Marx pressing for Tolain’s expulsion from the International.28  Marx and Engels also 
distrusted Malon, a harbinger of much more serious confrontations after the Commune’s 
repression.  Even Varlin, though considered one “of our people” by Marx, clashed with 
the London leadership over questions of the organization of the French Branch, leading 
Marx at moments of frustration to declare the Parisian Internationalists “ragamuffins” 
and disavow any connection to them.
29
  Despite these clashes between his ideological 
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tutor and his French comrades, Frankel still collaborated easily with the diverse lot that 
constituted the French Branch, illustrating his growing connection to that radical 
community and his ability to navigate networks defined by conflicting ideologies, goals, 
and personalities. 
Frankel’s work with his fellow radicals constituted his overriding mission in 
Paris; however, to provide for his day to day existence, necessity required Frankel to find 
regular paying work outside of radical activism.  In this, Frankel proved much more 
fortunate than some his comrades like Malon, whose activism left him blacklisted and 
forced to drift between menial jobs.
30
  Frankel, as a skilled jeweler and goldsmith, soon 
found employment at an exclusive Parisian goldsmith firm that, ironically, set him 
immediately to work on intricate pieces commissioned by Empress Eugénie.  For this 
skilled labor, Frankel earned between 30 and 40 francs a week for doing between three 
and four hours of work a day in his trade, thus freeing up substantial amounts of time for 
political agitation. His continued work for Sozialdemokraten, as well as occasional 
contributions to the German and Austrian radical journals Volkswille and Volkstimme, 
also further supplemented his income and, unlike his main vocation, allowed him to 
combine wage-earning with activism. 
His financial security assured, Frankel focused most of his physical and mental 
energies on organizing for the International among the Parisian working class.  His 
efforts quickly bore fruit, particularly his efforts among German workers, leading in mid-
1869 to the official recognition of a German Section of the International’s Parisian 
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Branch.
31
  Beyond his work with foreign workers, Frankel, in conjunction with Varlin 
and Malon, also engaged in organizational and educational efforts among French 
workers.  Of particular significance, Frankel, Varlin, and Malon spearheaded efforts to 
spread the International’s message among Paris’s working women and promoted female 
participation in the organization’s efforts, an approach vehemently opposed by 
Proudhonist French radicals.  These efforts introduced Frankel to Nathalie Lemel and 
André Léo, both of whom became prominent feminist voices during the Commune.
32
  By 
1869, Lissagaray counted Frankel along with Varlin and Duval as the leading lights of 
the French movement.
33
 
Unfortunately, just as Frankel’s collaboration with Varlin began to bear fruit, 
Varlin was arrested in late 1869 in a police sweep of the International’s members and 
imprisoned for organizing a mutual credit society among bookbinders and belonging to 
the International, a “secret society.”34  In reality, Varlin’s activism during the May 1869 
parliamentary elections led to his targeting by the Imperial police.  During that campaign, 
Varlin and other leading French Internationalists issued an address “To the Voters in 
1869,” which demanded workers to elect only candidates that vowed to press for the 
standing army’s abolition, a separation of church and state, and the nationalization of 
industry.
35
  Unsurprisingly, the Bonaparte Regime took a rather dim view of such 
demands.  Thus, Varlin’s arrest, along with that of Malon and seven other leading 
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Parisian Internationalists illustrated the growing unease within the Imperial government 
with the French working class’s increasingly vocal demands for labor and social 
reform.
36
  Louis Napoleon’s ministers and secret policemen saw the International’s red 
hand behind the wave of protests and strikes sweeping France as the decade waned.  
Thus, the Imperial Government, discarding its liberal veneer, reversed an earlier tolerant 
attitude toward the International and marked the organization for destruction. 
In early 1870, Varlin and the other accused Internationalists were brought before 
the Imperial Court’s Sixteenth Chamber and tried for their participation in a “prohibited 
organization.”  Prompted by the plight of his comrades, Frankel responded with a 
vigorous organizing effort to galvanize support among the city’s workers.  On February 
24, Frankel, along with the Austrian Internationalist Henrik Bachruch, published a 
petition in Égalité, the International’s French-Swiss newspaper, protesting against the 
“illegal arrest of the citizen Varlin” and asking for the sympathy and support of all 
socialists for this “courageous fighter.”37  While this plea aimed specifically at organizing 
protest among Paris’s workers from the German lands, its tone and prominence in the 
French Branch’s official organ indicates Frankel’s growing prominence within the 
Parisian radical movement as well as his growing devotion to his fellow activists.  
Despite Frankel’s earnest efforts, the trial’s outcome was a foregone conclusion: Nine 
guilty verdicts were handed down and Varlin, Malon, and their fellows each received 
three months imprisonment as well as a 100 franc fine.
38
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During Varlin’s imprisonment, Frankel remained undeterred in his efforts to 
expand the International, particularly among Paris’s foreign workers.  After organizing 
German workers for Varlin’s defense in February, Frankel scored a major victory in early 
April 1870 with the official establishment of a German Section of the International’s 
Parisian Branch.  In the journal La Réforme Sociale Frankel praised Paris’s German 
workers for their choice, declaring that their participation in the International 
demonstrated an understanding that “the working class can only escape the arising moral 
and material slavery of capital by a fraternal organization of all workers.”  Interestingly, 
with most major Parisian radicals imprisoned, he also encouraged the new German 
Section to abide by the decisions of the International’s General Congress in Basel, a clear 
nod toward Marx’s ideological conceptions in the absence of his comrades’ differing 
French perspectives.
39
  At the same time, Frankel, along with Bachruch, also actively 
worked to organize the city’s Hungarian workers, pledging that if they aided the 
International, “you will win the fight for social and political equality.”40 
This notable acceleration in Frankel’s organizational work in early 1870 was not 
without cause, but rather a vital element in an overarching effort that proved both the 
apogee and the swansong of the International’s French Branch’s labors during the Second 
Empire.  On April 18, 1870, between 1,200 and 1,300 French Internationalists gathered in 
Paris to found the Paris Federation of the International Workingmen’s Association, a new 
body designed to unify the efforts of various International sections and branches 
throughout France.  Varlin, mere weeks out of prison, accepted the chairmanship and 
                                                 
39La Réforme Sociale, April 3, 1870. 
40
Quoted in Aranyossi, 20. 
105 
 
immediately directed the new federation to concentrate its activism on opposing the 
newest plebiscite on reform being put forth by Louis Napoleon’s regime, an order with 
repercussions that would be soon made apparent.  To facilitate this centralizing effort, the 
delegates also debated and adopted a set of rules of federation.  Both Frankel and Paul 
Lafargue strongly pushed the inclusion of language in the rules that called for stronger 
centralization within the new organization, as well as adherence to the motions passed in 
the recent Basel Congress.
41
  Though opposed by the remaining Proudhonian Mutualists, 
Frankel and Lafargue, with the support of Varlin, managed to have this language 
included.
42
  Following this founding assembly, the Federation established a permanent 
headquarters at the Place de la Corderie du Temple and began its efforts at coordinating 
the International’s French efforts.43  While the creation of the Paris Federation 
represented a singular triumph for Frankel and his Internationalist comrades, their 
celebration proved to be short-lived. 
As Frankel’s and his fellow Internationalists” efforts peaked in early 1870, the 
hold of Louis Napoleon over the country was rapidly crumbling, prompting a new series 
of reforms aimed at reconstituting the government as a “Liberal Empire.”  First proposed 
in 1869, the government organized a plebiscite, set for May 8, 1870, to give approval to 
this new constitution.  The French Internationalists opposed this plebiscite and called on 
French workers to abstain from voting.  The Internationalists, like the entire range of 
opponents of the Second Empire, smelled blood in the water and thus devoted themselves 
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to taking obstructionist stances at every possible point.
44
  However, while the Empire’s 
legitimacy was unquestionably deteriorating, this breakdown did not extend to its police 
forces.  In late April, the Prime Minister Emile Olivier ordered the Justice Ministry to 
crack down on the International’s leaders prior to the plebiscite, using a series of bomb 
scares engineered by lone-wolf extremists as cause.  Anticipating the Regime’s actions, 
Frankel, along with thirty other Federal Council members, issued a statement on May 2 
denouncing the Empire’s effort to tie these “bomb outrages” to the International and 
definitely declaring that the International “will exist in spite of all the powerless 
prosecutions against its… [leaders], as long as all the speculators, capitalists, priests and 
political adventurers shall not have disappeared.”45  Within days, Frankel and nearly 
every prominent Internationalist leader in Paris were arrested and charged with 
conspiracy and membership in a secret society. 
Brought before the Supreme Court of Justice at Blois in late June, Frankel and 
eighteen other defendants first challenged the validity of the charges, contending that 
neither the membership nor the meetings of the International were held in secret; hence it 
could not be considered a secret society.  However, once it became readily apparent that, 
regardless of legal realities, the outcome of the trial was a foregone conclusion, Frankel 
and his comrades used the court as a soapbox to attack the regime in the Press, which, 
granted greater freedoms under the Liberal Empire, reported verbatim the minutes of 
each session.  Frankel garnered significant fanfare for his performance, which ranged 
between attacks on the legality of the charges to discourses on the origins of economic 
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inequality as highlighted by Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot.  Utilizing both notable 
rhetorical flourish and transparent grandstanding, Frankel ended his defense with the 
following crescendo: 
The International is a tree whose roots reach deeply into the earth of all lands… 
and it is exceptionally naïve to believe that one can extinguish the life swimming 
under the bark by cutting off one branch or another.  To all who do not understand 
the voice of time and believe that the Socialist movement can be stopped, I cry as 
once did Galileo, “Eppur si Muove!”46 
 
Reading these accounts, Engels reported back to Marx that “our little Jew Frankel has 
won laurels,” and, indeed, his performance before the High Court greatly enhanced his 
reputation among Parisian radicals.  Nevertheless, it did nothing to mitigate the trial’s 
outcome and in early July Frankel was condemned, along with dozens of others, to one 
year imprisonment and a hundred franc fine.
47
 
 Following the guilty verdict, Frankel and his fellows found themselves at St. 
Pelagie, Paris’s main prison for political prisoners.  Interestingly, as Alistair Horne 
relates, St. Pelagie lacked the harsh conditions usually associated with political prisons, 
particularly those familiar from twentieth-century manifestations.
48
  As a result of the lax 
nature of the compound, Frankel spent much of his incarceration “networking” with other 
radicals.  In particular, he spent much time conversing with Jules Vallès, a radical 
republican journalist/author well known in Parisian leftist circles for his long-standing 
opposition to the Second Empire who later became the editor of the highly influential Cri 
du Peuple during the Commune.
49
  However, the acquisition of new political 
                                                 
46
Excerpt from the “Third International Trial" in Réveil, July 7, 1870. 
47
Villetard, 213. 
48
Alistair Horne, The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870–1 (London: MacMillan, 1965), 270. 
49
Aranyossi, 27. 
108 
 
acquaintances provided small comfort to Frankel and his comrades, whose painstaking 
organizational efforts proved for naught in the face of the Second Empire’s wave of 
arrests and trials.  By the summer of 1870, the French Branch of the International ceased 
to exist as a viable political organization just as France began to undergo one of the most 
disastrous and politically unstable periods since the Great Revolution of 1789. 
 While Frankel and his comrades languished, their great nemesis, the Empire of 
Louis Napoleon, met its less than glorious end at Sedan.  When word reached Paris on 
September 4, three days after the Emperor’s surrender, the last vestiges of the shabby 
Bonapartist regime were swept away by a popular tide, which poured toward the Hôtel de 
Ville to proclaim a Republic.  That same day, Frankel and his fellow radicals were freed 
from St. Pelagie by armed workers from Paris’s proletarian districts, only to discover a 
city in turmoil as elation over the republic’s proclamation mixed with hysteria over the 
pending Prussian investment of the city.  However, any elation they themselves felt about 
a new republic’s promise was quelled later that day when word spread that Paris would 
be governed by a quasi-military Provisional Government of National Defense for the 
duration of the Prussian threat.  Lissagaray later wrote that Parisian Internationalists felt 
that “all Paris abandoned itself to the men of the Hôtel de Ville,” who were able to prey 
on the Parisian masses’ fears of the Prussians to declare themselves “legitimate by 
popular acclamation.”50  In ensuing days, prominent non-Internationalist figures on the 
French Left, such as Blanqui, Louis Blanc, and Victor Hugo, joined the initial chorus 
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calling on all Parisians to unite behind the Provisional Government in defiance of the 
Prussians.
51
 
 Despite any resentment the Parisian Internationalists may have felt at this 
“capitulation” to the “reactionary” Provisional Government, they wasted little time in 
organizing a response, holding a mass meeting on the evening of September 4 at their old 
headquarters at Place de la Corderie du Temple that drew a large and diverse crowd 
described by one participant as strongly “revolutionary socialist” in nature.  After some 
debate, this meeting agreed to send delegates to the Provisional Government demanding 
municipal elections, the abolition of the police, and the arming of the Parisian populace, 
all of which the Provisional authorities rejected in short order.  Two days later, Frankel, 
at the request of the General Council, authored an appeal “To the Social Democratic 
people of Germany,” which called on proletarians fighting with the Prussian Army to 
throw down their weapons and join with their French comrades in the struggle against the 
bourgeoisie.
52
  However, despite such grandiose pronouncements, the combination of 
war, repression, and the siege had greatly crippled the French Section of the International.  
While the Parisian Internationalists chaired the September 4 meeting, labor federation 
members, diverse activists, and neighborhood association leaders all played an active role 
in debating and shaping policy.  Some Internationalists balked at this decentralization of 
power and argued the French Section should assert its leadership over the growing Leftist 
opposition to the Provisional Government.
53
  Recognizing the French Section’s situation 
better than its rank and file members, Varlin, Frankel, Malon, and other members of the 
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leadership  accepted that current political realities required members of the International 
to compromise their long-term goals in favor of cooperation with the larger Left 
opposition within Paris.
54
 
 The diverse nature of the Parisian Left’s response to the Provisional Government 
manifested itself in the weeks following September 4.  Prompted by a call issued during 
the September 4 meeting at La Corderie and subsequently published in La Réveil, Left 
opposition activists within each arrondissement began organizing so-called “committees 
of vigilance” in imitation of those formed during the Great Revolution in 1793.  As these 
committees developed, the International played only a minor role in organizing these 
groups, usually limited to arranging a public meeting to vote on their leadership.  While 
some arrondissements included prominent Internationalists in their leadership, such as 
Frankel in the 11
th
, and at least one, the 15
th
, had a vigilance committee completely 
dominated by the International, others were controlled by other Leftist groups.  The 
working class stronghold of Belleville, for example (constituting the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
arrondissements), was led almost exclusively by followers of Blanqui.
55
  This provides 
conclusive evidence of both the weakness of the International during the siege and its 
adherence to subordinating its overall principles to the common cause of the Parisian Left 
opposition, with its willingness to cooperate with the oft-criticized Blanquists providing 
compelling proof. 
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 Despite the factional diversity within these vigilance committees, the need for an 
overarching citywide organization rapidly became apparent.  Frankel, as well as the other 
elected leaders from each arrrondissement’s committee, began to hold general meetings 
at the Internationalists’ headquarters at La Corderie as early as September 9.  By 
September 13, the individual vigilance committees had developed a citywide executive 
council, styled Le Comité Central Républicain du Défense National des Vingt 
arrondissements de Paris (the Republican Central Committee of National Defense of the 
Twenty Arrondissements).  Though later characterized by the Commune’s repressors as 
an Internationalist front, in reality the Central Committee represented a wide range of 
views and was particularly influenced, according to Frankel’s comrade Malon, by 
delegates drawn from the political clubs that had formed in the last years of the Empire.   
These representatives drew heavily from the “violent language of the popular 
assemblies,” which in turn drew inspiration from the radical nationalism of the Great 
Revolution’s Jacobins.56  This neo-Jacobin sentiment is easily discerned in the first 
proclamation issued by the Central Committee on September 15.  Though certain 
elements in the proclamation reflect general Leftist principles shared by the 
Internationalists, other statements, particularly those calling for action in the name of “the 
safety of the Nation and the Republic” clearly echo the chauvinism of 1793, which 
obviously contradicted the International’s core principles.  Further, the proclamation’s 
blatant attempts to replicate certain policies from 1793 (expanding the National Guard via 
a levée en masse, the reintroduction of maximums, etc.) demonstrated an anachronistic 
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tendency among some French Leftists denounced as far back as Marx’s 1852 Eighteenth 
Brumaire.
57
   
Clearly the willingness of Frankel and other Internationalists to associate 
themselves with these chauvinistic anachronisms can be credited in part to organizational 
weakness; however, other factors were also in play.  While not a majority within the 
Central Committee, nearly every prominent member of the French International, 
including Frankel, Varlin, Malon, and Bachruch, represented their arrondissements on 
the Committee, thus placing them in a strong position to influence policy.
58
  Lefrançais, 
writing thirty years later, contends that the International purposefully distanced itself 
from a leadership role, arguing that committing themselves in such a fluid and unstable 
situation would undermine their long-term social and economic goals.
59
  However, more 
contemporary sources challenge this assertion.  In a mid-September letter to a comrade in 
Brussels, Marx includes an excerpt from a letter sent by Auguste Serraillier, a long-
standing member of the French Branch charged by the London General Council after 
September 4 to act as their agent in Paris.  Reflecting on the French Branch’s policies 
thus far, Serrailier’s contemptuously reports, “it is unbelievable that for six years people 
can be Internationalists…no longer recognize anyone as a foreigner and arrive at the state 
they have now reached, simply to preserve a fictitious popularity…moreover, what a 
situation they are creating for the International by their ultra-chauvinist discourses!”  He 
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follows by roundly condemning their abdication to the popular fervor, closing with the 
damning critique that “they can think of nothing better than to parody the revolution of 
’93.”60  This account, combined with the International’s manifest weakness in Paris after 
two years of repression, paints a picture of a Parisian Internationalist leadership moving 
away from its long-standing ideological commitments toward positions driven by the 
realities of their political environment and their continuous interactions with non-
International Parisian radicals.  Leo Frankel, who had a close working relationship with 
Serraillier,
61
 soon found even his ardent Internationalism challenged and swayed by the 
riptides sweeping through a Paris both besieged and brimming with internal discontent. 
Frankel’s growing involvement with the particularities of Parisian wartime 
politics was also further demonstrated by his military service.  When the conflict with 
Prussia began in July, the city government, in order to man Paris’s extensive 
fortifications, called to the colors most existing units of the capital’s National Guard.  
Nearly all of these volunteer, unpaid units originated in Paris’s more affluent 
arrondissements due to the Empire’s latent (and understandable) hesitance to arm 
residents of the capital’s working class neighborhoods.  However, the revolution of 
September 4, coupled with the approaching Prussian army, led to a radical change in 
policy as Leon Gambetta, one of the Provisional Government’s more radical leaders, 
called for a vast expansion of Paris’s National Guard on September 6.  Despite deep 
reservations on the part of the rest of the Provisional Government’s leadership, the Guard 
expanded from 60 (overwhelmingly bourgeois) battalions to 138 within a week and 
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nearly 194 by the end of September, most drawn from either mixed or working class 
neighborhoods.  This armed mass, nearly 340,000 strong, provided the city’s radical 
forces with a previously unimagined political weapon: an armed populace.  The National 
Guard’s expansion also further played into the opposition Left’s hands due to the 1.5 
franc per day allowance for service established on September 12.  Given that the siege 
(which officially began on September 19) resulted in massive unemployment, particularly 
for those on the economic ladder’s lowest rungs, daily military service became a virtual 
necessity for the city’s poorer elements.62  However, though the National Guard provided 
public works/welfare funding during the Siege, most working class and radical Parisians 
enlisted in the Guard primarily from a sense of patriotic duty coupled with the desire to 
be armed and thus capable of holding the Provisional Government accountable to the 
people. 
Frankel, despite both his Internationalism and his Prussian citizenship, was also 
swept up in the popular call to defend Paris and enlisted in his neighborhood battalion of 
the National Guard.  Soon after his joining the 66
th
 Battalion, based in his own 11
th
 
arrondissement, Frankel found himself promoted to corporal and appointed to the 
battalion commander, Augustin Avrial, as a member of his staff.
63
  Avrial, a worker and 
member of the International who would later represent the 11
th
 arrondissement on the 
Communal Council,
64
 viewed Frankel’s previous service in the Prussian Army as an asset 
in training his amateur soldiers for battle.  Like all National Guard members, Frankel 
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participated in twice daily drills, as well as serving stints guarding the ramparts or 
standing sentry duty at key points within the city.
65
  Though these limited duties left 
Frankel ample time to continue his radical activism, this experience of military service 
unquestionably further exposed him to the neo-Jacobin sentiment fast spreading through 
the besieged city.  Further, his time in the ranks likely fostered the development of new 
relationships within the Parisian radical population, particularly at the neighborhood 
level, thus introducing yet more influences on his political thinking.
66
  Finally, his 
enlistment in the Parisian National Guard, an organization that viewed itself (in working 
class units) as both a protector of the nation and an instrument of revolution, assured his 
presence at any journées aimed at the increasingly unpopular Provisional Government. 
Beyond serving with neighborhood level radicals in the National Guard’s ranks, 
Frankel also further expanded his local interactions through participation in the club 
movement that developed during the Siege.  As mentioned above, these clubs, though 
inspired by the Great Revolution’s Jacobins and Cordeliers, appeared during the 
“Liberal” Empire’s last years.  However, after September 4 these political clubs began to 
proliferate rapidly, often emerging in tandem with local vigilance committees.  These 
clubs, meeting in dance halls and churches, provided lively grass-root forums on both 
grand political, social, and military issues as well as addressing local concerns 
(particularly related to food) arising during the Siege.
67
  While the International as a body 
distanced itself from such organizations (with one notable exception), individual 
members, such as Frankel, actively participated in these public forums.  According to one 
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source, Frankel most frequently spoke at le Club de la Reine-Blanche in Montmartre, 
earning repeated standing ovations for his fierce rhetoric.
68
  However, given the 
prominence of Théophile Ferré and other leading Blanquists in that club, as with most of 
the 18
th
 arrrondissement’s radical organizations, such a prominent role for Frankel seems 
unlikely.  The Internationalist-dominated Club de l’Ecole de Médecine, in the 6th 
arrondissement, served rather as the most frequented platform for Frankel and other 
International leaders to participate in the club culture.  Frankel, after attending for months 
and observing this organization, served on a committee charged with considering 
providing this club’s newspaper, Lutte à outrance, with official recognition as an 
Internationalist organ.
69
  While Paris’s capitulation eventually tabled this discussion, 
Frankel’s willingness to endorse this club despite the International’s coolness toward 
such “anachronistic” organizations denotes a level of identification with the diverse street 
corner activism of the clubs. 
Leo Frankel’s participation in multiple Parisian radical associations as the Siege 
progressed contrasts markedly with his inaction as an International member.  Frankel’s 
behavior mirrors that of his Internationalist comrades in this regard and seems to be 
symptomatic of a continuation of the French Branch’s malaise noted in September.  On 
October 5, an appeal by the Central Committee appeared in Leftist newspapers.  This 
call, reflecting growing radical discontent over the Provisional Government’s failure to 
hold municipal elections and its conduct of the war, once again heavily utilized neo-
Jacobin language in its demands.  The document contends that rapid elections would 
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allow “the people of Paris to assume the leadership in this supreme effort to deliver Paris 
from the foreign invader and...protect the Republic from reactionary forces.”70  As was 
the case with the September 15 Proclamation, Frankel signed this document, along with 
Varlin, Malon, Lefrançais, and nearly every other major Internationalist figure.  Though 
operating in their Central Committee capacity, Frankel and his comrades once again 
approved a political statement utilizing the neo-Jacobin language of anachronistic 
patriotism that they found ideologically problematic.   
The day after this appeal appeared, the Central Committee, prompted by 
Lefrancais’s suggestion, voted to organize a demonstration at l’Hôtel de Ville for October 
8.  Though ultimately a failure, with bourgeois National Guardsmen dispersing the 
crowd, the actions of the Internationalist during this event are telling.  Serraillier, in his 
report to the International’s General Council in London, reported that during this 
demonstration “all our members (including Frankel) were present but only as individuals, 
not an association; there was no concerted action, they did nothing.”71  This failed 
demonstration established a pattern of behavior by the International leadership that 
reasserted itself during the events of October 31.  On the previous day, word spread 
throughout Paris that the stronghold of Metz, containing France’s last remaining 
professional army, had surrendered to its Prussian besiegers.  This news coincided with 
word that Adolphe Thiers had opened armistice negotiations with Bismarck on the 
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Provisional Government’s behalf.72  In response, radicals of all stripes converged on the 
morning of October 31 at la Corderie to formulate a response.  The Central Committee 
decided to send a delegation, led by Lefrançais, to the l’Hôtel de Ville to demand 
immediate elections to replace the inept Provisional Government.  Despite some initial 
success, the untimely intervention of the Leftist adventurer Gustave Flourens and the 
aged Blanqui caused the effort to degenerate into chaos and allowed the Provisional 
Government to marshal a successful response.  By early the next morning, all of the 
revolutionaries had been bloodlessly expelled from the l’Hôtel de Ville by pro-
government National Guard units.  Though ultimately a failure, the events of October 31 
proved a watershed, further galvanizing Parisian radicals against the Provisional 
Government and thus providing the impetus for the eventual Revolution of March 18.
73
 
During this critical juncture, Frankel, along with Varlin, Malon, and other top 
International leaders, glaringly failed to show any unity of purpose and once again acted 
as individuals rather than as an organization.  As noted above, Lefrançais played a 
leading role in events, as did Frankel’s National Guard Commander Avrial; however, 
both acted in their capacity as Central Committee members rather than as 
Internationalists.  Serraillier’s account relates that he urged the International’s Federal 
Council to meet on the morning of October 31 “to take some steps for 
the...demonstration” only to be met with the reply from Varlin, Frankel, and others that 
“the International could not act politically as an association.”  While it appears likely that 
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Frankel and his comrades joined the march against the Provisional Government, they did 
so as free political agents operating within a larger Parisian radical community.  The fact 
that no major Internationalist (aside from Lefrançais) found themselves arrested in the 
Provisional Government’s roundup in the days following October 31 gives further 
credence to both the International and its individual members’ limited role.  In contrast, 
twenty-one other left-wing leaders, mostly Blanquists, were swept up in the police net, 
while the venerable jailbird himself, along with Gustave Flourens, eluded the authorities 
only to find themselves condemned to death in absentia.
74
  Though the French 
International’s avoidance of political action preserved its distance from Blanqui’s 
conspiratorial vanguardism, in the case of the October 31 journée this fig leaf fails to 
cover the profound weakness and indecisiveness displayed by Frankel, Varlin, and the 
International leaders in the face of rapidly moving events.  The consequence of this 
inaction by Frankel and the International would, when they revealed themselves, prompt 
a serious reassessment of ideology vis-à-vis hard political realities. 
Following the failure of the October 31 insurrection, the Provisional Government 
decided to take full advantage of the momentum provided by its opponents’ shortcomings 
and called for elections beginning on November 3.  These elections were to be limited in 
scope, consisting of a plebiscite on the Provisional Government as well as mayoral 
elections for the 20 arrondissements, a far cry from the general election demanded by the 
radicals during their journée.  The plebiscite proved an unmitigated disaster for the 
International and the entire Parisian Left.  In the final tally, the Provisional Government 
enjoyed an overwhelming oui vote by a margin of 221,374 to 53,585.  Even more 
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troubling for the Left was the support for the Provisional Government apparent among 
those in uniform, with 236,623 oui to only 9,053 non.
75
  The mayoral elections proved 
almost as disastrous, with radicals becoming mayors in only two arrondissements (the 
19
th
 and the 20
th
) and assistant mayors in a further nine.  Tellingly, only two prominent 
Internationalists won posts, with both Malon and Lefrançais serving as assistant mayors 
in the 17
th
 and 20
th
 arrondissements respectively.
76
  Frankel, given his status as a 
foreigner, did not stand in this election; however, Varlin’s name appeared on a number of 
lists but failed to garner enough votes.  Without question, these early November elections 
represented a massive defeat not just for the International but for the Parisian radicals 
overall.  The Republican Central Committee ceased (temporarily) to be the center of 
radical organization within the city, as many arrondissements stopped sending 
representatives to its meetings.
77
  This defeat represented the nadir for the French Left 
during the siege, as Jacques Rougerie relates, “the revolutionary organizations became 
inactive, popular meetings languished, everywhere the October 31 fiasco was cruelly 
felt.”78  Clearly, Frankel and his comrades needed to reformulate their approach, not only 
as a means to contribute to the struggle with both the Provisional Government and the 
Prussians, but also as a way to remain a relevant force within the Parisian radical 
movement. 
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In the short term following October 31, the perceived failures of Frankel, Varlin, 
Malon, and the other leaders led to a fracture among the Internationalists in the city.  
Serraillier, disgusted by the old guard’s inaction, organized a new Federal Council that 
drew on the more revolutionary members of Paris’s neighborhood sections (Serraillier’s 
group reconciled with the Federal Council and returned to its ranks only in late January 
1871, following Paris’s capitulation).  The original Federal Council’s control over 
neighborhood sections greatly diminished in general following the October 31 debacle, 
with many of these groups acting independently while claiming to speak for the entire 
French Branch.
79
  This challenge drove Frankel and the other core leaders to take action, 
leading to the drafting of a new “Declaration of the International” in late November.   
This document clearly aimed at restoring the Internationalists’ lost prestige by 
presenting a coherent and comprehensive strategy addressing both the pressing issues 
brought on by the Siege and their long term approach to overseeing the foundation of the 
“Social Republic.”  According to Rougerie, a small group including Frankel drafted this 
document after weeks of spirited debate among the Internationalist leadership.
80
  This 
Declaration represented a major departure from the French Branch’s traditional strategy, 
including for the first time a clear political program, which had been consciously avoided 
in the past, as well as calls for economic and social reforms.  Moreover, this political 
program focuses extensively on the issue of municipal autonomy and freedom, a clear 
reference to the political model of the 1792 Paris Commune.  In addition to immediate 
elections for a municipal council, the document closes by stating, in addition to demands 
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for solidarity and worker control of the means of production, that “What we all want, it is 
that every village recuperates its local independence and governs itself within a free 
France.”81   
This emphasis on the municipal Commune demonstrates Frankel’s and his 
comrades’ growing pragmatism in the face of Parisian political realities.  The 
Internationalists loyal to Marx, despite their best efforts, remained an ideological 
minority, greatly outnumbered particularly by those adhering to the Proudhonian model 
that emphasized local autonomy.  In the aftermath of October 31, talk among the various 
strands of Parisian radicalism began to focus more and more on the recreation of the 
“revolutionary Commune” of the Great Revolution.  This was made particularly apparent 
by the calls coming from growing club movement in Paris’s working class districts, 
which asserted that the only viable solution to the failed Government of National Defense 
was a new revolutionary government directly controlled by the Parisian radical masses.  
Thus, Frankel and his fellow Internationalists, in order to preserve their radical relevance, 
willingly embraced this “revolutionary anachronistic” (at least in the view of many 
Internationalists) vision of city government.
82
 
Also telling in this document is the balancing act Frankel and his colleagues 
attempt to strike between the International’s universalistic principles and the intense 
patriotism that defined the Parisian radical response to both the siege and the Provisional 
Government’s war effort (or lack thereof).  At several points within the document, 
Frankel and the other drafters present the orthodox Internationalist view, emphasizing 
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their role as “partisans of peace and the fraternity of all peoples” and their rejection of 
workers fighting workers in the interest of “monarchs” and “exploiters.”  However, the 
overall language utilized in the document is not that of International brotherhood but 
rather a fierce patriotism much more akin to the fiery rhetoric of 1792.  The phrase 
“guerre à outrance” (war to the bitter end) appears throughout the Proclamation and 
indeed constitutes the fourth point in the International’s plan of immediate action.  The 
Proclamation begins with the phrase “At this time when the soil of France is invaded by 
the Prussians and their vassals,” a clarion call more reminiscent of La Marseillaise than 
the International’s ideological anti-nationalism.83  Obviously pragmatism and the need to 
generate mass appeal were in play when Frankel and his fellow Internationalists penned 
their Proclamation.  However, particularly for an Internationalist like Frankel whose own 
experiences emphasized a transnational understanding of radicalism, the willingness to 
indulge in this linguistic resurrection of the “spirit of ’92” denotes the transformative 
effect the growing crisis in Paris was having on his ideological conceptions.  As Rougerie 
states in assessing this Proclamation, “These Internationalists are not only inspired (or 
poisoned) by the “grand legacy” of the Year II…they began to seek to exceed it.”84 
Despite the grandiose nature of the November Declaration, radical activity in 
Paris for much of December focused on the local level, and clubs and the neighborhood 
sections of the International became the main venue for political activity.  This process of 
decentralization can be credited in part to worsening conditions as besieged Paris began 
to feel both the tightening of the Prussian vice and the onset of winter.  The writer 
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Edmond de Goncourt observed on December 8, “hunger begins and famine is on the 
horizon.”85  Horseflesh supplemented by the Parisian rat, became the primary source of 
protein for most citizens by mid-November.  The quality of bread declined and heating 
fuel became nearly non-existent for average Parisians by Christmas. Only wine seemed to 
remain plentiful throughout this period of depredation.
86
  Consequently, aside from 
Guardsmen manning the city defenses, many Parisians, particularly those with limited 
resources, restricted themselves primarily to their own quarter.  Interestingly, Frankel, as 
well as Varlin and most of the other grands militants of the International, disappear from 
the record of radical doings until the beginning of January.  In Frankel’s case, his 
residency in the 11
th
 arrondissement, a mixed-class neighborhood not known for 
particularly active political clubs, might account for his temporary absence from the 
radical political scene.  However, residency alone does not account for the seemingly 
dominant role the International’s neighborhood sections on the Left Bank played in 
radical doings for much of December, temporarily eclipsing the Federal Council.  In 
particular, the Democratic and Socialist Club of the 13
th
 arrondissement, made up of 
Internationalists with strong Blanquist ties, claimed during this period to speak for the 
International as a whole.
87
   
This silence on Frankel’s and the other Federal Council members’ part in favor of 
these local militants took on greater significance on January 1, 1871, when a mass 
meeting of the city’s various radical groups agreed to replace the Republican Central 
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Committee with a new organization, the Delegation of the Twenty Arrondissements, seen 
as the first step toward the establishment of a “revolutionary commune” in Paris.  
According to all accounts, while many local-level Internationalists participated in the 
Delegation’s founding, Frankel, Varlin, and the other leading figures on the Federal 
Council played no prominent role and quite likely had no direct involvement.  Indeed, the 
comité d’initiative, operating as an ad-hoc executive council, listed in the organization’s 
January 6 minutes consists exclusively of ardent Blanquists.
88
  Further evidence of 
Frankel’s and his leading Internationalist comrades’ absence from the Delegation is the 
famous second “Affiche Rouge,” which first appeared throughout Paris on the morning of 
January 6 with its clarion call to “Make Way for the People, Make Way for the 
Commune.”  Beneath the proclamation the poster closed with 140 signatures of support, 
with only Malon representing the Federal Council.  Of the other Internationalists who 
signed, all “had never been named to the Federal Council; they were local militants who 
were better known at the clubs and committees than at the Corderie.”89  Accounting for 
the non-participation (or exclusion) of Frankel and the other Federal Council leaders from 
this new nexus of radical activity is necessary. 
A number of factors contributed to the International’s Federal Council’s weakness 
as the siege entered into its most trying and potentially most volatile period.  It is 
apparent that even by the beginning of January 1871 the French International had not 
recovered from the leadership vacuum created by the crackdown in the last days of the 
Second Empire.  Frankel himself cites this during Federal Council meeting, stating that 
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“since September 4, events have scattered the International to the four winds… (thus) we 
lack an effective physical structure because of a weak organization.”90  While this long 
term organizational issue accounts for some problems, Frankel’s and the other Federal 
Council members’ indecisiveness, particularly on October 31, contributed significantly to 
the erosion of their authority.  This failure was clearly acknowledged by one of Frankel’s 
comrades, who contended, “the International did not properly understand its role…If 
from the first day the International had lived up to its program, everything would have 
turned out differently, especially on October 31.”  Frankel, agreeing with this assessment, 
urged the development of a more coherent program to address these shortcomings to 
prevent future debacles.
91
  However, by January the issuing of another program, as was 
done to little effect in November, likely would have done little to redress the damage 
already done to the Federal Council.  As stated above, action independent of the Federal 
Council had become the norm for many neighborhood sections of the International, and 
proclamations alone seemed unlikely to bring them back into the fold. 
Indeed, most of the Federal Council meetings during January, rather than tackling 
the broader issues, concentrated on the inability of the group to establish even a 
newspaper to convey their proposals to the larger Parisian radical community.  This is 
particularly telling about the Federal Council’s weakness, given that, as Frankel pointed 
out, two neighborhood sections established their own newspapers and “the International, 
with all the other sections united” could not raise the funds to do the same.  However, 
shortly thereafter Frankel repeatedly commented on the lack of communication with the 
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local section and how their representatives’ presence at the Federal Council was 
“indispensable.”  Obviously this undercut his earlier reference to the unity of all the 
sections and indicated the Federal Council’s inability to exercise central control.  In the 
end, Frankel, along with his frequent collaborator Varlin, admitted defeat and consented 
to using the Batignolles section’s newspaper Lutte à Outrance to communicate with the 
Parisian masses.
92
  Clearly by mid-January Frankel understood, as did his colleagues, that 
the Federal Council’s authority and prestige had declined significantly and that decisive 
action was necessary to rectify the situation.  For Frankel, this would entail further 
engagement with the broader Parisian radical community, more flexible coalition 
building, and, inevitably, greater ideological flexibility. 
However, while Frankel and the Federal Council attempted to redress their 
newspaper deficiency, the siege and the Provisional Government’s war effort moved 
rapidly toward a climax.  On January 5, the Prussians began to shell the city, leading to 
hundreds of deaths and further fueling unrest.  To quell this unrest, which constantly 
called for direct action by the National Guard against the Prussians, a final sortie was 
launched on January 19.  Militarily ill-advised, the Provisional Government viewed this 
final effort as a means of placating the city’s radicals to a degree prior to the impending 
capitulation.  In addition, by placing the battalions from the radical districts in the front 
lines, it was hoped that the Prussians could aid the Provisional Government in dealing 
with its internal opponents.  However, after the attack rapidly dissolved into chaos and a 
rout, the Provisional Government’s military leaders openly declared their belief that 
further military action was futile and terms must be sought.  This, unsurprisingly, 
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infuriated the Parisian Left and thus led to the final clash during the siege between its 
radicals and the so-called “Government of National Defection.”93 
The radical response to Paris’s impending surrender came within days.  The 
Delegation and its comité d’initiative began on January 21 to organize a revolt to seize 
the Hôtel de Ville and officially establish Paris’s revolutionary commune.  Working 
rapidly, the Delegation’s largely Blanquist leadership managed to unite a widely diverse 
force for the following day’s coup, including Blanquist-dominated National Guard 
battalions, prominent radical republicans/Neo-Jacobins, and several neighborhood 
sections of the International.
94
  Once again the Federal Council itself apparently had no 
direct involvement as a body in the planning or preparation for the move on the Hôtel de 
Ville.  However, when the city’s radical forces began marching on the Hôtel de Ville the 
following afternoon, Frankel, as well as Varlin, Malon, and most of the Federal Council’s 
other leaders, could be found within their ranks, a stark contrast to the October 31 
insurrection.  Nevertheless, this did not signal the last minute inclusion of the 
International’s Federal council; rather, Frankel and his comrades all participated in the 
January 22 Journée in capacities outside of their leadership roles in the Federal Council.  
Frankel it appears marched with his National Guard battalion from the 11
th
 
arrondissement, while his comrades Varlin and Malon appeared as a representative from 
the 6
th
 arrondissement vigilance committee and as the 17
th
 arrondissement’s assistant 
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mayor respectively.
95
  This indicates that even while Frankel agonized over the daunting 
challenges faced by the Federal Council, he still remained engaged with the larger 
Parisian radical community, participating in political actions not directly connected with 
his role in the International.   
Regardless of these efforts by Frankel and others, the January 22 Journée ended 
not just in failure but in the first bloodshed between the city’s radicals and the Provisional 
Government.  The Government, not wanting a repeat of October 31, heavily fortified the 
Hôtel de Ville and filled it with loyal Breton Mobiles.  After an afternoon of tense 
confrontation, nerves broke and the Bretons opened fire.  As Louise Michel describes it, 
“the bullets…make their hail-like noise…the square became deserted while the 
projectiles coming from the Hôtel de Ville dug into the ground haphazardly and killed 
people here and there.”96  When the firing ceased, at least five radicals and bystanders lay 
dead with eighteen more wounded, among them Frankel himself, who sustained a minor 
but painful flesh wound to his shoulder.  This clash, the only civil spilling of blood during 
the siege, served as an ominous harbinger of things to come.  However, for Frankel 
himself, it served to reinforce the necessity of greater participation by the Federal Council 
in events.  At a Federal Council meeting held four days later, Frankel responded to his 
comrades repeated assessments of January 22 by stating, “Let us concentrate less on 
January 22 and more on the future…if we go out among the people, appealing to them 
properly, we can win over the masses.”97  While Frankel’s personal network allowed him 
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to interact with the wider radical community, promoting the Federal Council’s 
reengagement entailed the re-forging of organizational ties that had lapsed during the 
siege.  Events, once again, would intercede to facilitate this process. 
On January 28, 1871, after a siege of more than four-months, the Provisional 
Government signed an armistice with Bismarck and the Prussians.  This armistice 
provided Adolphe Thiers, Jules Favre, and the other negotiators with twenty-one days to 
organize elections for a national assembly charged with ratifying a permanent peace 
treaty.  These rapid elections, leaving little time for electioneering, were not a purely 
Prussian demand.  Rather, Thiers and his fellow bourgeois republicans saw this as an 
opportunity to isolate the capital’s radicals politically, a necessary first step in their vision 
of restoring national order.  These circumstances, coupled with the Federal Council’s lack 
of influence, propelled Frankel and his colleagues to engage in serious and rapid coalition 
building with several leftist groups previously considered ideologically incompatible.  
Unfortunately, due to a gap in the Federal Council’s minutes, only a short glimpse of this 
discussion is provided.  At the close of the session, one member asserted that “the 
Republic is in danger… (thus) we must unite with the republicans to defend it.”  Frankel, 
the acting chairperson of the meeting, indicated his agreement with the sentiments but 
stated that a final vote must wait for the presence of more local section representatives.
98
  
However, within days, members of the Federal Council began cooperating actively and 
openly with the much more ideologically diverse Delegation of the Twenty 
Arrondissements in preparation for the February 8 elections announced along with the 
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armistice.
99
  This strongly indicates that the vote Frankel discussed on January 26 had 
gone in favor of such collaboration. 
However, for Internationalists such as Frankel, creating a joint list of candidates 
for Paris’s forty-three Assembly seats necessitated significant negotiations and 
ideological concessions.  The first recorded public discussion of a candidates’ list, which 
occurred at the club Réunion de la Cour de Miracles on February 1, included a mish-
mash of Leftists, ranging from Blanqui to Garibaldi, from Louis Blanc to Victor Hugo, as 
well as prominent members of the International.
100
  During the next six days, hard 
negotiations eventually led to the exclusion of most radical republicans, who refused to 
appear on an electoral list with Blanqui and his followers.  This action caused at least 
three neighborhood International sections hostile to the Blanquists to break with the 
Federal Council’s electoral strategy and endorse a list containing the radical republicans 
and excluding the Blanquists.
101
  Finally, on February 6, two days before the election, the 
International and its coalition formalized their union by announcing the founding of a 
Revolutionary Socialist Party and posting its platform and candidates’ list throughout 
Paris.  For Internationalists like Frankel, the Revolutionary Socialist Party platform 
presented a mixed ideological bag.  The political language in the document was 
deliberately vague, stating that as a “party of the dispossessed” the Revolutionary 
Socialists demanded “workers to have political power.”  The vagueness was a necessity 
given the ideological gulf on that issue existing between the Internationalists and the 
Blanquists.  Obviously the reference to the “handing over to the workers their tools of 
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production” resonated with Frankel’s ideological conceptions; however, this is followed a 
few words later by a call to act “just as the Republic of 1792,” a display of the 
revolutionary anachronism roundly condemned by the International.
102
  Frankel’s assent 
to this political compromise was confirmed by his appearance as one of the forty-three 
Revolutionary Socialists candidates for Paris.   
While Frankel’s candidacy, along with nearly all of the Federal Council’s major 
figures, provides evidence of the International’s willingness to compromise ideologically, 
it also raises interesting questions regarding the ability of Frankel as a foreigner to 
compete for national office.  Frankel was not the only non-Frenchman on the 
Revolutionary Socialist Party’s electoral list; Giuseppe Garibaldi, the Italian 
revolutionary and adventurer, was also listed among their candidates.  Here the context of 
war and republicanism is of particular import, as well as the conception of citizenship 
first posited during the French Revolution.  Prior to 1793, foreign supporters of the 
Revolution were welcomed and, as long as they adhered to the Revolution’s principles, 
were granted the same rights and privileges open to all Frenchmen.
103
  In addition to this 
inheritance, the view in 1871 was that as “a result of the revolutionary wars 
themselves…arms could make the citizen” and thus “foreigners serving with the French 
thus became citizens de facto.”104  Thus Frankel, given his service in the National Guard 
during the Siege, had gained for himself the rights open to all French citizens, including 
the right to run for public office. 
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Despite the Left’s rapid organizational efforts and ability to run even étranger 
candidates, the February 8 election for the National Assembly proved an utter disaster at 
the national level.  Nearly 400 of those elected to the Assembly were 
conservatives/monarchists of various stripes, versus only about 150 republicans.  Paris, 
along with a few other cities, provided the exception; nearly all of the forty-three seats in 
Paris were won by pro-war republican candidates with only one member of the 
Provisional Government being elected within the city.
105
  However, only five of these 
forty-three came from the Revolutionary Socialist Party’s list, and this included 
Garibaldi, who appeared on many lists.  Only two Federal Council members, Malon and 
Tolain, were elected and both allowed their names to appear on other lists as well.
106
  
Varlin received only 53,199 votes and Frankel’s total appears to have numbered only a 
few thousand, totals far from indicative of widespread support.
107
  Again, the short period 
for campaigning (only ten days) clearly played a major role in the poor showing of many 
Internationalists and other radical leaders in the February 8 elections.  Name recognition 
also played a prominent role in deciding the outcome of the election within Paris, with 
Victor Hugo, Louis Blanc, and other notables from the 1848 Revolution winning the 
largest vote totals in the city. 
                                                 
105
Tombs, 62–63. 
106Malon’s election via his inclusion on the “bourgeois” lists produced significant discord within the 
International.  Serraillier reported to the General Council in London that prior to the election, Frankel had 
approached Malon about his appearance on the “bourgeois” list and urged him to have it removed.  Though 
Malon claimed it had been placed there without his permission, he expressed to Frankel that, given the 
choice, he preferred to remain on the bourgeois list.  Following the Commune, Malon would have a major 
falling out with Marx, Frankel, and the International in general.  See Documents of the First International, 
141–43, n. 128, 512. 
107
Rougerie, “Mouvement Ouvrier a Paris,” 43–44. 
134 
 
Leo Frankel’s response to the electoral defeat of February 8 seems to have 
manifested in a renewed devotion to strict (verbal, at least) re-adherence to 
Internationalist ideology.  His statements during this period are of significant note, not 
only because of their relevance to contemporary events but also because of their effect on 
historians’ characterization of Frankel’s ideological position as unvaryingly “Marxist” 
throughout the siege and Commune.
108
  One of these pronouncements is Frankel’s 
assessment of the failure of February 8 and how the French Branch should respond (given 
at the Federal Council meeting on February 15): 
Many members do not understand the aims of the Association.  Thus many 
members do not understand why, in drawing up the list of socialist candidates, we 
included obscure names instead of Louis Blanc and Victor Hugo.  It is simply that 
we are eager to see the election of workers, members of the International.  It is 
unfortunate that there has been little understanding of the objectives that the 
Association has to pursue.  We need a vigorous organization comprising 
disciplined sections…consistently holding fast to the ideas of the International, 
without wavering.
109
 
 
The other statement, made five days earlier at meeting of the Delegation, addressed what 
the radical response should be to the likely Prussian occupation of Paris.  While many 
members spoke in favor of violent resistance, Frankel proposed greeting Bismarck’s 
forces with a city festooned with alternating black and red flags inscribed with the names 
of “German democrats” such as Liebknecht and Jacoby under the banner “République 
Universelle.”  While this motion was rejected, this proposal, along with his February 15 
assessment of the French Branch, has led several historians to thus label Frankel as the 
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“most fervent disciple of internationalism,” “close to Marx,” or the Commune’s lone 
Marxist.
110
  While these two statements seem to lend credence to such an assessment, 
both need to be taken in the larger context of Frankel’s activities during both the siege 
and subsequently during the Commune.  As was the case with Frankel and the Federal 
Council in their meetings prior to entering first the Delegation and then the Revolutionary 
Socialist Party, statements often failed to reflect the actual policies adopted and acted 
upon.  In addition, Frankel, along with his colleagues, often acted as individuals during 
the siege, thus freeing them to a degree from any ideological boundaries placed upon 
them as Internationalists.  While the disappointing February 8 elections prompted a 
degree of disengagement on Frankel’s part from the political realities of the moment, the 
rapidity at which events began to move from February to March drew Frankel back into 
the Parisian radical milieu. 
 The ramifications of the February 8 election quickly made themselves apparent, 
as the intensely conservative National Assembly first gathered in Bordeaux.  One of its 
first acts involved expelling Garibaldi on February 13, sending a clear message to 
Parisian radicals as to its mood toward the city and the republic.
111
  In response, the 
Delegation began discussions on further solidifying the Socialist Revolutionary Party 
created for the election into a vehicle capable of taking direct revolutionary action.  In the 
last recorded Delegation debate before the Revolutionary Socialist Party’s February 
20/23 “Déclaration de Principes,” Frankel openly stated his support for strong action, 
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asserting that “Compromise destroys one party after another.”112  On February 20 and 23, 
as Thiers was preparing to convey Bismarck’s terms to the National Assembly, the 
Delegation issued its “Déclaration de Principes,” which presented the political basis for 
revolutionary action in Paris if events made it necessary.  Like the principles stated prior 
to the election, this document represents compromise for Frankel and Varlin, both of 
whom contributed to its drafting.  While its talk of the abolition of classes and “social 
equality,” as well as its call to place its facilities in the service of the International 
Working Men’s Association, meshed well with Internationalist principles, many other 
elements represent clear compromise.  The clear call for direct political action and the 
“assumption of political power by the workers” denotes the influence of the Delegation’s 
numerous Blanquists, who’s revolutionary Bonapartism had previously been opposed by 
the French Branch.  Further, its talk of the “revolutionary Communes of the country 
and…principal workers’ centers” clearly reflects, as Johnson notes, “Proudhon’s 
federalism,” long the target of Internationalist critique.  Nevertheless, Frankel and his 
Internationalist colleagues, driven by the shared experience of the siege and the National 
Assembly’s impending challenge, looked beyond their ideological differences in favor of 
this joint radical action.
113
 
 While the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the Delegation organized themselves, 
the National Assembly approved on February 28 the humiliating peace dictated by 
Bismarck, which stripped France of Alsace/Lorraine, burdened it with massive 
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reparations, and allowed the Prussians a triumphal march through Paris.  Even before the 
February 28 Treaty, groups outside of the Delegation and the Revolutionary Socialist 
Party had begun making preparations for the impending confrontation with Thiers and the 
National Assembly.  Most significant was the growing organizational efforts among the 
National Guard’s “red” battalions.  While some electoral organizing occurred within its 
battalions prior to the February 8 election in the weeks that followed these organizational 
efforts expanded and broadened, driven largely by the National Assembly’s stated 
intention to disarm the Guard and end its daily 30 sous pay (this was done on February 
15).  By the third week of February, the “red” National Guard, numbering roughly 200 
battalions, agreed to federate and elected a Central Committee as a governing body for 
the Guard, which declared itself dedicated to three principles: to resist any efforts to 
disarm the Guard; resist any Prussian occupation of the city; and to be governed by 
itself.
114
 
 Initially, Frankel and his Federal Council colleagues viewed this new organization 
skeptically due to its lack, aside from a devotion to general republican principles, of any 
clear ideological adherence.  While discussing joining a mass protest the National Guard 
Central Committee was organizing for February 24, Frankel stated that though he was 
“very sympathetic” to protest against the pending peace treaty, he felt that the Federal 
Council would be best served by studying specific issues so that he, as the Council’s 
chosen liaison, could communicate them to Malon and Tolain in Bordeaux.
115
  However, 
following the mass demonstration at the Place de la Bastille on February 24, organized to 
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honor the anniversary of the 1848 Revolution but serving as a clear show of force, the 
National Guard Central Committee grew significantly in influence, particularly as it 
began seizing arms throughout Paris, including 300–400 cannons that it installed in 
Montmartre and Belleville.   
Recognizing this power shift among radicals, Frankel and his fellow Federal 
Council members began debating on March 1 whether or not the International should join 
the Central Committee.  Frankel appeared initially skeptical, fearing that joining the 
diverse Central Committee might be viewed as a “compromise with the bourgeoisie” and 
that perhaps time was needed for further discussion, particularly among the local 
sections.  Other Federal Council members expressed their reservations as well. Although, 
as Lissagaray notes, these objections may have been prompted by “a jealous reserve” 
toward this new Committee made up of “unknown men, who had never taken part in any 
revolutionary campaign.”116  Finally Varlin, while recognizing the caution of Frankel and 
others, asserted that “if we remain outside of this force our influence may disappear, 
while if we join with this committee it will be a big step forward in the future of 
socialism.”  Convinced by Varlin, Frankel and the Council members voted to send a four 
man delegation to the National Guard Central Committee.
117
  While these four named 
delegates did not include Frankel, Varlin further encouraged his Federal Council 
comrades to attend the Central Committee meetings, as well as National Guard events, 
“not as members of the International but as National Guards working to win over the 
spirit of that assembly.”  Based on his existing affiliation with the 11th Arrondissement’s 
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66
th
 Battalion, it is fair to assume that Frankel took Varlin’s advice and began engaging 
politically with his comrades in arms.  Indeed, by March 15 so many Internationalists 
followed Varlin’s suggestion that its members became the largest ideological group 
identified at the Central Committee’s meetings.118  Unquestionably, at the leadership 
level, Frankel, despite some personal reservations, again operated with a clear 
understanding of the pro-Central Committee current driving Parisian radicals by late 
February and thus favored coalition once again over ideological purity. 
As Frankel and the other Federal Council members solidified their connections 
with the National Guard Central Committee, tensions between radical Paris and the 
National Assembly hurtled toward the breaking point.  After concluding its business in 
Bordeaux, which focused heavily on overturning the emergency measures on rents passed 
while Paris was besieged, the National Assembly voted to move not to the capital but to 
the former royal seat of Versailles.  Few radical Parisians failed to recognize the 
symbolic portent of this act.  Secretly, Thiers also gave orders for regular army units to 
prepare to enter the city and disarm the National Guard, particularly by seizing the 
artillery parks in Montmartre and Belleville.  This effort, attempted early on Saturday 
March18, rapidly degenerated into a disaster for the government forces.  Radicals 
operating at the neighborhood level responded rapidly, soon supported by many regulars 
who sided with the Guardsmen. By day’s end Thiers and nearly all vestiges of the 
Versailles Government were driven from the city in a spontaneous, decentralized popular 
uprising.  Thus, unheralded, arrived the hour of the Revolutionary Commune.  
 For Paris’s radicals, including Frankel and most of his fellow Internationalists, the 
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suddenness of the March 18 Revolution undercut all the planning and organizational 
efforts they had undertaken over the previous months.  As Horne aptly observes, “for 
such a contingency nothing like a plan had been prepared and…the reaction was 
completely spontaneous and uncoordinated.”119  The Federal Council did not meet 
formally to discuss events until March 18, leaving its members as free agents.  Frankel’s 
personal actions on the March 18 are unknown; however, given that his close comrade 
Varlin, along with other Federal Council members, operated as a National Guardsman 
and participated in the uncoordinated seizure of strategic positions within Paris following 
the Government’s flight, its seems likely that Frankel, too, joined in these efforts.120  By 
the following morning, Paris’s radical forces had established clear military control over 
the city; however, establishing a new political order proved a much more complex 
endeavor.  At the Hôtel de Ville, the Central Committee of the National Guard assumed 
temporary political power with the stated goal of organizing municipal elections for a 
Communal Council.  This met with opposition from a significant portion of the 
Delegation and the neighborhood vigilance committees, who wanted a 1793-style 
Committee of Public Safety established to employ revolutionary means against the 
Versailles Government’s anti-revolutionary efforts.121 
Frankel and the Federal Council, meeting on March 22 and 23, engaged in this 
debate over elections and political power as well.  Several members, still uncomfortable 
with the National Guard Central Committee’s ideological diversity, opposed the 
International giving its support to the Central Committee overseeing any elections.  
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Frankel, however, contended ardently that the International must support Communal 
elections, trying to mollify the opposition by arguing that giving such support was “not 
political anymore, but social” and thus within the International’s traditional realm of 
action.  Frankel, displaying the breathless enthusiasm that would characterize his 
statements over the ensuing week, further asserted that the International must support the 
Central Committee with “all our moral force,” specifically by issuing a public manifesto 
articulating this position.  Frankel’s repeated calls finally swayed a majority within the 
Council, and it was agreed that Frankel, along with two other members, would craft this 
public endorsement of the Central Committee and Communal elections.
122
  While others 
within the Council supported this action, Frankel, based on the debate’s minutes, played 
the leading role in publically tying the International’s French Branch to the soon to be 
established Paris Commune.  The fact that Frankel, traditionally viewed as the 
Commune’s most devoted “Marxist,” led the charge within the Federal Council for 
elections proves particularly interesting given the stated views of Marx himself at the 
time.  In a letter dated April 12, Marx, though effusive in his praise of the Communards, 
critiqued these rapid elections, stating that “the Central Committee surrendered its power 
too soon, to make way for the Commune…a too honorable scrupulousness!”123 
Regardless of Marx’s disapproval, the French Branch’s manifesto of support, 
which appeared as a wall poster on March 24, demonstrated clearly how adroit Frankel 
(the primary author) had become in crafting appeals that effectively navigated the diverse 
ideologies of the Parisian radical community.  After a preamble stating that the city’s 
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older political order’s “incapacity constitutes its negation,” the manifesto goes on to 
outline the International’s vision of the independent Paris Commune.  While this section 
begins by asserting that the Commune will ensure “the emancipation of the working 
class” by “ending class conflict and (securing) social equality,” it makes no specific 
statement that this would result from the exclusive political rule of the working class, a 
fundamental Internationalist conception. Clearly, given this document’s intent to support 
the Central Committee’s election-organizing efforts, a diverse body including non-
socialist republicans, the exclusion of such class-based exclusionary language was 
essential.  Beyond this political flexibility, the language Frankel utilizes in the realm of 
economics and financial policy also demonstrates strategic breadth.  In discussing 
economics and labor under the Commune, the manifesto contends that “the organization 
of credit, of exchange, and of production co-operatives” will be essential to “guarantee 
the worker the full value of his labor.”124  The utilization of such language denotes an 
effort by Frankel and his comrades to appeal to the large body of Parisian workers still 
devoted to Proudhon’s mutualist concepts.  While Internationalists recognized the 
cooperative movement’s vital contributions as early as 1864, Marx contended that 
cooperative movements can only be deemed a success when “fostered by national means” 
in a state where the working class has conquered political power.
125
  Since the Commune 
made no claims to be exclusively working class in composition, as Frankel was well 
aware, this presents another example of Frankel’s understanding of the ideological 
flexibility necessary to engage in Parisian radical discourse. 
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With the Federal Council’s support and, more importantly, that of the majority of 
the Delegation and neighborhood committees, the Central Committee managed to 
coordinate Communal elections on March 26.  Given the limited time for campaigning, 
few electoral lists appeared; however, the Delegation did assemble a list of radical 
candidates that exercised significant influence over the electorate.  Interestingly, the 
Delegation listed Leo Frankel as a candidate for the 13
th
 arrondissement, rather than his 
home district, the 11
th.   Electoral tactics most likely account for Frankel’s political 
transfer.  Examining the electoral slate, the 11
th
 had six candidates already listed, 
including prominent figures such as Frankel’s National Guard commander Avrial, as well 
as the prominent Blanquist Emile Eudes and the military adventurer “General” Cluseret, 
soon to be appointed the Commune’s first Delegate of War.  Though well known among 
prominent Parisian radicals and Internationalists, Frankel lacked the name recognition of 
these other candidates.  Thus placing him on the 13
th
 arrondissement list, a predominately 
bourgeois neighborhood with a smaller radical cadre increased the likelihood of his 
election.
126
  Frankel’s position on the Delegation list proved fortunate, as he, along with 
49 of the 87 candidates on the Delegation’s electoral list, won Commune seats, aided in 
large part by the tens of thousands of abstaining bourgeois voters.  Frankel, the number 
four candidate elected in the 13
th
 arrrondissement, won a seat with only 1,520 votes.  In 
his home district, the 11
th
, the last candidate to win a seat, the seventh place winner, did 
so with 15,567 votes.
127
  In addition, Frankel’s three fellow candidates in the 13th were all 
radical republicans, further denoting the conservative bent of the district.  However, the 
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fact that Leo Frankel, a Hungarian Jew residing in France only a few short years, had 
risen to a seat on the Commune’s revolutionary government testifies to the broad 
connections he established within the Parisian radical network, as well as his capacity to 
operate within its internal structures successfully. 
Networking and an understanding of Paris’s radical political landscape constituted 
essential skills if Frankel hoped to play an influential role within a body as diverse as that 
elected to the Communal Council on March 26.  The seventy-eight members who met 
regularly (with allowances for resignations, duplications, and deaths) represented nearly 
every stripe of Parisian radicalism, supplemented by a handful of moderates and 
conservatives.  Most historians of the Commune shy away from neat ideological 
categorization, given the fluidity of individual identification; however, the largest 
identifiable groups consisted of the Blanquists, Neo-Jacobin Republicans, and 
Internationalists.  While in strict membership terms 43 percent of Communal Council 
members were also members of the International, this statistic is misleading, given the 
ideological diversity even among those who claimed membership in the International.
128
  
Malon, in categorizing the Council’s membership, only lists seventeen of its members as 
Internationalists, including Frankel, Varlin, Avrial, Lefrançais, and himself, a reckoning 
that, given subsequent events, much more accurately represents the French Branch’s 
influence as a body.
129
  Nevertheless, as individuals, Frankel and other prominent Federal 
Council members exercised significant influence and found themselves appointed to 
prominent positions on the nine commissions created by the Commune during a nearly 
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twelve hour marathon session.  Frankel, along with Malon and Avrial, were appointed to 
head the Commission of Labor and Exchange, with Frankel serving as chairman.  Varlin, 
Frankel’s longtime collaborator, was elected to both the Executive Commission and the 
Finance Commission.  Most of the other seventeen men listed by Malon were appointed 
to commission positions as well.
130
  Clearly the commission appointment indicates 
Frankel’s radical connections beyond the Federal Council; however, even stronger 
evidence appeared at the following day’s meeting.  The Election Commission, reporting 
to the Communal Council after reviewing the March 26 vote, presented its view that the 
Council should accept foreigners into its ranks and recommended “that you offer the 
admission of Citizen Frankel,” which was approved by a unanimous vote.131  While this 
vote further reinforces the existence of Frankel’s established connections far beyond the 
Federal Council, it also demonstrates a general regard among the radical community for 
Frankel’s capacities, an appreciation likely developed through regular interaction with the 
Parisian Left’s various elements.  It also illustrates the acceptance and appreciation of 
some foreigners by the Commune’s majority. 
The Commune’s establishment, coming after years of police repression coupled 
with the arduous siege, filled its members, as well as the Parisian radical masses, with a 
sort of revolutionary euphoria.  Frankel, who had shared these travails with his Parisian 
revolutionary comrades, reflected this enthusiasm for and intoxication with the 
possibilities in his statements and writings immediately following his March 26 election.  
Speaking to his Federal Council colleagues on March 29, Frankel asserted that the 
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moment to establish workers’ rights by their ardent “fortitude and persuasion” had 
arrived.  He further added, with a hint of bloody glee, that if the “despots” would not 
respect this right, they would have it conveyed through “a hail of bullets.”132  A letter to 
Marx written on March 30, the day of his official acceptance into the Communal Council, 
also demonstrated his fevered enthusiasm.  Frankel, after noting his limited time to 
correspond due to his office, informed Marx of the mass approval of his election that day, 
despite his foreign status.  Frankel’s excitement was almost palpable, though he informs 
Marx if “this one act (was) the most gratifying” for him, it was only due to its 
“international character” rather than from a personal point of view.  However, after this 
tempered opening, Frankel launched into the grandiose, proclaiming March 18 as 
potentially the most important revolution in recorded history, one that could, if 
successful, “remove every cause for future revolutions, since there would be no further 
social demand to be made.”  He felt this was particularly the right moment, since, in his 
view, “the proletariat of this country seems to me to be in the vanguard of the republican 
and social forces.”  After asserting that the Commune’s victory must be achieved at all 
costs, he closed by asking for rapid advice from Marx, since “time presses” and “we must 
before all other things lay the foundations of the social republic.”133 
Frankel’s understandable enthusiasm notwithstanding, this letter to Marx 
demonstrated how Frankel’s experience within Paris transformed his perspective, 
bringing him into contention with Marx’s and the General Council’s assessment of the 
situation.  Particularly noteworthy is Frankel’s assessment of the French proletariat as a 
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revolutionary vanguard.  Marx repeatedly asserted in his writings and statements that he 
viewed France’s working class as underdeveloped and unprepared for revolution, a 
position of which Frankel was most certainly aware.  Further, from September 4 on, 
Marx, along with the General Council, constantly encouraged the International to hold 
back from direct revolutionary activity, given both the ideological ill-preparedness of the 
French working class and the long odds of success.
134
  Clearly Frankel’s active role in 
events, combined with his personal radical connections within Paris, shaped his 
perceptions and led him to assess the situation in a manner divergent from Marx and the 
other London Internationalists.  Though Marx and the General Council, “in spite of their 
warnings against premature revolution making,” rendered Frankel and his comrades all 
possible aid during the Commune’s brief existence, they retained their concerns about the 
long-term viability of the Parisian revolutionary project.
135
  Frankel, despite his personal 
devotion to Marx and Internationalism, jettisoned such concerns during the heady days 
following the March 18 uprising and joined his radical comrades in constructing a “new 
world” in Paris. 
Thus Leo Frankel and his comrades, having established the Communal 
government as a first step in creating the “social republic,” set about restructuring Paris’s 
existing order to achieve this end.  Frankel, as the head Commissioner of Labor and 
Exchange, focused on laying the groundwork for labor’s emancipation by redressing 
exploitative productive relations within the city.  However, by early April Paris once 
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again found itself besieged, this time by the Versailles government’s forces, thus limiting 
the time and resources that could be devoted to this and other social measures.  
Nevertheless, Frankel, well-acquainted with the pressing labor issues within the city, 
managed to address some viewed as the most pressing.  One that he particularly wished 
to address was the mandatory night work done by Parisian bakers, seen as inhumane and 
thus a target of radical critique.  Even prior to the Commune, Frankel began doing 
background research to respond to bakery owners’ argument that night work was 
traditional, countering that during the Middle Ages, bakers had only done day work and 
celebrated around 100 feast days per year.
136
  Armed with his research, Frankel began 
crafting in early April an official Labor Commission statement ending this practice, 
coupled with a comprehensive justification for its abolition.  However, on April 20, the 
Commune’s Executive Commission, without Frankel’s or the Commission’s prior 
knowledge, abruptly outlawed all night work for bakers.
137
  This precipitate action, taken 
without the preparation and justification Frankel intended to utilize, soon encountered 
extensive opposition.  Bakery owners mobilized and within days presented the 
Communal Council with a petition, signed by over 850 owners and bakers that labeled 
the decree an attack on the owners’ and workers’ liberties.  Prompted by these protests, a 
group of Commune members began pushing for the decree’s repeal. 
Frankel, though irritated by the Executive Council’s ill-conceived actions, quickly 
rose to the night-baking ban’s defense in a contentious Commune meeting on April 26.  
Though not hiding his annoyance that he and the other Labor and Exchange Commission 
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members were not consulted, Frankel asserted that “nonetheless I support it (the decree) 
because I feel it is the only truly socialist decree passed by the Commune,” taking into 
account the suffering of “the most unfortunate section of the proletariat.”  He emphasized 
the extensive study that he, Varlin, and Malon had made of the subject and that while it 
was the correct action, prior to such efforts in the future “the needs of the public must be 
considered and the people informed, so that they fully understand the benefits of the 
reform you are carrying out.”  He closed with a flourish (and his colleagues’ applause), 
asserting that taking into account the owners concerns precluded change, proclaiming, 
“Were the employers consulted in ’92?  No!…The measure decreed is fair, we must 
therefore defend it.”138  Frankel’s active participation in the night baking debate and his 
ardent defense of its abolition illustrate once again his awareness of the particular issues 
relevant to both working-class Frenchmen and his fellow radicals.  Even after 
successfully defending the measure, he followed through on its enforcement, pushing the 
Commune on May 3 to give him authority to seize bread produced in violation of the law, 
which they granted.
139
  Though enforcement was difficult, Frankel continued to pursue 
the issue, sending two representatives on May 15 to liaise with the Bakers’ Union to 
ensure enforcement.  So pleased were the bakers that they marched the following day to 
the Hotel de Ville with red flags and banners to thank the Commune for defending their 
interests.
140
  Frankel’s familiarity with this particularly Parisian issue provided him with 
both the motivation and the knowledge necessary to effect change at the grassroots level. 
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While his work on the night baking issue demonstrated Frankel’s detailed 
knowledge of Parisian labor issues, his involvement with workers’ co-operatives once 
again illustrated his capacity to operate within the established structural constraints of 
Parisian radicalism.  On April 16, the Commune issued a decree, crafted by Frankel and 
the other Labor and Exchange Commissioners, declaring that all workshops “abandoned 
by their managements without any regard for the interests of their workers” could be 
seized and reopened as worker co-operatives.  While hailed by some later Marxists as the 
Commune establishing state control over the means of production, this move by Frankel 
and his colleagues rather embodied the kind of cooperative socialism common in 
Proundhonian thought long denounced by Marx.  The decree makes clear that this effort 
did not constitute nationalization or even an attack on private property, including a 
provision to provide eventually “upon the return of the…employers” compensation for 
their losses.
141
  Despite his economic views as an Internationalist, Frankel recognized 
that, given the diverse ideological positions held by his fellow Communards, such 
policies must be an exercise in compromise.  Workers’ co-operatives, operating within 
the existing economic order, had a long tradition in France, being first introduced on a 
large scale in 1848 under Louis Blanc’s short-lived National Workshops program.142  
Frankel and his comrades understood that utilizing a policy with a historical and cultural 
precedent was necessary, given the Commune’s vital need for unity in the face of the 
looming threat posed by the Versaillaise forces. 
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Despite these limitations, Frankel and the Commission of Labor and Exchange 
played an active role in promoting the formation of co-operatives.  By mid-May at least 
forty-three producers’ co-operatives had been established in diverse fields ranging from 
tailors and engineers to café waiters and concierges.
143
  That Frankel and the Commission 
served as facilitators of these efforts is demonstrated by several sources.  Members of 
these co-operatives wrote frequently to the Commission and its members for aid, 
particularly in the form of government contracts.  One letter, addressed to Frankel’s close 
comrade and fellow Commission member Avrial, asserts that by providing arms contracts 
to the Iron Foundry co-operative, the Labor and Exchange Commission would promote 
“a great step forward for the social democracy towards which we are all striving.”144  
Another letter, addressed directly to the Commission by a stone-carver, outlines a fairly 
detailed plan to facilitate co-operative grown within Paris.  The author asserts that, if 
implemented by the Commission, “the system of co-operative associations will become 
universal… (and) we will have thus succeeded in obtaining control over our own 
production.”  Clearly, Parisian co-operative members saw the Commission of Labor and 
Exchange, headed by Frankel, as an essential partner in promoting worker-controlled 
production.  Indeed, Frankel’s role in promoting co-operatives extended beyond 
traditional working-class fields and into the arts.  During April and May, several theater 
co-operatives appeared, aimed at allowing entertainers to profit directly from their work 
rather than operating through traditional middlemen.  On May 19, in a debate over 
whether government support of these associations threatened artistic freedom of 
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expression, Frankel actively supported the Blanquist Edouard Valliant, head of the 
Education Commission, in arguing that the Commune had an obligation to “end all 
exploitation,” thus making affiliation with these artist co-operatives necessary.  
Convinced by Frankel and Valliant’s arguments, the Commune voted in their favor.145  In 
attempting to reorder Paris’s productive relations, co-operative members of all stripes 
viewed Frankel’s Labor and Exchange Commission as an accessible and valuable ally in 
their efforts.  Frankel, despite any personal ideological reservations, proved to be an 
active and vocal advocate of their efforts, particularly at the Communal level. 
However, despite his earnest support of co-operative efforts under the Commune, 
events and political realities forced Frankel at times, despite deep personal reservations, 
to compromise on his support of the co-operative movement in favor of more capitalistic 
arrangements.  This is most clearly demonstrated in the controversy over awarding 
military supply contracts.  Given Paris’s renewed investment by mid-April, this time by 
the Versaillasie forces, providing essential military materials for the National Guard 
constituted one of the Commune’s primary concerns.  However, meeting these military 
needs rapidly and at the lowest possible cost brought it into conflict with the co-
operatives, who felt that the Commune’s capitalistic buying practices undercut its 
essential economic and social mission.  Essentially, the workers’ co-operatives found 
themselves unable to compete with established capitalist factories, which could supply 
arms and equipment reliably and cheaply.  By late April, multiple co-operatives began 
protesting this state of affairs.  The Tailor’s Co-operative, after having their contracts for 
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2000 uniforms cancelled in favor of a capitalist concern, protested that “we…who have 
always considered the Revolution of 1871 to be based on the emancipation of the 
Proletariat find ourselves regretfully obliged to stop work due to the efforts of Capital.”146   
Similarly, the Shoemakers’ Union protested that the large Godillot shoe factory received 
all of the National Guard’s footwear contracts due to its lower production costs.  They 
countered that the Commune should be willing to pay more for shoes to support worker-
run industries like theirs.
147
 
Frankel, prompted by these protests, ordered the Commission of Labor and 
Exchange on May 4 to investigate the contract bidding and award system utilized by the 
Commune.  On May 12 Frankel went before the Commune and presented an impassioned 
report, which asserted that the present policies on contracts showed “a lack of harmony 
between the policies of the Government and its socialist principles.”  Though starting 
with this ideological assertion, the report in total illustrates the political skills Frankel had 
developed during his time in Paris, utilizing arguments targeted at appealing to the 
Commune’s diverse supporters.  While he employs a conventional socialist critique 
focusing on unscrupulous businessmen “filling their pockets” at the workers’ expense, he 
also uses time-honored fiscal arguments as well, contending that not supporting the co-
operatives would lead to unemployment and a need for public assistance that would 
“result in a burden on public funds.”  Popular patriotism is utilized as well, reminding the 
Commune that “the worker is getting killed on the ramparts to put an end to this every 
kind of exploitation.”  Supported by these different arguments, Frankel concluded by 
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calling on the Commune to award contracts only to workers’ co-operatives and to 
establish set prices through arbitration between the Commune and the co-operatives.  To 
hammer his point home, Frankel added some additional commentary at the end of the 
report, stating “we must not forget that the Revolution of March 18 was won solely by 
the working class…If we can do nothing to assist this class…I can see no reason for the 
Commune’s existence.”148   
However, despite these strong sentiments, the ensuing debate diluted Frankel’s 
demands by claiming military necessity as a mitigating factor in economic policy.  In the 
end, the Commune’s decree, published on May 13, stated only that “preference” be given 
to workers’ co-operatives in awarding contracts, though Frankel’s Commission was given 
the authority to revise existing contracts and include language establishing a minimum 
wage rate.
149
  Even after being granted these powers, Frankel, supported by Varlin, 
expressed reservations about breaking contracts lest they slow critical supplies and it is 
unlikely any contracts were thus revised.  While advocating with some success for 
workers’ co-operatives, Frankel, prompted by the military situation and the need for 
consensus, bowed to the Commune’s majority and allowed private interests to continue 
receiving some government contracts.  This case again illustrates his capacity to serve the 
Commune effectively and to further its overall success even when its policies diverged 
from his ideological principles.   
Though Frankel’s work as the Commission of Labor and Exchange’s chairman 
led him to make repeated ideological and political compromises, it also contributed to his 
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involvement in other issues of concern to Parisian radicals.  In particular, Leo Frankel 
used his Commission position to advocate for an expanded role for women in the 
Commune’s economic efforts.  While earlier contacts with such radical women as 
Nathalie Lemel and André Léo likely influenced Frankel, the arrival of Elizabeth 
Dmitrieff, sent by Marx to Paris in late March, provided much greater impetus to his 
efforts.  In early April, Dmitrieff founded the Union des femmes and immediately began 
advocating for the Commune’s support in organizing Paris’s women politically and 
economically.  In late April, Dmitrieff addressed a letter to Frankel’s Commission that 
outlined a plan to organize women’s work at the arrondissement level both to aid the 
Commune and to provide economic support for struggling women, lest a “state of 
continual privation relapse them into the more or less reactionary and passive position the 
social order…marked out for them.”150  Following this letter, Frankel and Dmitrieff 
began collaborating closely on promoting the Union des femmes co-operative organizing 
efforts and established both a professional and personal rapport.  Indeed, Frankel, taken 
by Dmitrieff’s organizational brilliance, ardent radicalism, and oft-remarked upon beauty, 
developed a romantic interest that was not reciprocated.
151
   
Affairs of the heart notwithstanding, Frankel began working in support of 
women’s co-operatives, providing Commission funding for materials and equipment and 
for the establishment of small coordinating offices in each arrondissement.  At the 
Commune’s May 4 meeting, Frankel addressed the issue of expanding government 
funding for women’s work.  Knowing that Proudhon’s ideas on women heavily 
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influenced many of his colleagues, Frankel framed the argument in terms of military 
expedience, asserting that employing women would increase war material production.  
He also appealed to patriotism, contending that paying women would supplement their 
husbands’ meager National Guard pay, thus sparing them suffering while their men 
fought.  Finally, with a nod towards the Proudhonists, supporting the organization of 
women’s work at the arrondissement level would “bring work to women so they could 
stay in their households.”152  Despite Frankel’s clever political maneuvering, the 
Commune declined to take immediate large-scale action.  Nevertheless, Frankel 
continued to work with Dmitrieff and the Union, signing as Commissioner of Labor and 
Exchange a poster calling for a mass meeting on May 17 to establish women’s unions in 
each profession to collaborate with their male counterparts.
153
  Frankel’s advocacy work 
with Dmitrieff demonstrates once again Frankel’s ability to operate within the 
Commune’s ideological structures, tailoring his approach to preempt his Proudhonist 
comrades’ objections.  Further, it illustrates how his personal radical connections forged 
within Paris influenced his political actions. 
Though circumstances often forced ideological and political compromises, the 
Commission of Labor and Exchange under Frankel collectively oversaw policies that, as 
Stuart Edward states, “constituted the socialist work of the Commune, as the term was 
understood at the time.”154  However, this assessment cannot be applied to Frankel’s 
political endeavors during the Commune.  Following the National Guard’s failed sortie 
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against Versailles on April 3, the Commune’s military situation gradually worsened as 
Thiers mobilized an army from the provinces and soldiers recently released from Prussian 
captivity.  Led by Bonapartist generals and containing most of France’s remaining 
professional army, the Versailles forces reinvested the city and began reducing its fixed 
fortifications, often facilitated by the National Guard’s inexperience and ineptitude.  
However, ineffective leadership played an even more prominent role, particularly at the 
Communal level, with militarily unschooled radicals constantly attacking the Commune’s 
handful of experienced military leaders, particularly Gustave Cluseret, an able 
professional soldier whose efforts to train and discipline the National Guard alienated 
many communards.
155
  This combination greatly facilitated the Versailles Army’s efforts 
and by late April they had captured most of Paris’s outer defenses, thus placing them in 
position for an assault on the city itself.  Faced with this crisis, radicals within the city 
once again looked to the past for inspiration and focused their gaze on 1792 and the Great 
Revolution’s moment of military crisis. 
Mining the revolutionary tradition, in late April radical newspapers and clubs 
began demanding the establishment of a new Committee of Public Safety, vested with 
dictatorial powers and thus capable of redeeming and reinvigorating the Commune’s war 
effort.  For Internationalists such as Frankel, this, in ideological terms, constituted the 
height of folly.  Marx had long condemned this practice, famously urging the French after 
the failure of 1848 to “let the dead bury their dead” and look to the present rather than the 
past for revolutionary inspiration.  As recently as September 1870, Marx warned French 
radicals that they must not “allow themselves to be deluded by the national souvenirs of 
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1792,” rather they must “build for the future.”156  Frankel, along with other Federal 
Council members, condemned this tendency among their French radical comrades at 
meetings just prior to March 18.  Indeed, when debate began on creating this Committee 
on April 28, most Federal Council members vocally denounced it; however, after two 
days of debate the motion passed by a narrow margin of thirty-four to twenty-eight.  
Explaining their vote collectively, Varlin, Malon, Avrial, Lefrançais, Serraillier,
157
 and 
nearly every other major Internationalist asserted that the Committee of Public Safety’s 
creation amounted to “the creation of a dictatorship” that constituted “a veritable 
usurpation of the sovereign rights of the people.”158  However, one prominent 
Internationalist did not lend his name to this condemnation because of his vote in the 
affirmative.  Leo Frankel, the Commune’s lone “Marxist” and foreign representative, 
approved of the resurrection of this monument to French revolutionary chauvinism.  
Why? 
Not due to any ardent support for the institution, as his justification for his vote 
clearly indicates: “Although I cannot see the usefulness of this Committee I do not wish 
to give reason for attacks against my revolutionary socialist opinions…While I reserve 
the right to revolt against the Committee, I vote in favor.”159  Obviously other factors 
than ideological conversion were in play, one in particular being Frankel’s position as a 
foreigner.  On April 25, in a letter to Marx, Frankel indicated that his Prussian citizenship 
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had subjected him to attacks by “enemies of the Commune.”  While he noted this 
included the reactionary press, this seems to include internal enemies as well, particularly 
Felix Pyat, a Neo-Jacobin journalist and Commune member.  Marx, in his reply on April 
26, attacked Pyat vehemently and counseled Frankel and the other Internationalists to be 
wary of this “dirty schemer.”160  Pyat proved to be one of the most vocal advocates of the 
Committee of Public Safety’s establishment and was appointed as one of its five 
members.  It appears, based on these letters and Frankel’s comment regarding “attacks on 
his revolutionary socialist opinions,” that Pyat and others made Frankel’s nationality an 
issue within the debate, prompting him to consider that when casting his vote. 
However, while insinuations about his Prussian citizenship likely played a role in 
Frankel’s vote, his subsequent actions regarding the Committee of Public Safety indicate 
no major constraints on his political actions.  While Frankel did not sign the statement by 
the “minority” on May 3 refusing to participate in this “plagiarization of the past,”161 he 
did respond when “majority” members attacked this critique and one made ten days later 
as the work of counter-revolutionary Girondins.  On May 15, Frankel signed a 
“Declaration of the Minority” condemning the Commune’s “surrender of authority to a 
dictatorship” and proclaiming their dedication to remain “answerable to the voters and 
not to shelter behind a supreme dictatorship.”  Members of the majority took Frankel’s 
signing of this document as his resignation from the Commune and recorded it thus in the 
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minutes.
162
  However, Frankel disputed that his signature constituted his resignation and 
on May 17, delivered a response that, in addition to renouncing his apparent 
“resignation,” provides his overriding justification for his affirmative vote for the 
Committee of Public Safety.  After condemning the Girondins comment as historically 
ignorant, Frankel stated that, while he strongly disagreed with the Committee’s creation, 
unless they chose to relieve him he intended to “stay in his Commission and continue his 
work in the interest of the worker.”163  Though Frankel did declare he would stand with 
the minority and not attend meetings not directly involving his Commission, his 
willingness to compromise and endorse an institution like the Committee of Public Safety 
indicates the strong radical ties Frankel developed in Paris.  Further, it provides the 
sharpest example of his willingness to compromise ideological principles for the sake of 
the Commune’s best interests. 
While Frankel continued his Commission work despite the Committee of Public 
Safety’s anachronistic reign, the Commune stood only a few days from its 
Götterdämmerung.  While the Commune’s “majority” and “minority” crossed swords, 
Thiers’ troops, bolstered by another 100,000 men released from Bismarck’s prison 
camps, moved into position for a final assault on Paris.  Despite Marx’s personal plea to 
Frankel and Varlin to “be on guard” and to focus on Paris’s defenses rather than “trifles 
and personal squabbles,” the Versailles Army took Frankel and the entire Commune 
leadership unaware when it entered the city via its unmanned southwestern defenses on 
May 21.  This inaugurated the Commune’s final chapter, the Semaine Sanglante, a week 
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of bloody street fighting culminating in a political massacre on an unheralded scale.  Leo 
Frankel, despite his foreign status, forewent the option of flight and chose instead to 
defend his belief in the Commune’s revolutionary potential on the barricades.  Records of 
individual activities are understandably limited from this chaotic period.  However, 
multiple sources place Frankel in the thick of the fighting, first taking charge of barricade 
construction along the rue de Rivoli near the Place de Saint-Jacques.
164
  While the 
Versailles forces easily advanced across Paris’s bourgeois western districts, by May 25 
they began meeting fierce resistance as they moved into the working-class eastern 
neighborhoods.  Frankel, along with Varlin
165
 and Elisabeth Dmitrieff, aided in defending 
the communard strongpoint at the Place de Bastille.  Here the battle ended for Frankel, as 
well as Dmitrieff, as both were wounded too badly to continue.  They were last recorded 
in Paris in the 11
th
 arrondissement, unable to walk without mutual assistance.
166
  Despite 
their wounds, Frankel and Dmitrieff eluded the authorities and by mid-June they 
managed to cross France secretly and arrive safely in Switzerland. 
Leo Frankel’s experiences both prior to and during the Commune illustrate the 
complex set of negotiations and compromises that foreign radicals with firm ideological 
principles underwent in their efforts to see Paris’s revolution won and, ultimately, spread 
beyond its borders.  Arriving in Paris as an earnest partisan of Marx’s model of 
internationalism, Frankel immersion in Paris’s complex and diverse transnational radical 
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community taught him the necessity of political and organizational flexibility.  This skill 
set became essential, first during the Prussian siege but most particularly during his 
service to the Commune.  Though still committed to his Internationalist principles, his 
time on the Communal Council as Commissioner of Labor and Exchange became an 
exercise in compromise, forcing him to negotiate and, at times, concede his own radical 
principles for the sake of seeing Paris’s revolution become the République Universelle’s 
inaugural moment.  As subsequent chapters shall demonstrate, Leo Frankel’s experience 
as a non-French radical navigating the complex and at times difficult realities of Paris’s 
transnational radical community for the sake of facilitating his own aspirations would not 
prove unique.  
163 
 
Chapter Three 
A Russian de Gouges: Elisabeth Dmitrieff and the Citoyennes of Paris  
In late April 1871, the General Council of the International received a letter from an 
enraged young Russian revolutionary, writing on behalf of her besieged Parisian 
comrades.  The young Communard minced few words in expressing her frustration at the 
International’s leadership, including its de facto leader Karl Marx: “How can you 
possibly stay there [in London] doing nothing when Paris is about to perish, because of 
people like you?”1  This same young woman, only months before, had raptly listened as 
these same men instructed her on matters of revolutionary philosophy and organization.  
She even developed a close relationship with the Marx family, ending a letter on the 
Russian peasantry to Marx warmly requesting that if it would not be a burden on “his 
time,” he free several hours on the next Sunday to spend with her and his daughters.2  
What can explain this rapid transformation? 
 For the woman in question, born Elisavieta Koucheleva but known among her 
fellow revolutionaries as Elisabeth Dmitrieff, the experience of transforming intellectual 
inquiry and radical philosophizing into practice as a participant in the Paris Commune 
account for these changes.  Though spending much of her late teens immersed in radical 
study in St. Petersburg and Geneva as well as London, it was not until her arrival in Paris 
in late March of 1871 that she encountered the difficulties, compromises, and 
negotiations that occur while making revolution in real time.  While other works, 
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particularly Sylvie Braibant’s Elisabeth Dmitrieff: Aristocrate et Pétroleuses and Carolyn 
Eichner’s Surmounting the Barricades: Women in the Paris Commune, examine 
Dmitrieff solely in the context of her contributions to women’s history and feminist 
socialism’s development, this chapter will analyze how she, like other non-French 
radicals, came to view the Commune as the best means of realizing her political and 
ideological goals, both within the bounds of Paris and beyond.  Particular emphasis will 
be placed on how her interactions with both French radicals and her fellow foreign 
revolutionaries contributed to advancing her political beliefs from youthful philosophical 
inquiry into practical policy and action forged amid the violence and discord of a city 
under siege.  For Dmitrieff, the success of Paris’s revolution constituted a first necessary 
step for a transnational reordering of women’s relations to production and the nature of 
women’s work. 
 The future Mme. Elisabeth Dmitrieff, revolutionary and alleged pétroleuse, 
entered the world as Elisavieta Loukinitchna Koucheleva on November 1, 1850,
3
 the 
third of five children born to a Russian nobleman and a German nurse.  Her father, Louka 
Kouchelev (b. October 28, 1793), came from a family with a high pedigree; his father 
(Elisabeth’s grandfather) served as a special councilor to both Paul I and Alexander I.  
Indicative of the Kouchelev’s standing, the Czar and Czarina attended Louka’s baptism.4  
Following a distinguished military career that included participating in the occupation of 
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Paris after Napoleon’s first abdication in 1814, Louka settled at the family estate in 
Volok in the Russian Empire’s Pskov region.  From his 28-room manor house, Louka 
oversaw hundreds of peasants, still living in serfdom, who worked his fields and knew 
him as a harsh and, at times, cruel lord.  In June 1848, while attending his brother 
Nicolai’s funeral, he met Carolina Dorethea Troskievitch, a nurse from Prussia’s 
Courland region who cared for his brother in his final months.  Described by 
contemporaries as strikingly beautiful, Carolina captivated Louka, despite being twenty 
years his junior.  Carolina returned to Volok with Louka, where she lived as his partner 
until their official marriage in 1856.  Prior to being wed, Carolina gave birth to Elisabeth 
and four other children (one of whom died at birth), a fact that presented Louka with a 
serious problem.  Given the Russian nobility’s conservatism and intense Orthodoxy at the 
time, formally acknowledging these children as his might taint Louka’s family’s august 
name, thus he legally recognized Elisabeth and her siblings as his wards, rather than his 
heirs.  Under Russian law, this allowed them to inherit his wealth but not his noble title, a 
policy usually employed with bastards.  Though Louka’s legitimate children, this black 
mark in the eyes of Russian elite society would greatly complicate much of Elisabeth’s 
early life as she balanced her relative privilege with this social stigma.
5
 
 After Louka’s death on February 13, 1859, their mother, known as Natalia 
Iegorovna following her conversion to Orthodoxy, was left in charge of the children’s 
education and general upbringing.  The problematic status they inherited from their father 
complicated this to a significant degree, particularly for the Kouchelev girls.  While their 
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brother Vladimir attended an elite academy frequented by the children of the nobility, 
Elisabeth and her sisters Sophia and Anna found themselves barred from a corresponding 
girls’ school due to their perceived “bastard” status.  However, despite this setback, their 
mother continued Elisabeth and her sisters’ education through the use of private tutors.  
Drawn from throughout Europe, these tutors included a Prussian exile from the 1848 
Revolution and a British woman known as “Miss Betsy,” both of whom exposed the girls 
to the most cosmopolitan intellectual currents.  The tutor with the greatest influence on 
Elisabeth’s subsequent development, however, was unquestionably the composer Modest 
Mussorgsky who, as a friend of the family, worked with the Koucheleva girls in early 
1862.  Influenced by the “new ideas” sweeping through Russia in the wake of Czar 
Alexander II’s emancipation of the serfs, Mussorgsky introduced Elisabeth to current 
radical literature, including, according to one source, Karl Marx’s writings in the journal 
Rousskoie Slovo.
6
  While tales of a twelve-year-old Elisabeth reading Marx may be 
apocryphal, Mussorgsky did present her with a copy of Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s What is 
To Be Done.  Described as a literary bible for dissatisfied Russian aristocratic youth, the 
highly controversial novel (it landed Chernyshevsky in a St. Petersburg prison) presented 
a blueprint, albeit drenched in melodrama, for both cooperative socialism and a path for 
female liberation.
7
  Its heroine, Vera Pavlovna, manages to subvert her family’s control, 
as well as the limitations Russian society placed upon women, by entering into a 
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“fictitious marriage” with a like-minded young radical who facilitates her independence.8   
The influence this book exercised on Elisabeth, particularly the model it presented for a 
woman’s emancipation, within a few years made itself readily apparent. 
 While the radical literature presented by her tutors introduced her to new 
ideological horizons, Elisabeth’s relative isolation in Volok prevented her from 
interacting with other like-minded young Russians and thus furthering her intellectual 
development.  This, however, was remedied as the Kouchelev family began, in either 
1864 or 1865, to spend a portion of the year living in a second residence within St. 
Petersburg.
9
  The family’s St. Petersburg home itself presented Elisabeth with new 
literary offerings, as it contained the portion of her late father’s library that focused on 
“new ideas,” with volumes in French, English, German, and Italian that focused on both 
advances in the natural sciences and the liberal movements of the 1830s and 1840s.
10
  
While these works furthered Elisabeth’s development, the connections she forged with 
other like-minded young urban aristocrats opened up entire new avenues of thought and 
discourse.    
 Drawing from Chernyshevsky, these young intellectuals described themselves as 
“new people” dedicated to restructuring Russian life in a manner that promoted 
individual liberty, social equality, and the application of modern scientific principles to 
governance, as well as rectifying society’s ills.  Their opponents deemed them nigilistki 
or nihilists, asserting their approach was a mindless, immature rejection of the existing 
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order.  While these young intellectuals, as indicated, engaged in a wide variety of fields, 
Elisabeth gravitated at this early point toward those circles interested in the question of 
female liberation.  While travelling in these circles, Elisabeth first met Anna Korvin-
Krukovskaia, a fellow young radical interested in exploring various means of gaining her 
emancipation.  These early encounters eventually solidified into both a friendship and 
working relationship that continued in both Geneva and Paris.
11
  Along with 
Chernyshevsky’s book, these “liberation” circles also focused on other works that 
provided a blueprint for young Russian women to escape the patriarchal realities of their 
time.  Stories such as Nedezhda Khvoshchinskaia’s “The Boarding-School Girl” and 
Nadezhda Suslova’s “A Story in Letters” presented templates for young Russian women 
to escape their family’s tyranny over their future and realize themselves both personally 
and intellectually.
12
  Given Elisabeth’s own complex relationship with the Russian social 
order, which denied her the educational access given to her brother due to her gender and 
social standing (while still providing her with relative privilege), it is little wonder she 
was rapidly drawn into these groups.  While participation in these groups introduced 
Elisabeth to like-minded individuals, it must be noted that few, if any, of these groups 
engaged deeply with theory; rather, their radicalism found expression in emotionally-
driven and intellectually immature critiques of the existing order.   
 By late 1866, Elisabeth, soon to be seventeen, grew restless in St. Petersburg.  
Deeply interested in politics and theory, she longed to further her studies in these fields.  
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However, nearly all Russian institutes of higher education barred females from attending, 
thus travel abroad was her only viable option.  However, for a young unmarried woman 
such an action would certainly lead to scandal and thus was forbidden by her mother.  
Faced with these limitations, Elisabeth drew inspiration from Chernyshevsky’s heroine 
Vera Pavlovna and sought a “fictitious marriage” with a man who would provide her with 
the capacity to travel and study without her family suffering catastrophic social 
consequences.  This problem found its solution in Colonel Mikhail Nicolaievitch 
Tomanovsky, whom Elisabeth met through common social connections in St. Petersburg.  
Though thirty-three years old to Elisabeth’s seventeen, Tomanovsky found himself 
attracted to the young women’s intellect as well as her beauty.  For Elisabeth’s part, 
Tomanovsky seemed an ideal candidate for a marriage of liberation; not only was the 
Colonel interested in “new ideas,” but he also suffered from a serious illness, likely 
tuberculosis that had already forced him to leave his regiment of hussars frequently to 
allow him to convalesce at his family’s Novgorod estate.  Both families assented to the 
match, and the two married in 1867.  The match followed the Chernyshevsky model for 
Elisabeth, thus, in late 1868, the young Mrs. Tomanovsky departed for Geneva to 
continue her studies with her husband’s support and consent.13 
 For the first year and half following her departure from Russia, no record exists of 
Tomanovsky’s activities.  While the Soviet sources (Knizhnik-Vetrov), as well as Singer-
Lecocq and Eichner, list her as travelling directly to Geneva, no record of her presence in 
the city exists until mid-1870.
14
  Braibant, though agreeing with other scholars regarding  
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Mrs. Tomanovsky’s arrival in Geneva in late 1868, does suggest that she may have made 
several stops in Germany during her voyage, possibly in Berlin, Leipzig, and Frankfurt.
15
  
What seems most likely, given the level of prominence Tomanovskaya possessed when 
first appearing in mid-1870 Internationalist records, is that she first underwent a period of 
vetting and initial instruction before being accepted fully into the Russian radical 
expatriate community’s ranks.  Though active in youthful radical circles in St. 
Petersburg, Tomanovskaya would encounter a much more sophisticated level of radical 
thought and discourse that, understandably, required study prior to engagement.  Equally 
important, Tomanovskaya had to initiate contact with connected individuals within 
Geneva’s Russian community who could both provide for her introduction and vouch for 
her intentions (i.e., give assurances that she was not a Czarist agent).  Nearly all sources 
agree that Tomanovskaya’s old St. Petersburg friend Anna Korvin-Krukovskaia, who 
arrived in Geneva in early 1870, served in this role.   
At the time Tomanovskaya and Korvin-Krukovskaia became reacquainted, the 
latter enjoyed established connections not just among expatriate Russians but also among 
prominent Internationalists.  Having first gone to Paris in 1869, Korvin-Krukovskaia, 
while working as a typist, became an active participant in several working class 
organizations.  This work introduced her to André Léo and her partner, Internationalist 
Benoît Malon, both prominent players within Parisian radical circles.
16
  Through them 
Korvin-Krukovskaia met Victor Charles Jaclard, a longtime Blanquist and member of the 
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International’s Paris branch,17 who soon became her lover and later her husband.18  Their 
partnership proved political as well as personal, as Korvin-Krukovskaia actively 
collaborated with Jaclard in his work for the International.  During the Second Empire’s 
crackdown on the International in early 1870 (which netted Malon and his fellow future 
Communard Leo Frankel), Jaclard, along with Korvin-Krukovskaia, managed to flee to 
Geneva successfully, where they continued their work for the International.  By the time 
they encountered Tomanovskaya, they enjoyed high regard both among Russian radical 
expatriates and within the International, with Marx referring to Korvin-Krukovskaia as “a 
very learned Russian lady” and Jaclard as “an excellent young man.”19  Tomanovskaya’s 
relationship with Korvin-Krukovskaia and Jaclard does much to account for her rapid rise 
in importance among Geneva’s Russian exiles and Internationalists after mid-1870. 
1870, the year of Tomanovskaya’s emergence in Geneva, marked the end of a 
highly divisive period for both the city’s radical Russian community and its larger 
population of radical exiles from Germany, France, and elsewhere.  Since 1868 the city 
had been the site of an ideological power struggle between the International’s General 
Council, led by Marx, and Mikhail Bakunin, a Russian revolutionary and collectivist 
anarchist.  The conflict with Bakunin, who joined the International in 1864, began in 
1868 when he started organized a new group in Geneva, the International Alliance of 
Socialist Democracy.  This group attracted the majority of Geneva’s Russian radicals, as 
well as others (Korvin-Krukovskaia and Jaclard joined in 1868 prior to their arrival in 
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Geneva) who were told by Bakunin that the Alliance would operate as a section within 
the International.
20
  Marx, however, viewed the situation very differently; asserting that 
through the Alliance Bakunin “had started a nice little conspiracy against the 
International, “a plot to place our society under the guidance and supreme initiative of the 
Russian Bakunin.”21  On December 22, 1868, Marx composed a circular in the General 
Council’s name that declared the Alliance to be in violation of the International’s rules 
and had it secretly distributed to all branches.  However, by the summer of 1869, Marx, 
greatly angered by Bakunin’s continued organizing efforts, condemned his efforts as an 
“extremely reactionary business, fitting for the Pan-Slavists” and once again asserted that 
he and his Internationalist colleagues must “immediately and publicly quash it (the 
Alliance) as contrary to the rules.”22 
This growing split between Marx and Bakunin by mid-1869 forced Geneva’s 
Russian radical community to commit themselves to one or the other.  While most had 
joined the Alliance in 1868, by the summer of 1869 many began to drift away from 
Bakunin toward the Marxist-International position.  A Russian-language newspaper, 
Narodnoe Delo, edited by Marx’s supporter Nicholas Utin, served as the mouthpiece for 
this group, asserting that its pro-Marx stance represented the will of Geneva’s Russian 
radicals.  By late 1869, the Narodnoe Delo was encouraging Russian exiles to leave the 
Alliance and petition for official status as a Russian Section of the International within 
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Geneva.
23
  On March 24, 1870, Marx, as the representative of the General Council, wrote 
Geneva’s Russian exiles and informed them they had been unanimously accepted as a 
Section of the International.  He ended by extolling them in their actions to honor “your 
teacher Chernyshevsky” and “prove that your country is also beginning to take part in the 
movement of our age.”24  However, while this official recognition greatly boosted the 
Genevan Russian exile community’s standing with London (aside from the minority who 
remained loyal to Bakunin); serious questions remained within the International’s 
leadership regarding the organization’s long-term commitment to Marx’s ideological 
views.  Nearly all of the new Section’s leadership had been Alliance members or worked 
directly with Bakunin, including even Marx’s favorites Korvin-Krukovskaia, Jaclard, and 
Utin.
25
  This situation required the recruitment of new members to Geneva’s Russian 
section, who had been uninvolved with the Alliance or Bakunin and who could represent 
the group to the General Council without the taint of questionable political associations.  
It thus comes as little wonder that in the summer of 1870 the young Elisabeth 
Tomanovskaya began to play a prominent role within the Russian Section. 
During the brief period for which records exist, young Tomanovskaya (she would 
turn eighteen in November of 1868) took to her work for the Russian Section with great 
vigor.  Her active participation at section meetings aided her in refining her 
understanding of radical and socialist thought.  One of her first recorded actions, which 
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deeply endeared her to her Geneva comrades, was to donate 50,000 rubles, her 
inheritance from her father, to help fund Narondnoe Delo.
26
  Her linguistic skills, the 
product of her international tutors, also proved an immense asset to the Russian section in 
their correspondence with London, the diverse radical community in Geneva, and with 
other sections in Europe.  It appears, in addition to Russian, she spoke and read French 
and German fluently and also spoke some English.  According to Knizhnik-Vetrov, 
Tomanovskaya joined a section of women workers and began aiding in the organizing of 
women’s cooperatives.27  Eichner interprets these actions as being representative of 
Tomanovskaya exercising her already fully actualized ideological views on feminist 
socialism, combining Marxian thought with Russian populism and feminism.
28
  However, 
based on her limited experience with working class organizing, it seems much more 
likely that she assisted in these efforts rather than leading them.  Her relative 
inexperience also makes it likely that she undertook these efforts in cooperation with 
other comrades from the Russian section.  Moreover, Tomanovskaya’s developing such a 
sophisticated ideological perspective in such a short time, as Eichner contends, seems 
unlikely as well.  As her later communications with Marx in London indicate, her work 
with the Russian Section represented a continuation of her political learning process. 
While Tomanovskaya broadened her radical horizons in Geneva, events in France 
began moving toward the true crucible of Tomanovskaya’s ideological formation, the 
Paris Commune.  While her participation in Paris as “Elisabeth Dmitrieff” was still 
months away, she began to develop several contacts within France that tied her to the 
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tumultuous political process occurring there.  After being introduced by Korvin-
Krukovskaia and Jaclard, Tomanovskaya began corresponding with Benoît Malon, a 
prominent figure in the International’s Parisian section.  The Russian section’s contact 
with Malon began in early 1870 following the Le Creusot strike, and sometime during the 
summer of 1870, while Malon sat in Saint-Pelagie prison, he and Tomanovskaya began 
exchanging letters as part of this relationship.
29
  Through her relationship with Malon, 
Tomanovskaya would meet his partner André Léo upon arriving in Paris the following 
March, who proved an important collaborator (at least initially) in her work organizing 
the Commune’s women.  Moreover, it is likely that this network with Malon introduced 
her to Leo Frankel (a close comrade of Malon’s), who would provide vital support within 
the Communal leadership for her Union des Femmes. 
Equally important in terms of establishing connections within Paris was the return 
of her close comrades Anna Korvin-Krukovskaia and Victor Charles Jaclard to the city in 
September 1870.  Arriving only a week after the events of September 4, Jaclard 
immediately resumed his radical activities, becoming commander of the 158
th
 National 
Guard battalion based in the heavily working class 18
th
 Arrondissment.  Anna began 
working for the 18
th
 Arrrondissement’s Vigilance Committee, concentrating mainly on 
raising money to support her husband’s unit.  Jaclard himself actively participated in the 
October 31 insurrection against the Provisional Government, leading to his arrest and 
imprisonment until the Paris Siege ended in January.  Following a brief foray to Metz in 
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February, where Jaclard unsuccessfully ran for the National Assembly, the couple 
remained in Paris and once again became active following the Revolution of March 18.  
Though Korvin-Krukovskaia’s and Tomanovsky’s relationship became strained in the 
weeks after Tomanovsky’s arrival in Paris, her long-standing relationship with the couple 
would prove advantageous upon her initial arrival in Paris.
30
 
While developing these radical networks had later significance, in the fall and 
early winter of 1870 Tomanovsky’s focus still lay on the work of Geneva’s Russian 
section: going to meetings; translating documents for Narondnoe Delo; and working with 
the local women’s cooperatives.  These activities, coupled with her continued reading of 
radical literature, furthered her intellectual maturation process.  Geneva provided an ideal 
sanctuary for Tomanovsky during this period of ideological formation.  Similar to 
London during this period, Geneva possessed a liberal government relatively tolerant of 
radical activities.  Of particular import to young female radicals like Tomanovsky, 
Geneva also presented a site tolerant of women’s active presence in the public sphere, a 
rarity in Europe’s highly patriarchal social order.31    
Though her time in the Swiss city proved fruitful, in December 1870 events 
presented Tomanovskaya with an opportunity to accelerate her radical development while 
furthering the interests of Geneva’s branch of the International.  That month Geneva’s 
Central Council informed Tomanovskaya that she would be travelling to London for two 
purposes: first, to present the General Council with a report on the Russian section’s 
work and to provide perspective on current developments within Russia itself.  Since 
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Marx had agreed to be the Russian section’s representative on the General Council, he 
would be the main recipient of these reports.
32
  Second, Geneva’s Central Council also 
charged her with informing London about recent developments within the city, 
particularly those pertaining to the continued struggle with Bakunin and his supporters.  
However, this appointment begs an important question: why send a twenty-year-old 
newcomer to the Internationalist Movement on a mission of such importance?  Why not 
send a more experienced figure, such as Nicholas Utin, who had been operating within 
Geneva’s Russian community and larger radical community for years? 
There are several reasons Mrs. Tomanovskaya served as Geneva’s representative 
to London.  First, her natural intellect, coupled with her linguistic skills, made her 
particularly well-suited to present the work of both the Russian Section and the larger 
Geneva branch.  Moreover, both Thomas and McClellan contend that her charm and 
beauty (the latter describes her as “stylishly frail”) also factored into her choice as the 
Russian section’s representative.33  Eichner argues that the choice is also “indicative of 
Dmitrieff’s (Tomanovsky’s) importance within the organization.”34  While the sources 
certainly indicate that Tomanovskaya’s star was rising within the Geneva group, she still 
lacked the experience that other Russian section members’ possessed; thus, additional 
factors must have played a role in her choice.  Here is where her recent joining of the 
section comes into play; unlike most of its other members, including Utin, she had not 
participated in the Alliance with Bakunin and thus did not carry the stigma of associating 
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with the man who was rapidly establishing himself as Marx’s main ideological opponent 
within the International movement.  The language utilized in the introductory letter the 
Russian section sent with Tomanovskaya reinforces this assertion.  They begin by 
informing “Citizen Marx” that their “best friend” Elisabeth Tomanovskaya “is sincerely 
and profoundly devoted to the revolutionary cause of Russia.”  While this establishment 
of her radical credentials constitutes standard operating procedure in such letters, the next 
sentence is telling: “we will be glad if, through her, we will come to know you better, and 
that at the same time you will understand the circumstances of our activities in more 
detail, on which she will be able to speak to you.”35  Clearly, “understanding the 
circumstances of our activities” included the full disclosure of all previous activities 
involving Bakunin and the section’s ardent assurances that all remaining ties had been 
cleanly severed.  Moreover, the “come to know you better” may have, beyond Bakunin, 
also referenced an earlier misstep with Marx made by the Russian section.  In early 1870, 
Utin and his comrades addressed Marx in a formal letter as a “Dear and venerable 
Citizen,” to which Marx, 52 at the time, took personal umbrage, leading him to write his 
close colleague Hermann Jung inquiring why these Russians thought him an old man.  
Though the Russian section quickly apologized,
36
 this incident further reinforces 
Tomanovskaya being chosen as a representative to rehabilitate the Geneva Section’s 
image in the eyes of Marx and the General Council. 
Regardless of the reasons for her being chosen, Mrs. Tomanovskaya received a 
warm reception from the General Council; indeed, Marx, Engels, and Hermann Jung all 
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were impressed and charmed by the young Russian woman.  The Marx household shared 
this positive impression, particularly Marx’s beloved daughter Jenny, with whom 
Tomanovskaya became particularly close during her time in London.
37
  Tomanovskaya’s 
only surviving letter to Marx, written on January 7, 1871, demonstrates the personal 
relationship she developed with both Marx and his daughters, indicating that she spent a 
great deal of time with the family socially.
38
  It further appears that Tomanovskaya, who 
suffered from poor health, might have spent some time residing at the Marx home while 
recovering from a bout of bronchitis.  Indeed, the closeness of Tomanovskaya’s 
relationship with the Marx family was well-known enough to be utilized by Marx’s 
anarchist opponents, whose later anti-Semitic attacks asserted that Tomanovskaya was a 
Jewess and “fanatical admirer of Marx” whom he encouraged to venerate him as a 
“Modern Moses.”39  While these charges have no basis in historical reality 
(Tomanovskaya was raised Russian Orthodox), it is apparent that Tomanovskaya’s charm 
and intelligence rapidly won her the regard of Marx and his family, a regard that was 
soon reflected in her expanding work for the General Council. 
While her warm relations with the Marx family brightened her time in London, 
the bulk of Tomanovskaya’s time in the British capital focused on study and work.  As 
she was charged by Geneva’s Russian Section, Tomanovskaya focused much of her 
attention on answering Marx and the General Council’s questions regarding the current 
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situation in Russia.  The post-emancipation rural situation in Russia particularly drew 
Marx’s interests, and in a letter from January 7 Tomanovskaya responded to Marx’s 
questions on the future of communal property held among Russia’s former serfs.  This 
letter, given it is the only one from Tomanovskaya to Marx that survives, has been the 
subject of intense scholarly scrutiny and interpretation.  Eichner argues that 
Tomanovskaya’s assertions in this letter “disputed Marx’s model of historical 
progression… (and) posited a Russian exceptionalism, interwoven with an underlying 
critique of Russian patriarchy,” as well as illustrating her “feminist socialist thought” at 
the time.
40
  However, little in Tomanovskaya’s letter seems to support such a broad 
ideological assessment.  On the issue of communal property, she simply stated that 
governmental policy aimed at promoting the evolution of private ownership, thus 
concluding that “unfortunately it is very probable that it (communal property) will be 
transformed into small individual properties.”41  This hardly supports Eichner’s 
assessment that Tomanovskaya’s letter challenged Marx’s dialectic model of 
development by supporting the commune as a pre-modern alternative to capitalism.  
Moreover, Eichner’s contention that this letter offers a “window” into Tomanovskaya’s 
feminist thought is based on a single line where she states “a law passed last year already 
abolished communal property in communes with fewer than forty souls (men’s souls, 
since women, unhappily, do not possess souls).”42  Though clearly a critique of Russian 
gender norms, this phrase hardly constitutes an articulation of Tomanovskaya’s “feminist 
socialist thought.” 
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Rather than providing elements of Tomanovskaya’s fully developed ideological 
positions, the letter of January 7, taken as a whole, presents a young radical still 
formulating her political positions and thus still highly dependent on the writings and 
analysis of others.  Nearly a quarter of the letter, following her brief assessment of the 
current state of communal property, focuses on providing Marx with other sources he can 
consult for a fuller assessment.  She suggests that he consult Narodnoe Delo, “in which 
this problem is examined,” as well as the 1847 works of the Prussian Baron von 
Haxthausen, of which she owns “a copy and could send it…immediately.”  True to her 
nigilistki St. Petersburg roots, she concludes by adding that the last source is particularly 
valuable, since the great hero of her youth “Chernyshevsky mentions it often and quotes 
passages from it.”43  While Tomanovskaya does offer a brief analysis of her own, the 
letter is clearly aimed at providing Marx with the necessary information to further his 
assessment of conditions within Russia.  Given her relative newness to the International, 
as well as relative inexperience within the radical movement as a whole, 
Tomanovskaya’s role as a research assistant to Marx makes perfect sense.  Indeed, her 
heavy reliance on the works and assessments of others indicates a degree of self-
recognition of her limited experience within the radical movement, which in early 1871 
was based solely on her studies in St. Petersburg and Geneva, coupled with a limited 
amount of activist work for Geneva’s Russian section.   
However, though reflective of her lack of practical experience, Tomanovskaya’s 
letter also demonstrated her remarkable awareness of Russia’s current political and social 
conditions, as well as her engagement with current radical literature.  Given she already 
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possessed such skills at only twenty years old, the members of London’s General 
Council, particularly Marx, could not help but be impressed by this young Russian 
woman.  Indeed, this positive impression soon translated into an opportunity for the 
young Mrs. Tomanovskaya to convert her radical studies into practice as events in Paris 
accelerated following its surrender to the Prussians in late January 1871.  With the lifting 
of the Prussian siege, communication reopened with Paris, allowing the General 
Council’s representative to the city, Auguste Serraillier, to return and make a report on 
February 28.  His assessment deeply troubled Marx and the other Council members, 
highlighting as it did the lack of organization among the Internationalists during the 
siege, as well as during the February National Assembly elections.  While Serraillier 
praised the work of Leo Frankel and, to a lesser degree, Benoit Malon, his overall 
assessment of the Parisian Internationalists’ performance was quite poor and that, as a 
result, they had missed several key opportunities to further both the International’s 
interests and those of the French working class as whole.  He strongly advised that, since 
tensions between Paris’s population and the recently-elected Versailles Government were 
increasing daily, it might be wise to dispatch new delegates to the city.
44
  Though the 
Council commended Serraillier for his work, no immediate action was taken. 
The Revolution of March 18 and the subsequent foundation of the Commune 
changed the General Council’s view markedly.  On March 28, Marx announced that 
Serraillier had once again been dispatched to Paris, both to serve as the General Council’s 
representative and, prompted by a request from the International’s Federal Council in 
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Paris, to aid in guiding that group’s policy under the Commune.45  The General Council 
initially chose Hermann Jung, Marx’s longtime comrade, to travel to Paris as well; 
however, a recent bout with influenza greatly weakened him and left him unfit to travel.  
In his place, the General Council chose the young Mrs. Tomanovskaya and charged her 
with representing the Council and observing and reporting on the Commune.  Though 
clearly lacking Jung’s experience, Tomanovskaya possessed several attributes that 
recommended her for this assignment.  Her fluency in French would prove an obvious 
asset in operating within the French capital, while her equally excellent German could be 
used in communications with the General Council, as well as with German-speaking 
Internationalists such as Frankel.  Moreover, her existing relationships with several well-
connected radicals already within Paris, particularly Korvin-Krukovskaia and Jaclard but 
also Benoît Malon and his partner André Léo,
46
 ensured Tomanovskaya access to 
prominent radical leaders as well as their networks.  Finally, her newness to the 
International provided her with the advantage of obscurity; whereas the French 
authorities possessed detailed dossiers on Jung and other leading Internationalists, no 
records existed of Tomanovskaya’s affiliations.  To further disguise her origins and 
purposes, prior to leaving London she adopted the pseudonym Elisabeth Dmitrieff, 
created by replacing Tomanovskaya with her paternal grandmother’s maiden name.  As 
both Eichner and Singer-Lecocq note, Tomanovskaya, in establishing her nom de guerre, 
chose the masculine form of Dmitrieff, rather than the traditional feminine Dmitrieva.  
Whether this was an action taken wholly for the sake of secrecy or a “revolutionary 
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feminist act…appropriating a male prerogative,” as Eichner claims, is unclear.47  
Regardless of the name’s origin, Dmitrieff’s pseudonym proved effective in protecting 
her identity (and thus her safety after the Commune’s fall).  Her police dossier notes that, 
“it has not been possible to ascertain what the Dmitrieff woman was doing before March 
18.”48  To further preserve secrecy, within the minutes of the General Council, Marx and 
his colleagues would refer to Dmitrieff by the even more obscure title “the Russian 
Lady.”49 
Armed with this fresh identity, as well as false papers to that effect, the newly 
minted Madame Dmitrieff crossed the English Channel in late March and arrived in the 
city on March 28 or 29, with the latter, based on a letter from Jung to Marx, appearing the 
most likely.
50
  She found a city gripped in both excitement and trepidation.  Only the day 
before, Parisian radicals, along with many others, had gathered at the Hôtel de Ville to 
celebrate the election of the Commune’s new representative government, an event 
characterized by one participant as “a revolutionary and patriotic festive day, peaceful 
and joyous…worthy of those witnessed by the men of ’92.”51  However, the looming 
confrontation with the recently expelled Government, now residing at Versailles, 
tempered this enthusiasm to a marked degree.  Soon after arriving Dmitrieff contacted 
Benoît Malon, now a representative of the 17
th
 arrondissement, who was to facilitate her 
introduction into the city’s Internationalist and radical networks over the ensuing days.  
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This meeting likely included Dmitrieff’s first encounter with Malon’s partner André Léo, 
who encouraged Dmitrieff to join her as a member of the Comité des Femmes.
52
  This 
organization, founded during the siege by Proudhonist and 8
th
 Arrondissement Mayor 
Jules Allix, focused on pressing matters for women such as work and social welfare, but 
also long-term issues such as education and political rights.  Its efforts to train women in 
first aid to serve as nurses, as well as creating employment centers for women workers, 
made it very popular during the Siege, allowing it to boast by the March 18 Revolution 
160 district subcommittees and nearly 1800 members.
53
  Furthermore, the Comité made 
the first attempt in Paris (during the Prussian siege) to create units of women to serve in 
combat.  However, Allix’s idea for these so-called “Amazons of the Seine” involved a 
bizarre scheme of arming women with needles tipped with prussic acid, which 
unsurprisingly became the subject of humor and scorn.
54
  Following the Commune’s 
foundation, the Comité focused primarily on promoting educational reform, as well as 
providing work for women suffering economically in the unstable political environment. 
While Dmitrieff initially associated herself with this organization, which counted 
Léo, her old friend Anna Jaclard, and the “Red Virgin” Louise Michel within its ranks, 
this affiliation proved short-lived.  Less than two weeks separate Dmitrieff’s arrival in 
Paris and the April 11 declaration, which she authored, creating the Union des Femmes 
pour la Defense de Paris et les Soins aux Blesses.  Furthermore, when the initial lists of 
Union des Femmes members appeared after April 11, the names Léo, Jaclard, and Michel 
appear neither in the executive committee nor in the lists from individual arrondissement 
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committees.  This strongly indicates a break between Dmitrieff and the Commune’s other 
leading female radicals.  Edith Thomas notes this in passing but does not address its 
possible causes.
55
  Eichner, however, offers a potential reason for this break: a 
combination of Dmitrieff’s insistence that the Union adopt a “top-down, centralized 
structure” with her, young and unknown among most Parisian radicals and female 
activists, positioned as its leader.
56
  While this certainly contributed to the break among 
the Commune’s most prominent women, another element likely was at play as well.  
Dmitrieff, upon her arrival in Paris, began establishing new networks that, due to their 
ideological implications, created a gulf between her and the female radicals with whom 
she had previously established associations. 
One element that supports this model is the relationship that developed upon 
Dmitrieff’s arrival with Nathalie Lemel, who emerged after the Union’s establishment as 
Dmitrieff’s closest collaborator and her essential second-in-command.  Long established 
within Parisian radical circles, Lemel, twenty-five years Dmitrieff’s senior, arrived in 
Paris with her husband in the early 1860s.  Their work in book-binding led to her 
involving herself with the labor associations that sprang up during the late Second 
Empire.  Her radicalization led to her to joining the International by 1866.  Upon joining, 
she met Eugène Varlin who, following Lemel’s break with her husband over his 
alcoholism became her partner and lover.
57
  Varlin, along with his close collaborator Leo 
Frankel, constituted the faction within the International’s Parisian branch most closely 
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aligned with Marx and the General Council.  Given that Dmitrieff’s presence in Paris was 
a result of her dispatch by the General Council with whom Varlin and Frankel kept close 
contact through the Commune, one can conclude that Dmitrieff’s and Lemel’s connection 
also brought her into contact with Varlin and Frankel.  Indeed, Dmitrieff’s subsequent 
relationship with Frankel further reinforces this view.
58
 
This new network placed Dmitrieff in clear ideological opposition to Léo, Michel, 
and even Jaclard.
59
  Though partnered with the prominent Internationalist Malon, Andre 
Léo had little use for London’s General Council and Karl Marx in particular.  A feminist 
first, Léo viewed gender equality as a prerequisite for social revolution.  During the 
Commune she vigorously attacked the Communal Government, the International, and all 
radical organizations that alienated women by exclusion and thus “found a way to cause 
half of (their) troops, who asked only to march and fight with them, to be passed over.”60  
Léo, beyond viewing the International under Marx and the General Council as a 
detriment to equality between the sexes, also objected to its model of centralized control.  
Favoring the decentralized approach to revolution favored by Marx’s opponent Bakunin, 
which she viewed as more inherently democratic, she attacked Marx for establishing 
himself as the “pontiff of the International Association” with the power to 
“excommunicate” all who disagreed with his “papal bull.”61  Given Léo’s strong views 
on Marx and centralized organizations, a clash between her and Dmitrieff, Marx’s 
personal choice to represent the General Council in Paris, seems highly likely.  Louise 
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Michel, who first collaborated with Léo during the late Second Empire, shared her 
disdain for highly centralized political forms and preferred the grassroots networks of the 
neighborhood vigilance committees and clubs.  Moreover, as Edith Thomas notes in her 
biography, Michel reveled in her celebrated position as the “Red Virgin,” which 
manifested in her virtual need “to bathe in the crowd…she sought attention out 
everywhere.”62  Given this, it seems highly unlikely that Michel would willingly defer to 
a newcomer like Dmitrieff, either in terms of leadership among the Commune’s women 
or the corresponding spotlight it yielded. 
The breakdown of Dmitrieff’s political relationship with Anna Jaclard, her 
childhood friend and comrade from the Geneva days, appears also to have been a product 
of a preexisting division within Paris’s radical community.  During the late Second 
Empire, Anna’s husband Victor, though a member of the International’s Paris section, 
closely identified himself with Louis-Auguste Blanqui and his ideological mission to 
realize revolution through the seizure of political power.  This agenda, promoted within 
the Paris branch by Jaclard and Emile Duval, drew opposition from Paul Lafargue, 
Eugene Varlin, Leo Frankel, and others close to Marx and the General Council, though it 
did not prevent these men from working together in their common opposition to Louis 
Napoleon’s regime.63  Jaclard’s and his future wife Anna’s work in Geneva did much to 
redeem him in the eyes of the General Council and Marx, who, despite his long-standing 
ideological disdain for Blanqui, expressed his admiration for the young radical.
64
  
 However, the evidence strongly suggests that, upon Jaclard’s return to Paris, he 
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reestablished his close ties to Blanqui and his faction.  His appointment to a National 
Guard command in the 18
th
 Arrondissment, as well as his and Anna’s work for that 
section’s Vigilance Committee during the siege, support this argument, as the 18th 
Arrondissment constituted the main Blanquist stronghold within Paris.  Moreover, during 
the October 31, 1870, insurrection against the Government of National Defense, Jaclard 
clearly identified himself with Blanqui’s unsuccessful efforts to seize control at the Hotel 
de Ville and establish a revolutionary government.  This support, as mentioned 
previously, led to Jaclard’s arrest following the failed uprising, placing him on a list 
dominated by Blanquists.
65
  During his imprisonment, Anna remained active in the 18
th
 
Arrondissment Vigilance Committee, as well as participating heavily in club activities in 
that district.
66
  Following Jaclard’s release in January, fellow radicals elected him 
commander of the XVIIe Légion fédéréé, a National Guard unit made up almost 
exclusively of Blanqui’s supporters.  On March 18, Jaclard, “a partisan of direct action” 
in the Blanquist tradition,
67
 urged an immediate march on Versailles, which ultimately 
did not occur.  Standing for election in the 18
th
 Arrondissment on March 26, Jaclard fell 
short of being elected to the Communal Council and then focused his activities on his 
military duties.
68
  While Anna and Jaclard had been in contact with Dmitrieff during this 
period, she likely did not discover the extent of their relationship with the Blanquist 
faction until her arrival at the end of March.  This growing political gulf between the two 
childhood friends serves to account, along with Dmitrieff’s differences with Léo and 
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Michel, for the vastly different leadership in the Union des Femmes when it first 
appeared in early April as compared to that of the Comité des Femmes. 
The exact origin of the Union prior to the publication of “A Call to the Women 
Citizens of Paris” on April 11 is unclear, as no records exist of Dmitrieff’s actions during 
that period.  However, based on the background of those signing the subsequent 
documents and those serving later in committee posts for the Union, it appears that 
Dmitrieff, assisted by Natalie Lemel, began recruiting women of working class origin 
from the vigilance committees and clubs to participate in this new organization.  
According to Edith Thomas, this represented a departure from the Comité des Femmes, 
whose membership consisted heavily of women who though often politically radical 
came primarily from bourgeois and petty bourgeois backgrounds.
69
  Dmitrieff’s success 
in this regard, given her less than proletarian background, demonstrates her capacity to 
navigate Paris’s working class networks as well as its radical circles, though the support, 
influence, and knowledge of Natalie Lemel likely contributed as well.    
Dmitrieff’s personal charisma, which strongly asserted itself during the 
Commune, also played a role in her organizational efforts.  Lissagaray, the Commune’s 
great chronicler, described her as “tall, golden-haired, wonderfully pretty” and displaying 
in her efforts “unbelievable strength in her noble heart.”70  Even the police reports in her 
dossier indicate this magnetism, citing her “active disposition” and an elegance similar to 
the heroine of the Great Revolution, Théroigne de Méricourt.
71
  By utilizing both her 
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personal skills and her connections, Dmitrieff by April 11 garnered enough support to 
issue a proclamation calling upon Paris’s women to mobilize in order to further 
participate in the city’s defense. 
This proclamation, entitled “A Call to the Women Citizens of Paris,” though 
issued in the name of “a group of Parisian women,” almost certainly was authored by 
Dmitrieff herself.
72
  It illustrates how quickly she grasped the necessary nuance needed in 
crafting an appeal that would resonate with the Parisian masses’ diverse ideological 
views.  Portions of the language reflect her background as an Internationalist and devotee 
of Marx, such as her statement emphasizing that nations throughout Europe are “waiting 
for our victory to free themselves in their turn” and her harsh attacks on the “tyranny” of 
the “privileged classes.”  However, others, particularly on the question of labor’s 
organization are more ambiguous; she writes of how the masses “want to work but...also 
want the products of our work.”73  This deliberate ambiguity illustrated Dmitrieff’s 
recognition that she needed to appeal beyond Marxist Internationalists, who represented a 
very small portion of Paris’s radicals.  The majority of Parisian working class activists 
and socialists (including many members of the International’s French branch) viewed 
economic reform in the cooperativist terms put forth by Proudhon, Louis Blanc, and even 
Blanqui.
74
  Under this conception, the state would assist workers in the establishment of 
cooperatives that would allow them to control the fruits of their labor within the existing 
capitalist order.  As one Communard newspaper, the Montagne, asserted, “socialism does 
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not deny property...on the contrary it affirms the need for individual ownership.”75  While 
this certainly contrasted with the Marxist views on labor’s organization she had favored 
during her time in Geneva and London, Dmitrieff ‘s willingness to compromise for the 
sake of more effective mobilization demonstrates her growing understanding of the 
differences between ideological study and revolutionary organizing in the face of a crisis. 
While the elements aimed at appealing to Parisian radicals’ diverse views on 
organizing labor represent strategic ambiguity on Dmitrieff’s part, at other points within 
the “Call” she departs from her Marxist views outright to mobilize women through the 
utilization of France’s revolutionary legacy.  In attempting to gather women to this new 
organization, Dmitrieff explicitly calls to “the citoyennes of Paris, daughters of the 
women of the Great Revolution, the women that, in the name of the people and justice, 
marched to Versailles and took Louis XVI as a captive.”76  Obviously, such appeals ran 
counter to the position posited by Marx in his 1852 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon, in which Marx decried French radicals’ tendency “to parody, now 1789, now 
the revolutionary tradition of 1793–95” by “conjuring up the spirits of the past to their 
service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans and costumes.”77  Only a few months 
before, during his “Second Address to the General Council on the Franco-Prussian War,” 
Marx asserted the need for French radicals to avoid “allow[ing] themselves to be deluded 
by the national souvenirs of 1792” and instead  “build for the future.”78  As discussed in 
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the previous chapter, Leo Frankel and other Marxist Internationalist permitted themselves 
at times to be associated with such statements but never made them directly.  Clearly, by 
virtue of her association with Natalie Lemel, as well as the other working class women 
who rapidly emerged as leaders within the Union, Dmitrieff recognized the resonance 
that such appeals had among female French workers.
79
  Moreover, while ideological 
differences carried great weight within radical intellectual circles (as demonstrated by 
Dmitrieff’s clashes with Leo and Jaclard), in matters of practical organizing to care for 
the wounded and assist the war effort, Dmitrieff clearly recognized that the importance of 
ideological purity diminished greatly.  Thus, with this first call to organize Paris’s 
working class and radical women, Elisabeth Dmitrieff established her capacity to 
distinguish what tactics were needed during “on the ground” operations amid crisis from 
debates and peaceful organizing in St. Petersburg, Geneva, and London. 
As directed in the April 11 proclamation’s conclusion, interested Parisian women 
met that evening at 8 PM at le Grand Café de Nations at 79 rue de Temple.  A second 
organizational meeting was held two days later at the municipal building in the 3
rd
 
Arrondissement.
80
  These two meetings marked the official birth of the Union des 
Femmes pour la Defense de Paris et les Soins aux Blessés, which, under Dmitrieff’s 
leadership rapidly grew into the Paris Commune’s most important and influential 
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women’s organization.  The name itself that this organization adopted provides, like the 
April 11 “Call,” important clues as to why Dmitrieff’s Union functioned so successfully 
as a mobilizing force in Paris.  By design, potentially polarizing political language and 
labels were omitted.  Though Dmitrieff explicitly stated in her notes that she intended all 
Union members to be obligated to join the International Workingmen’s Association and 
pay dues, no mention of the International appears in the organization’s title.81  Other 
words utilized by similar organizations during the Commune, such as “revolutionary” and 
“socialist,” are absent as well.  Rather, the name emphasizes the city’s defense and the 
care of the wounded, causes capable of drawing women from the broadest possible 
political spectrum.   
This relatively politically neutral title mirrors the language utilized by Dmitrieff 
in the April 11 “Call,” demonstrating again an understanding on Dmitrieff’s part as to 
what language resonated with both ideological and non-ideological Parisian women.  
Obviously Dmitrieff and most of her fellow Union members envisioned a far more 
sweeping role for their organization than simply caring for the wounded and other 
traditional “women’s” work (as their subsequent efforts illustrate); however, Dmitrieff 
recognized that women did not constitute the only audience interested in the organization.  
The Union’s title also served to disarm potential anti-feminist sentiment on the part of 
their male Communard comrades, many of whom possessed strong views on women’s 
roles.  An organization whose name indicated a challenge to existing gender norms likely 
would encounter resistance; however, a group that, in the words of a radical newspaper, 
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constituted “a responsible organization among the citoyennes of Paris” founded “to give 
assistance in the work of the government’s commissions and to serve at ambulance 
stations (and) at canteens” faced a much lower likelihood of male opposition.82  While 
Dmitrieff’s experiences in Russia and Geneva made her painfully familiar with her male 
comrades’ gendered views, she clearly benefited from her exchanges with Lemel and 
other radical Parisian women in creating a name capable of both mobilizing women and 
negotiating the chauvinism of radical Frenchmen. 
The Union’s April 14 appeal to the Commune’s Executive Commission further 
underscores Dmitrieff’s capacity to navigate the complex interaction between politics and 
gender under the Commune.  This document, authored by Dmitrieff and signed by her as 
well as seven women workers, constituted the Union’s first formal request for aid, 
support, and recognition by the Commune’s government.  As with the Union’s 
organizational title, this appeal adroitly framed its request in terms of aiding the city’s 
defense, stating “union makes strength; in time of danger all individual efforts must 
combine to form a collective, invincible resistance by the whole population.”83  More 
importantly, Dmitrieff included in this official request a cleverly crafted but explicit 
statement that the Commune also recognized that universal equality constituted one of the 
main principles for which it strove.  Rather than frame this as a rights-based demand, 
Dmitrieff explicitly ties her appeal for gender equality to the general call for the 
destruction of all distinction, including that of class.  She asserts that “the Commune, 
representing the principle of extinction of all privilege and all inequality, should therefore 
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consider all grievances of any portion of the people without discrimination of sex, since 
such discrimination having…been enforced as a means of maintaining the privileges of 
the ruling class.”84  She further contends that ALL Parisians possessed a vested interest in 
aiding the Commune’s success, since “ensuring the rule of justice and labor is of as much 
importance to women as it is to Paris’s men.”85 
Both the approach and tone of the April 14 “Address” to the Commune’s 
Executive Commission indicate a document constructed with great care and awareness of 
audience.  While Dmitrieff crafted the April 11 “Call” and the Union’s name to appeal to 
the general Parisian pro-Commune population, the “Address” was aimed at a body of 
specific individuals: the seven man Executive Committee as well as the general 
Communal body.  Given that Dmitrieff arrived in Paris only two weeks before, her fellow 
Union members’ aid, particularly Natalie Lemel’s, likely proved essential in properly 
nuancing this petition.  Indeed, it is impossible to imagine that Dmitrieff could have 
achieved so much so quickly without her connection with Lemel, who, as Eichner notes, 
“had work, union, and strike experience,” as well as many long-standing personal 
connections with members of both the Communal leadership and prominent individuals 
within Paris’s radical female community.86  In addition to Lemel, of the seven women 
who also signed the April 14 “Address,” two, Aline Jarry and Blanche Lefevre, also 
possessed established credentials within Parisian radical circles.  While our knowledge of 
their overall activities is limited, Jarry worked in the late 1860s with Andre Léo in her 
feminist organizing, thus indicating she possessed working knowledge of Paris’s radical 
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networks.  Lefevre established a reputation during the siege as a popular speaker in the 
clubs where other prominent Parisian radicals also participated frequently.
87
  These 
French women, as well as unnamed others, interacted regularly with the men who now 
constituted the Commune’s leadership, thus allowing Dmitrieff by virtue of her growing 
connections to these women to shape the April 14 “Address” in the manner most likely to 
yield success. 
Aided by these female comrades, the document Dmitrieff produced illustrates an 
acute awareness of the dominant currents regarding gender among the Commune’s 
leadership.  As noted above, the Union framed its April 14 request in terms of aiding 
Paris’s defense and undercutting the system of privilege previously perpetrated by 
France’s ruling class.  Direct calls for female suffrage and citizenship rights are avoided; 
rather the emphasis is placed on universal equality in the name of class solidarity.  While 
the Union soon shifted its emphasis to demanding economic justice for Paris’s women, 
this initially cautious approach demonstrates Dmitrieff and her comrades’ understanding 
of the powerful influence that Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s ideas still enjoyed within 
Parisian radical circles.  As Robert Tombs aptly observes, “Proudhon’s influence 
saturated Communard socialism,”88 and while this most often manifested itself in 
approaches to labor organization and economics, Proudhon’s ideas regarding women still 
carried great influence as well.  Proudhon’s general misogyny permeated most of his 
works, epitomized by such statements as “Man and woman are not 
companions…consequently, far from advocating what is now called the emancipation of 
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woman, I should incline, rather, if there were no other alternative, to exclude her from 
society.”89   
Proudhon and his followers strongly opposed women’s participation in both 
political activism and work outside the home, though beyond the factory floor most male 
French radicals rejected Proudhon’s militant misogyny and did support free education for 
girls as well as boys.  Proudhon’s ideas strongly influenced Parisian radical politics 
throughout the 1860s, including within the International’s French branch.  In 1866, the 
French delegates in the International’s Geneva Conference signed a joint declaration that 
deemed women’s participation in industrial work as “one of the most pressing causes of 
the degeneration of the species.”90  Henri Tolain, a founder of the French branch, asserted 
that women working outside the home contributed to female prostitution.  Though by the 
time of the Commune the International’s French branch included some members, 
particularly Frankel, Varlin, and Malon, who supported women’s active inclusion in 
radical activism and advocated for them in the workforce, the Proudhon view still carried 
significant weight.
91
  Though other factions within the Communal Government, 
particularly the neo-Jacobins and Blanquists, did not overtly express similar views, 
several of their actions, particularly their eventual banning of women from the battlefield 
on May 1, indicate, as Eichner notes, a significant degree of sexism.
92
  Given these 
realities, Dmitrieff’s emphasis on the need for unity across gender lines and her framing 
                                                 
89
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government 
(New York: Dover, 1970), 246. 
90
Quoted in Vincent, 15. 
91On Tolain see Edith Thomas, “The Woman of the Commune,” The Massachusetts Review 12, no. 3 
(Summer, 1971): 410–12.  For the General Council position on Proudhon, see August Nimtz, Marx and 
Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
200), 199–201. 
92
Eichner, 103. 
199 
 
of gender inequality in class terms represents a clear attempt to assure the Communal 
Government’s support in a manner that forestalled any objection based on existing 
ideological gender biases.  This approach proved successful and the Executive Council 
provided the Union with rooms in each Arrondissment municipal building for offices, as 
well as providing funding for printing expenses.  Thus granted de facto official 
recognition, Dmitrieff and her comrades began establishing institutions to facilitate the 
managing and running of their new Union.  For Dmitrieff, this process would present new 
opportunities and challenges in actualizing her ideological conceptions amid a Paris 
facing the realities of a new siege. 
While gaining the Commune’s support certainly aided Dmitrieff in her efforts, 
managing the Union also required the establishment of administrative and organizational 
structures capable of successfully operating in a Paris under growing military and 
economic pressure.  To this end, Dmitrieff employed an approach that combined her 
previous experiences in the International with elements geared to meet the specific needs 
of Paris’s female population.  Without question, the basic organizational model drew 
heavily on that utilized by the International.  Several scholars, combining these 
similarities with Dmitrieff’s statement regarding requiring Union members to join the 
International as well, conclude that the Union des Femmes “was actually the women’s 
section of the French International.”93  These scholars also cite statements made by 
Benoit Malon as evidence of this direct tie; however, Malon’s commentary only implies 
an understandably close relationship based on Dmitrieff’s and Lemel’s Internationalist 
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background.
94
  Though Dmitrieff likely intended an eventual official status as a section of 
the French branch, particularly given the potential which an influx of women presented 
for further diluting the Proudhonian tendencies of some male members, no evidence 
exists of the Union joining in an official capacity.
95
  Further, creating an explicit tie, at 
least at the onset, between the Union and the International ran counter to the inclusive 
language Dmitrieff and her comrades employed in both the April 11 “Call” and the April 
14 “Address.” 
Regardless of official ties, the Union des Femmes’ organizational model, shaped 
in large part by Dmitrieff and Lemel, mirrored that of the International, particularly with 
its emphasis on federalism.  The Union’s administrative plan, first published in La 
Sociale on April 20, created a two-tier system operating first at the Arrondissement level 
and then at the city-wide level through the auspices of a Central Committee.  This Central 
Committee, according to Article 1, consisted of a representative from each 
Arrondissement (twenty in all) elected by their membership and subject to recall at any 
time.  Replicated at the local level, the Union established the same structure in each 
Arrondissement section, with each consisting of eleven elected members headed by a 
rotating president.  At both levels, official committee meetings were to be held twice 
daily; however, Article 3 asserts that both the Central Committee and the Arrondissement 
offices must remain open “day and night.”96  This emphasis on permanent operation 
reflects the multifaceted role Dmitrieff envisioned for the Union.  Foremost in 
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Dmitrieff’s emphasis on keeping the Union in constant operation was serving in the 
Commune’s war effort: providing care for the wounded; producing vital war materials; 
and, if needed, playing a direct role in the fighting.  While it was not emphasized in the 
Union’s earlier statements, Dmitrieff clearly viewed the Union as playing a potential 
military role.  Article 14 states that funds not used for charity and administrative purposes 
be set aside to “purchase kerosene and arms for citoyennes who will fight should the 
moment arise.”97  While earlier organizations, particularly Allix’s “Amazons of the 
Seine” envisioned a combat role for Parisian women, Dmitrieff (who likely was aware of 
the derision that had met Allix’s plan) took a much more realistic approach, not 
presenting grandiose images of women armed with poison needles but rather gathering 
necessary arms and equipment for an eventuality that she deemed rather likely.  This not 
only further demonstrates her growing understanding of operating within Paris but also 
shows that, in a relatively short period of time, she came to grasp the dire military 
situation facing the Commune.   
Dmitrieff’s understanding of the military crisis came from several sources, 
indicating once again the importance of her expanding network within Paris.  One likely 
source of her knowledge was her growing contact with key Communard military leaders.  
In her letter to Hermann Jung on April 24, she prominently mentions her interactions 
with Jaroslav Dombrowski, a Polish officer considered by many the Commune’s most 
brilliant military leader.  Though she compliments Dombrowski’s brave efforts, Dmitrieff 
gloomily relates, based on the information he passed on, that she possesses “no illusions” 
regarding the Commune’s situation and that they “are expecting a general attack” any 
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day.  She then engages in an extended denunciation of General Gustave-Paul Cluseret, a 
French military adventurer serving as the Commune’s commander-in-chief.  Dombrowski 
despised Cluseret, viewing him as a dandy and fool, and thus actively conspired for his 
removal.  Clearly Dombrowski presented this assessment to Dmitrieff, which influenced 
her greatly, leading her to conclude to Jung that, due to military incompetence, “one of 
these days Cluseret will be arrested.”98  Dmitrieff’s access to Dombrowski, as well as 
other Communard leaders well apprised of the military situation (such as Frankel and 
Malon), provided one source of valuable military information necessary for the Union to 
prepare accordingly. 
While military commanders proved an important source for Dmitrieff in 
developing the Union’s administrative and military policies, her fellow Union members’ 
experiences likely played an equally vital role in shaping her planning efforts.  Since the 
events of March 18, radical Parisian women operated as both actors and spectators to 
most military actions within and without the city.  Of particular importance to 
understanding the potentially dire military picture were the experiences and observations 
of Parisian women during the so-called “Great Sortie” on April 3.  Prompted by internal 
pressure, the Communal government assented to allowing the National Guard to make a 
direct march on Versailles aimed at forcing Thiers and the National Assembly to 
recognize the Commune’s legitimacy.  Inspired by this effort, a proclamation appeared on 
both street corners and in radical newspapers calling for Parisian women to march as well 
on Versailles on April 3.  The call from “Une Véritable Citoyenne” invoked the tradition 
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of 1789 and called upon Parisian women once again to march on Versailles, this time to 
“tell Versailles that the (National) Assembly is not the law: Paris is.”99  Thus on April 3, 
as the National Guard began its march, Parisian women gathered at the Place de la 
Concorde where they made ready to begin their own march on Versailles.  The American 
Ambassador Elihu Washburne, no friend of the Commune, described the women’s 
demonstration as follows: “Many of them wore the ‘bonnet rouge,’ and all were singing 
the Marseillaise” as they marched “in poor imitation of those who marched upon the 
same place in the time of Louis the Sixteenth.”100   
However, as they arrived at Paris’s gate, they encountered the flotsam and jetsam 
of the “Great Sortie.”  The effort, due to its lack of organization and proper military 
planning, had been easily crushed by the French regulars with great losses.  As one of the 
marchers described, “there were not enough of us to go to Versailles but there were 
enough to go tend the injured in the Commune’s marching companies.”101  This 
experience alerted many radical Parisian women to the Commune’s precarious military 
situation and the urgent need for greater preparation, as demonstrated in the ensuing days 
following April 3 as groups of women walked the streets remonstrating with men they 
discovered not in uniform.
102
  While there is no direct evidence, it seems highly probable 
that a significant number of these women later joined the Union and thus conveyed their 
observations regarding the Commune’s limited capacities in the field to Dmitrieff and 
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other Union leaders.  This information provided to Dmitrieff by means of her growing 
network within the Union, coupled with her connections with the Commune’s military 
leadership, allowed her to make educated judgments regarding the necessity of the Union 
preparing for a military role.  The twenty-four hour schedule at all Union offices, coupled 
with the gathering of arms and incendiary weapons, illustrates just what types of 
preparations would be necessary to play a role in the city’s defense. 
Providing for the Union’s potential military role presents only one example of 
Dmitrieff’s thinking regarding the defense of the city in mid to late April.  While creating 
the administrative basis for the Union des Femmes, Dmitrieff also began actively 
working to assure that the Union stood as the unquestioned dominant body in terms of 
organizing the women of the Commune.  These efforts led her into direct and public 
conflict with her former associate André Léo and her longtime friend Anna Jaclard.  
Though the ideological gulf between Léo, Jaclard, and Dmitrieff likely contributed to 
their exclusion from any leadership role in the Union des Femmes, there had been no 
open break between the women.  This, however, changed on April 22, when a 
proclamation appeared from the Montmartre Vigilance Committee calling for Parisian 
women to “make themselves available to the Commune to form ambulance stations to 
follow troops engaged with the enemy.”103  This proclamation included the signatures of 
André Léo, Anna Jaclard, and Louise Michel, as well as several other women who had 
been prominent Comité des Femmes members.  The Montmartre Vigilance Committee 
served a similar function to the Union: providing for wounded soldiers; establishing 
sources of aid for impoverished soldiers’ wives; and sending petitions for aid to the 
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Communal Council.  In short, it served the same essential functions as the Union itself.
104
  
Dmitrieff, who saw the Union as the sole representative of the women of the Commune, 
greatly resented this action, as indicated by her response.  Several days after the 
Vigilance Committee’s proclamation, the Union responded in several newspapers, 
claiming that André Léo “declared she had no official connection with the…Vigilance 
Committee” that was “alien to our union.”  This statement further declared that she had 
“attested to her desire” to remain an active member of the Union’s 10th Arrondissement 
Committee.
105
 
This statement by the Union is interesting for several reasons.  First, there exists 
no record of André Léo serving on the 10
th
 Arrondissment Committee and very little 
evidence of her participation in the Union des Femmes in any capacity.
106
  This calls into 
question whether Léo actually made any of the statements the Union claimed in their 
rebuttal to the Vigilance Committee.  Unfortunately there exist no other documents or 
accounts relevant to this incident on the part of Léo, Dmitrieff, or any other figure.  
However, the vigor of the Union’s response, which could not have been made without 
Dmitrieff’s order, demonstrates a belief on the part of Dmitrieff that she now possessed 
the capacity and standing to challenge even the most prominent and established women 
within the Parisian radical movement.  Dmitrieff’s meteoric rise since her arrival in Paris 
less than a month earlier to the pinnacle of leadership among the Commune’s women can 
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be attributed in part to her organizational skills and vigor.  Yet, the real source of her 
growing authority stemmed from her ability to establish key connections within the 
Parisian radical community.  Her ability to gain official recognition by the Communal 
Council rapidly presents one example of this capacity.  Yet, her connections with other 
Internationalists, particularly Leo Frankel and Benoît Malon,
107
 ultimately proved vital to 
the Union’s position as preeminent among the Commune’s female organizations.  The 
close collaboration between Dmitrieff, Frankel, and Malon on the Union’s labor platform 
would effectively demonstrate the fruits of this association. 
Beyond the issues of caring for the wounded and defensive preparations, 
Dmitrieff’s Union des Femmes focused extensive attention during its brief existence on 
the question of women’s labor and economic concerns.  The measures taken by the Union 
under Dmitrieff’s leadership, while addressing the longue durée restructuring of labor 
relations in terms of gender and class, also focused extensively on addressing the 
immediate economic crisis facing many working class Parisian women and their families.  
Four months of siege by the Prussians followed by a renewed siege by the Versailles 
Government left the Parisian economy in absolute disarray.  Many businesses and shops 
closed as their owners abandoned the city in the wake of the March 18 Revolution. The 
resulting spike in unemployment disproportionately affected Paris’s working class.  The 
burden fell even more heavily on Parisian working women, who lacked the option of 
serving in the National Guard, which provided men with 30 sous a day subsidy for their 
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service.
108
  However, within working class family economies, the National Guard pay 
alone failed to meet even the most basic needs.  Hence working class women turned to 
the Commune seeking employment.  Given the military situation, many appealed for 
work in war industries: producing munitions; sewing uniforms; and providing other 
essential services for the war effort in exchange for compensation.  However, the 
complex relationship between the Communal Government and the city economy made 
this situation difficult, at least initially.  While cooperatives immediately sprang up in 
response to the demand for military supplies, the Commune insisted that contracts be 
accepted on a competitive basis.  Several sources relate that those contractors still 
operating in Paris following the Commune’s declaration universally lowered wages, 
citing the economic crisis prompted by political instability.  As a result, they could 
produce military supplies for much lower costs to the Commune than the worker-run 
associations.  For instance, the Monteux-Bernard textile factory sold the Commune 
jackets for 3.75 francs and trousers for 2.50.  In comparison, worker-run cooperatives, in 
order to provide their members with a living wage, could sell the same items for no less 
than 6 francs a piece.
109
  This disparity fell particularly on Parisian women, who had long 
predominated in the so-called “needle trades” and thus became the focus of Dmitrieff and 
the Union des Femmes. 
Prompted both by this immediate crisis and the larger goal of reshaping 
productive relations, Dmitrieff composed an appeal on behalf of the Union to the 
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Commission of Labor and Exchange.
110
  Like earlier documents composed by Dmitrieff 
on behalf of the Union, this appeal demonstrates a keen understanding of the need to 
balance ideology and practicality gained through a continually developing awareness of 
the Parisian radical milieu’s internal dynamics.  This is illustrated by Dmitrieff’s marked 
awareness of audience in her drafting of this document.  While her earlier public 
proclamations, such as the April 11 “Call,” largely employed general appeals to equality 
and the legacy of the Great Revolution, this document, addressed to a Commission 
controlled by fellow Internationalists Leo Frankel and Benoît Malon, is much more 
ideological in nature.  In calling for the establishment of “free producer associations,” 
Dmitrieff utilizes a language that is clearly Marxian, asserting that creating these 
associations “would put an end to the exploitation and enslavement of Labor by 
Capital.”111  Continuing this theme, she evokes Marx’s conceptions of immiseration and 
alienation in justifying why the creation of these associations would provide an 
immediate material benefit.  Further appealing to Frankel’s and Malon’s Internationalist 
sensibilities, Dmitrieff asserts that these associations in time would establish international 
networks, based around each trade, aimed at “centralizing the international interests of 
the producers,” largely through requiring all association participants to become members 
of the International Working Men’s Association.112   
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However, while Dmitrieff employs clear elements of Internationalist discourse in 
this appeal, she balances these ideological elements with more pragmatic justifications 
for the creation of these associations and carefully avoids overt arguments based on a 
gendered conception of rights.  Aware that while Frankel and Malon constituted two of 
the most ardent supporters of women’s rights within the Commune’s government, this 
appeal would also be seen by other sets of less enlightened eyes at both the Commission 
of Labor and Exchange and within the Communal Council.  To account for this, 
Dmitrieff, as in her earlier correspondence with the Commune’s government, frames her 
demand for greater economic rights for Parisian women in class terms, proclaiming that 
these associations aimed to end “all competition between male and female workers,” 
given that “their interests are identical and their solidarity is essential to the success of the 
final world-wide strike of labor against capital.”113  Furthermore, she calls for the 
establishment of these cooperatives primarily in those crafts dominated by women, 
providing a list of twenty-seven fields heavily concentrated in the “needle trades.”   
Similarly pragmatic, she presents this appeal for women’s producer associations as 
addressing the immediate economic crisis facing the Commune.  She contends that “with 
poverty increasing at an alarming rate,” Parisian women, “who have become 
momentarily revolutionary in spirit,” may “relapse into the more or less reactionary and 
passive position which the social order of the past marked out for them.”114  Thus, 
Dmitrieff contends, this economic crisis constitutes not just an issue of women’s labor 
but one that could potentially undercut the overall political support for the Commune 
                                                 
113
Ibid. 
114
Ibid. 
210 
 
itself.  Further asserting this economic and political pragmatism, Dmitrieff assures the 
Commission that the immediate concern of these women’s associations upon their 
inception would be war production.  Given the depressed nature of Parisian industry 
overall, she, like most of  her Union comrades and Parisian working women in general, 
understood that providing for the National Guard’s needs represented the only major 
booming aspect of the city’s economy.  With these points, Dmitrieff managed within this 
document to balance her Internationalist ideology with arguments framed to appeal to the 
radicals of other political stripes within the Communal government. 
While Dmitrieff’s proposal placed emphasis on using these producer associations 
to meet immediate needs, she also included broader, long-range plans to organize 
women’s work on a permanent basis.  However, she, like her fellow Internationalist Leo 
Frankel, understood that the Communal Government, with its diverse ideological 
elements, contained a majority opposed to any outright attack on the capitalist mode of 
production.  Ample evidence exists to support this state of affairs, beginning with the 
Communal Government’s refusal to seize the assets of the Bank of France and, as a 
result, its dependence on that institution’s line of credit to pay soldiers and remain 
solvent.
115
  In terms of production, the Communal Government, as discussed above, 
granted no competitive advantage to worker’s associations prior to May 12, little more 
than ten days prior to the entry of the French Army into Paris.   
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Recognizing this reality, Dmitrieff’s proposal to the Labor and Exchange 
Commission represented an ideological compromise on her part, envisioning a long-term 
restructuring of women’s work within the bounds of capitalist competition.  Financing 
these women’s worker associations presents one example of this. Dmitrieff recognized 
that government support would be necessary given the very low likelihood that these 
cooperative institutions would be given loans or credits from private institutions.  
However, rather than a direct subsidy, Dmitrieff, aiming to avoid opposition within the 
Communal Government, proposed that the state provide low interest loans for 
establishing these cooperatives.  Furthermore, in her proposed organization plan, she 
assured the Commission and the Communal Government a good return on their 
investment.  She maintained that, unlike the National Workshops created during the 1848 
Revolution, which left women engaged in “futile and unproductive work,” these new 
women’s cooperatives would take measures “to have marketable objects produced which 
have immediate value and are easily sold.”116  Informed by her immersion in Parisian 
radical politics, Dmitrieff realized that while her Internationalist ideological background 
rejected the idea of workers being forced to compete within a capitalist structure, the 
reality of the situation called for compromise in order to achieve the best possible 
outcome for Paris’s working women.117 
The results of Dmitrieff’s nuanced appeal to the Commission of Labor and 
Exchange appear mixed.  While Frankel and Malon began providing financial support to 
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the Union by the first days of May, neither the Commune nor the Commission took 
immediate action to facilitate the project of establishing women’s cooperatives.  This can 
be credited in part to continued resistance by some within the Commune’s government to 
supporting a project that potentially provided for women’s permanent removal from the 
home.  For many Communards, particularly those of the Proudhonian bent, the creation 
of the social republic offered the potential for the “single bread earner model,” allowing 
male workers to be paid enough to consign their wives and daughters to the domestic 
sphere permanently.  Indeed, at a meeting on May 7 of the Commune, even Frankel 
appeared to make concessions to the Proudhonian model, stating that these government-
supported women’s cooperatives “would hand out work…the women would be given 
work to do at home.”118   
However, at the same time the Commission of Labor and Exchange, as directed 
by Frankel and Malon, undertook a study beginning on May 4 to look into the issue of the 
distribution of military contracts raised by Dmitrieff and the Union, as well as other labor 
organizations within the Commune.  Discussing the conclusions of this report on May 12, 
Frankel allowed that given the continued practice by private contractors of offering low 
bids through slashing workers’ wages, “we recognize that the workers’ co-operative 
associations cannot at present compete with private industry and they will never be able 
to do so without the government’s support.”119  Thus, he proposes that, to redress this 
inequality, the Commission of Labor and Exchange be granted authority to award all 
possible future contracts for military supplies to the workers’ associations, including 
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those being established by the Union des Femmes.  However, this measure, seemingly a 
clear victory for the women’s associations being established by Dmitrieff as well as 
workers’ cooperatives in general, soon ran into opposition as being too sweeping.  Victor 
Clément, an Internationalist still heavily influenced by the Proudhon tradition, argued 
that an exemption must be made for existing contracts.  With the inclusion of this 
provision, the attempt to redress the inequality in terms of military contracts was greatly 
weakened.
120
 
While the Commission of Labor and Exchange proved incapable of pressuring the 
Commune to support workers’ associations fully, its actions still established it as 
Dmitrieff’s and the Union’s greatest ally within the Communal Government.  The 
political and economic support the Commission afforded the Union can be credited in 
large part to the relationship between Dmitrieff and the Commission’s heads Leo Frankel 
and Benoît Malon.  Dmitrieff’s initial introduction to Malon has already been discussed 
in relation to her (brief) association with Andre Léo.  However, the degree to which 
Dmitrieff successfully collaborated with these men, particularly Frankel, denotes a 
multifaceted connection, a product of ideological overlap as well as a common network 
stretching back to London.  As discussed in reference to Dmitrieff’s address to the 
Commission of Labor and Exchange, the three shared a common bond as Internationalists 
within a Commune where Internationalists constituted a minority.  In Carolyn Eichner’s 
analysis, this basic connection, coupled with the fact that “Dmitrieff and Frankel shared a 
commonality of interest” in terms of labor reform, accounts for the success of the 
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collaboration.
121
  While ample for Eichner’s study of Dmitrieff as a socialist feminist, this 
leaves unexamined the role played by the common network tying Dmitrieff, Frankel, and 
to a lesser degree Malon back to London, the General Council, and Marx.  In the previous 
chapter, Frankel’s relationship with Marx and his position as the most prominent 
“Marxist” among the International’s French section is discussed at length, just as 
Dmitrieff’s close relationship with Marx and the London Council is discussed above.122  
However, given the importance of the collaboration between Dmitrieff and Frankel in 
terms of the former’s work for the Union, it is necessary to examine briefly the 
relationship the two established during the Commune’s short tenure. 
That Dmitrieff and Frankel (as well as Malon) interacted as Internationalists and 
representatives of the London Council’s interests, in addition to their collaboration as 
head of the Union des Femmes and heads of the Commission of Labor and Exchanges, is 
established through several sources.  In Dmitrieff’s April 24 Letter to Hermann Jung, she 
sends along the regards of both Frankel and Malon, relating that their work at the 
Commission of Labor and Exchange is keeping both men very occupied.
123
  In addition 
to this direct mention of their interaction, the same letter talks of the efforts of another 
Internationalist, Auguste Serraillier, whom she knew from her time in London and who 
also likely accompanied her when she arrived in Paris at the end of March.
124
  Serraillier, 
who served as a representative of the International’s General Council, worked actively 
with Frankel and Malon on the French Branch’s Federal Council during the Siege and 
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then returned to aid them with their work for the Commune.  Clearly, these letters 
indicate the existence of an active network among these individuals within the Commune 
who were united by their very close ties to the London General Council and to Marx 
himself.   
Furthermore, the specific interaction between Dmitrieff and Frankel seems to 
have been based on more than just their ties as Internationalists and their common 
personal connections to Marx.  Several sources indicate a romantic interest on Frankel’s 
part, albeit unrequited in Dmitrieff.
125
  While the evidence for this is indirect at best, their 
actions in the Commune’s final days, as well as their successful joint escape to Geneva in 
its aftermath denote some degree of personal relationship.   
While a romantic link remains impossible to prove, the two unquestionably shared 
the experience of being non-French nationals deeply involved in a French Civil War.  
Despite the ardently internationalist language utilized by the Commune in many formal 
statements, national chauvinism began rearing its head in the form of attacks made on 
both Frankel and Dmitrieff by some of their fellow Communards as the Commune’s 
military situation worsened.  Frankel related to Marx that political opponents repeatedly 
spread the charge that he, due to his Prussian citizenship, served as an agent of 
Bismarck.
126
  While no record exists of similar attacks on Dmitrieff from the period of 
the Commune itself, such accusations seems likely based on the subsequent writings of 
the Commune’s unofficial participant/chronicler Lissagaray.  In his postmortem 
characterization of Dmitrieff, he describes her as a “Russian princess” who “left her 
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husband in the lurch” and who, rather than serving the interests of Parisian women, 
played the part of a young Russian aristocrat on holiday.
127
  This shared experience of 
fighting for a perceived internationalist cause with some who characterized them as 
outsiders also likely contributed to a common bond between Dmitrieff and Frankel 
beyond their shared ideology, a bond that greatly facilitated Dmitrieff’s work for the 
Union des Femmes by providing a powerful ally within the Commune’s government.  
While much of Dmitrieff’s work at the Union focused upon using her political 
associations to further the cause of gender equality in economic matters, the deteriorating 
military situation faced by the Commune in early May also called upon her to intervene 
in matters of morale.  On May 3, a group of Parisian citoyennes released a public “Appeal 
for Conciliation” to both the Commune and the Versailles Government for peace.  
Speaking as mothers, wives, and daughters they called upon both sides to bury their 
differences over the war with Prussia and economic disparity by looking to their “hearts” 
and “generosity,” rather than focusing on their ideological differences.  The main thrust 
of their argument held that the men on both sides should, due to the intense suffering of 
wives and mothers who feared for their children and husbands give up the conflict as a 
gift to the women of Paris.  While this appeal couched itself as appealing to both sides to 
accept a peaceful settlement, it called directly upon the Commune to begin negotiations 
as soon as possible with Thiers to establish an armistice.
128
 
For Dmitrieff and the Union des Femmes, this appeal represented a multifaceted 
threat that had to be addressed as soon as possible.  While the Commune had not 
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addressed every issue raised by the Union, it had already demonstrated itself more 
responsive to the political and economic concerns of women than any previous 
government in either French or European history.  Thus for Dmitrieff and her fellow 
feminist activists the Commune presented the first opportunity to push for the 
implementation of measures designed to challenge gender disparity and thus realize real 
equality.  Its dismantling through either a negotiated peace or conquest would extinguish 
what they hoped would be a catalyst for the challenging of gender norms on an 
international scale.  For these reasons, the opposition of Dmitrieff and the Union to any 
appeal for an armistice was a foregone conclusion.  However, the fact that the citoyennes 
who drafted this appeal did so in the name of all Parisian women necessitated a 
particularly vigorous response.  For one, Dmitrieff and her fellow Union members 
viewed themselves as the sole voice of Parisian women, as demonstrated by the 
confrontation in late April with the Montmartre Vigilance Committee.  Moreover, the 
authors of the May 3 appeal heavily utilized a traditional gendered view of women as 
passive supplicants only capable of viewing politics through the prism of their roles as 
wives and mothers, a view that subverted Dmitrieff’s efforts to equalize the political and 
economic roles of women and men under the Commune.   
Within three days, the Union des Femmes response appeared in poster form 
throughout Paris.  Authored by Dmitrieff and signed by the other members of the Union’s 
Central Committee, this document, despite brimming with righteous anger, still reflects a 
distinct understanding of the political environment within the city in early May.  It begins 
by declaring that the Union “protests with all its might” the “shameful proclamation” 
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issued by a group of “anonymous reactionaries” calling for “conciliation between 
freedom and tyranny, between the people and their oppressors.”  Given the nature of the 
May 3 appeal, this proclamation, unlike earlier documents drafted by Dmitrieff, employs 
much more overtly ideological language to establish the contrast between the Union and 
the “reactionaries.”  Establishing the Commune as the best hope for the working classes’ 
realization of the “social and international Republic,” Dmitrieff employs language that is 
unmistakably Marxian throughout the document, with repeated emphasis on the 
Commune’s struggle constituting “the replacement of the rule of Capital by the rule of 
Labor.”  In a similar vein, she invokes the internationalist implications of the Commune’s 
battle, asserting that the Commune “represented the international revolutionary principles 
of all peoples—contains the seeds of the Social Revolution.”  This contrast with the 
earlier documents Dmitrieff authored for the Union, which framed their appeals in less 
ideologically explicit calls for equality, illustrates the perceived need to strongly delineate 
the Union’s pro-war position in contrast to the conciliatory propositions put forth in the 
May 3 appeal.
129
  At this moment of crisis, with the French Army hammering the city’s 
defenses daily, it appears likely that Dmitrieff understood that the need for ideological 
vigor trumped more cautious and inclusionary language.   
However, within this proclamation’s revolutionary fervor Dmitrieff’s keen 
political acumen remains apparent in regards to the Union’s continued relations with the 
Commune itself.  While ideologically aggressive in the rhetorical sense, Dmitrieff still 
treads carefully in terms of discussing the relationship between rights, revolution, and 
gender within this document.  While asserting that “the women of Paris will prove to 
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France and the world that at the hour of greatest danger…they are as capable as their 
brothers of giving up their lives in the cause of the Commune,” she then quickly follows 
by proclaiming that victory will allow “men and women workers in complete 
solidarity…to defend their common interests… and extinguish all trace of exploitation 
and exploiters.”130  As in earlier documents issued to the Commune’s government, 
Dmitrieff here carefully avoids any language that could be construed as advocating 
specific rights for women, framing the drive for equality in explicitly class terms that 
encompassed both men and women.  Dmitrieff’s accounting for any potential political 
consequences that her language might have in the Union’s vital relationship with the 
Commune’s government demonstrates her growing capacity to navigate the complexities 
of Paris radical networks forged by her experiences and interactions with her fellow 
Parisian radicals. 
While battling internal threats to the Commune’s morale (and the Union’s 
agenda) presented important challenges, the restructuring of the economic order along 
more equitable gendered lines remained Dmitrieff’s and the Union’s primary objective.  
While her appeal to the Commission of Labor and Exchange in late April/early May 
resulted in the Commune’s conditional awarding of future National Guard uniform 
contracts to Union-led producers’ associations, the document itself only discussed long-
term issues of women’s production in the vaguest terms.131  Such wartime emergency 
measures might dissolve into smoke in peacetime, particularly given the opposition of 
many Communards to women becoming permanent fixtures within the labor force 
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outside the home.  Moreover, the Commune’s response focused only on government 
contracts involving female labor.  It as yet remained silent on introducing measures to aid 
women’s producer associations in establishing themselves as competitors with private 
industry.  Hence Dmitrieff, in consultation with her fellow Union members, as well as 
Frankel and Malon,
132
 began developing a nuanced justification for the permanent 
presence of women within the workforce as well as detailed blueprints detailing how 
their labor would be organized. 
The product of these efforts was a “Proposal for the Organization of Producer’s 
Cooperatives for Women,” a document that encapsulates how Dmitrieff’s experiences 
within the Paris radical community honed her ability to navigate the thin line between 
ideological aspirations and political pragmatism.  Crafted in mid-May by Dmitrieff, this 
proposal begins with a systematic ideological assessment of the Commune’s long-term 
significance, clearly aimed at defining the revolution in terms most amenable to 
Dmitrieff’s and the Union goals.  To this end, Dmitrieff starts by placing the Commune 
in a broad historical context: “the Revolution of March 18th, carried out spontaneously by 
the people in a historically unique situation, represents a major victory for the rights of 
the people in the relentless struggle that they have waged against all forms of tyranny.”133  
Dmitrieff’s goal here is multifaceted and rooted deeply in the political struggles raging 
within the Commune by mid-May.  In the last days of April, the Commune’s 
representatives engaged in a vicious debate over the issue of creating a five-man 
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Committee of Public Safety to bring greater centralization and focus to the faltering war 
effort with Versailles.  Supporters of the measure contended that in the face of the present 
crisis, the Commune must, according to the Blanquist Edouard Vaillant, “become like the 
first Paris Commune (during the French Revolution’s radical phase), an assembly of 
executives working together, not a parliament where everyone gets to speak.”134  This 
initiative, aimed at recapturing the spirit of 1793, threatened to undercut the Commune’s 
responsiveness to its electorate by producing a potential dictatorship born of military 
necessity.
135
  Realizing this possibility, a portion of the Commune’s members vigorously 
but vainly opposed the measure, which ultimately passed on May 1, forty-five votes to 
twenty-three.  Those opposed (known as the “Minority”) responded publically, 
contending in their declaration that while “the Paris Commune has surrendered its 
authority to a dictatorship, they of the Minority take an ‘opposite view,’ namely that the 
Commune is beholden to the political and social revolutionary movement to accept fully 
responsibility…on behalf of the voters we represent.”136 
For Dmitrieff and the Union, the creation of a Committee of Public Safety 
represented a clear threat to their economic and social aspirations.  In general, a 
concentration of power in so few hands, particularly hands no longer viewing themselves 
as directly responsible to the people, presented a major obstacle to gaining the 
governmental support necessary to realize the Union’s economic vision.  Hence 
Dmitrieff’s initial condemnation in her “Proposal” of “all forms of tyranny” possesses a 
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more specific meaning than a generalized rhetorical attack on Versailles and the 
bourgeois order.  However, Dmitrieff’s experiences within Paris’s radical community 
informed her that the situation presented even more dire portents for hers and other non-
French radicals’ goal of seeing Paris’s revolution spread.  Blanquists and neo-Jacobins 
constituted the main supporters of the Committee’s creation and dominated the five man 
Committee itself.  Large portions of both groups drew their economic inspiration from 
Proudhon; hence their support of a large scale reformulation of women’s work was 
highly unlikely.
137
  Moreover, while the Blanquists viewed the Commune as a potential 
springboard for a wider revolution, most neo-Jacobins, being all French, possessed much 
more limited views as to the long-term political aims of the Commune.  Charles 
Delescluze, easily the most prominent neo-Jacobin and the leading figure on the newly 
established Committee, viewed the Paris Commune as inaugurating a new national model 
based on greater autonomy at the municipal and department level.
138
  This highly limited 
conception of the Commune’s significance hardly presented the kind of international 
revolutionary springboard Dmitrieff’s goals required.  Thus, she directly challenged this 
neo-Jacobin position in the “Proposal,” contending that while “others have persuaded 
themselves of the notion that this revolution is simply a demand for a greater municipal 
franchise…the People, however are not blinded” and remain dedicated to the “creation of 
a new social order, of equality, solidarity and freedom.”139  Challenging the existing 
gender dynamics clearly required more than administrative reform, the Commune must 
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be viewed as a break with what came before if even moderate changes were to be made 
to women’s place in the economic and social order. 
Beyond carving out a position to counter the political forces behind the 
Committee of Public Safety’s creation, the first portion of Dmitrieff’s “Proposal” also 
established her and the Union des Femmes as endorsing, albeit indirectly, the critique 
offered by the so-called “Minority.”  While her personal ideology likely contributed, 
Dmitrieff’s support of the “Minority” also stemmed from the fact that the bulk of her 
political network within Paris fell within this grouping.  Both Malon and Serraillier voted 
against the proposal, along with the majority of the International’s French Branch.  While 
her close collaborator Leo Frankel did vote in favor, he was largely driven by a growing 
questioning of his “revolutionary socialist opinions” due to his foreign birth and thus 
heavily qualified his support, stating “I cannot see the usefulness of this Committee… 
(and) I reserve the right to revolt against (it).”140  While Dmitrieff avoids a direct 
endorsement, she utilizes language in her characterization of the Commune’s significance 
that draws heavily upon the brand of Marxian Internationalism favored by Frankel, 
Serrailler, and Malon.  Rather than contextualizing the Commune within a limited French 
context, she places the “Revolution of March 18th” within the much larger frame of 
Marx’s historical dialectic, asserting that “the slaves began the fight, the serfs continued 
it and the proletariat,” with the Paris Commune serving as the launching point, “will have 
the glory of bringing to fulfillment the revolution that brings about social equality.”141  
By employing this theory of understanding the Commune, Dmitrieff accomplishes two 
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goals.  First, she establishes herself and the Union as espousing the “Minority’s” position, 
a calculated political risk that favored supporting the Union’s most prominent advocates 
at the Commission of Labor and Exchange over risking the potential ire of the Committee 
of Public Safety’s members.  Second, reinforcing the Commune’s revolutionary nature 
provided greater justification for the economic and social changes Dmitrieff outlined in 
the second portion of her “Proposal.” 
Just as the first portion of Dmitrieff’s “Proposal” recognizes the political realities 
within the Paris Commune and responds accordingly, the document’s second section, 
focused on outlining Dmitrieff’s detailed vision for organizing women’s labor, presents a 
combination of assertion and compromise born of her understanding of gender’s 
operation within the Commune.  As in her earlier statements regarding women’s labor, 
Dmitrieff manages to walk a fine line between promoting her goals and accounting for 
potential resistance from male Communards.  Shifting to the issue of work, she begins by 
addressing the needs of all workers regardless of gender, arguing that the Commune must 
“complete the partial victory of the people, not by limiting itself to the urgent needs of 
military defense but by embarking unequivocally on the path of social reform”142 by 
introducing a long-term economic restructuring program.  Citing the example of the 1848 
National Workshops, she contends that temporary measures, though attractive in a 
moment of crisis, “only result subsequently in more formidable difficulties,” hence the 
need to introduce “organizational reforms that will continue to be valid after the 
circumstances that generated their initiation will have disappeared.”143  Only after this 
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call for restructuring in the name of all workers regardless of gender does Dmitrieff then 
focus more specifically on the issue of the reorganization of women’s work.  This 
strategic avoidance of calling for gender-based rights, illustrated in Dmitrieff’s earlier 
pronouncements, allows her to frame her most ambitious program in terms of the larger 
fight to establish labor’s control over production. 
Upon shifting to the larger question of restructuring female labor, Dmitrieff 
utilizes justifications that demonstrate her continued awareness of audience.  In defining 
the need for a new conception of women’s work, she first employs a traditionalist appeal, 
stating that “there are mothers, women and children who suffer miseries and deprivation 
but who still support (the Commune) with heroism…these citizens, these mothers, are 
short of jobs and resources.”  Carolyn Eichner, in her analysis, argues that this rare use of 
the “traditional equation of woman as mother” denotes an effort by Dmitrieff to employ a 
“moral imperative” with the Commune to garner support for this ambitious project.144  
While Eichner’s assessment of the stakes is quite correct, Dmitrieff’s willingness to 
employ a wide variety of rhetorical tactics (even appeals to traditional gender norms) to 
engage a broad and potentially hostile audience was a seminal element in her work for 
the Union des Femmes, as the previously discussed documents demonstrate.  Indeed, she 
follows this traditionalist statement with yet another to push her agenda, contending that 
the systematic introduction of regular work, rather than simple make-work programs, is 
necessary since the latter “tend to maintain inactivity and lower character.”  Finally, with 
potential opponents disarmed by the combination of political jockeying, generalized calls 
for labor’s supremacy, and traditionalist appeals, Dmitrieff  shifts the discussion to the 
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creation of “special workshops and retail centers” to allow women’s producers’ co-
operatives to enjoy and benefit from the fruits of their own labor.
145
 
The framework Dmitrieff proposes for these women’s co-operatives in many 
ways mirrors the organizational model utilized by the Union des Femmes.  She called 
first for the establishment in each arrondissement of a central depot for “the receiving of 
raw materials and for the distribution of work to individuals or groups of women, 
according to their skill.”  To run and administer these efforts, each arrondissement would 
establish a “committee of qualified and enterprising women” to oversee the process at the 
local level.  However, to address the larger questions related to production and 
distribution, Dmitrieff’s “Proposal” called for the establishment of a Central Committee 
to oversee the overall organization, as well as five other general commissions (Drafting, 
Purchasing, Style, Finance, and Investigating Abandoned Properties) to ensure that the 
local co-operatives combine their efforts in the most efficient and profitable manner 
possible.  Dmitrieff viewed this centralized but federated model as the most effective 
means of transforming female productive relations first in Paris and then, when the 
March 18 Revolution spread, beyond.
146
 
Given the vastness of this undertaking, as well as its unheralded involvement of 
women in organizing and benefiting from their own labor, resistance from various 
elements within the Commune was virtually assured.  Dmitrieff, drawing on her 
experiences, included elements both to mediate these objections and to address certain 
constraints placed upon her program by the Commune’s political and economic 
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parameters.  While Dmitrieff envisioned a co-operative producers’ federation that, in 
combination with the Union des Femmes, would allow women to control their own 
economic and social circumstances to a marked degree, she also understood that 
broadcasting this level of independence almost guaranteed a backlash.  Hence, 
throughout her “Proposal,” she emphasizes that this model would be under the constant 
oversight and indirect control of the male-only Commission of Labor and Exchange.  
This relationship can be understood largely in financial terms, as Dmitrieff held that the 
Commission “would make available in each district a weekly credit to cover the 
immediate costs entailed in the actual organization of work for women.”147  Furthermore, 
she holds that the Commission would also establish and run distribution centers to supply 
raw materials to each arrondissement’s co-operatives.  With the Commission providing 
the initial capital to establish these women’s co-operatives, as well as the necessary 
infrastructure, a degree of oversight was understandable and necessary.  Dmitrieff 
characterized this relationship as part of the women’s co-operatives’ “apprenticeship 
under the Commune.”148  To Proudhonists and other potential critics, these proposed 
measures by Dmitrieff gave potential assurance that these female undertakings would be 
guided by male hands.  For Dmitrieff, who understood the support she enjoyed from 
Frankel and Malon at the Commission, this so-called oversight consisted of little more 
than a means to hide an economic and social arrangement in which Paris’s women would 
enjoy near total autonomy. 
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Though a supportive radical network and some rhetorical sleight of hand allowed 
Dmitrieff to deflect potential attacks on the independence of these women’s co-
operatives, her “Proposal” still recognized and allowed for certain economic realities 
within the Commune.  Dmitrieff’s personal ideology, drawing heavily on Marx, 
envisioned an economic order where capitalist competition would be replaced by 
production based on human needs.  However, capitalism remained the order of the day 
under the Paris Commune, a state of affairs made apparent during her attempts to win 
uniform contracts for women’s co-operatives.  Thus, in this organizational proposal, 
Dmitrieff structures women’s co-operatives in a manner best suited to contend with 
capitalist competition.  The above-mentioned Style Commission presents one example. 
Its charge would be to encourage the production of styles currently in fashion within the 
marketplace.  Within her “Proposal,” Dmitrieff also encourages the abolition of unpaid 
textile work in prisons and nunneries, not due to any humanitarian concern but to raise 
wages by eliminating unfair competition.  Nor does she ignore the potential of luxury 
goods, arguing that areas of specialized production such as feathers and flowers “should 
be prepared for the future,” since these fields historically have allowed “businessmen to 
become millionaires in next to no time.”149  Finally, speaking on the general need to rush 
women back to the garment trades, which she deems Paris’s “first industry,” Dmitrieff 
focuses not just on immediate benefits but long term market potential.  With an eye to a 
period when the city was no longer under military siege, she speaks of the vast wealth to 
be garnered when the market was once again open to “the provinces and foreigners who 
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have been deprived of articles from Paris for a long time.”150  While without question an 
ideological compromise, Dmitrieff’s willingness to work within the existing system for 
the greater benefit of Parisian working women further proves her capacity to navigate the 
Commune’s economic and political contours. 
With this blueprint established, Dmitrieff and the Union des Femmes moved 
quickly to realize their project for organizing women’s co-operatives.  On the morning of 
May 17, “A Call to Women Workers” appeared on walls and posts throughout Paris, 
announcing a joint measure by the Union des Femmes and the Commission of Labor and 
Exchange to begin “the formation and federation of unions for women workers 
corresponding to those of male workers.”  Strategically noting that the Commission of 
Labor and Exchange “entrusted” the Union des Femmes with this effort, it calls women 
to a meeting in the 10
th
 Arrondissement that evening to elect delegates to serve on the 
local and commission committees.  The poster bore the signature of Dmitrieff and the 
Union des Femmes Central Committees, as well as the official endorsement of Leo 
Frankel in his capacity at the Commission of Labor and Exchange.
151
  With this 
accomplished, a second meeting was held on May 21 to finalize the organization of the 
local committees and city-wide commissions.  The success of these two meetings 
illustrated the value of Dmitrieff’s nuanced approach, born of her experiences within the 
Parisian radical community, to selling the women’s cooperatives to the diverse and 
partially hostile Commune.  The young Russian aristocrat turned radical stood on the 
verge of seeing her ideological conception moving toward realization. 
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Unfortunately, only hours after Dmitrieff and her comrades left their meeting, the 
Commune’s brief lifespan lurched toward its twilight as the French Army entered Paris 
late that same evening of May 21.  This military crisis immediately subsumed all other 
matters, as the Commune girded itself for the fiery trial on the barricades.  From the 
inception of the Union des Femmes, Dmitrieff had charged its members, in addition to all 
other matters, with grimly preparing for this possibility.  Article 14 of the Union’s 
statutes called for surplus money to be used “for buying kerosene and weapons for the 
citoyennes who will fight at the barricades, should the occasion arise.”152  Thus duly 
prepared, Dmitrieff issued her final statement to the Union des Femmes on May 22, 
calling simply for “all women and Committee members to gather immediately (at the 
Union office in the 11
th
 Arrondissement) to go to the barricades.”153  The accounts of 
Dmitrieff’s actions following this pronouncement remain fragmentary at best; however, 
they leave little doubt that her last services to the Commune involved a repudiation of 
gender norms without nuance or qualification, fighting on the barricades alongside 
comrades of both genders.  Burying her political differences with Louise Michel, they 
fought side by side and commanded a detachment of twenty-five women in Montmartre 
prior to Michel’s capture in a last-ditch defense of the Montmartre Cemetery.154  
Escaping to the east, Dmitrieff subsequently fought side by side with her frequent 
collaborator Leo Frankel, and, as related in the previous chapter, the two made a final 
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appearance, both wounded, at the courthouse in the 11
th
 Arrondissement before escaping 
Paris and arriving in Switzerland.
155
 
Elisabeth Dmitrieff’s experience, like that of Leo Frankel, illustrates the 
complexities and challenges facing non-French radicals balancing their service to the 
Paris Commune with the pursuit of their own ideological aspirations.  Given that 
Dmitrieff’s agenda included both promoting Internationalist socialism and addressing the 
social and economic inequalities facing women, the obstacles she had to overcome in 
Paris were even greater than those faced by her comrade Frankel.  However, like Frankel 
she benefited greatly from the connections she forged with Paris’s transnational radical 
community, both prior to her arrival in the French capital and during her time in the city 
itself.  Her creation of the Union des Femmes would have proved impossible without the 
aid of Natalie Lemel and other Parisian radicals, whose experience and connections aided 
Dmitrieff in navigating Paris’s complex and at times contentious radical community.  
While Dmitrieff worked energetically to promote her combined vison of internationalism 
and greater gender equality, she discovered as Frankel had that ideological negotiation 
and compromise were necessary in the face of other radical factions’ opposition.  Faced 
with these challenges, particularly the misogynistic views of the Proudhonists and some 
neo-Jacobins, Dmitrieff operated within the constraints imposed upon her by the political 
realities.  Ultimately, Elisabeth Dmitrieff adopted an approach of negotiation and 
concession in the name of bringing Paris’s revolution to fruition and seeing its potentially 
emancipatory model proliferate far beyond the city’s boundaries. 
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Chapter Four 
A Son of Poland: Jaroslav Dombrowski, Revolutionary Paris, and 
Polish Liberation 
“The Commune admitted all foreigners to the honor of dying for an immortal 
cause…Thiers, the bourgeoisie, the Second Empire, had continually deluded Poland by 
loud professions of sympathy...The Commune honored the sons of Poland by placing 
them at the head of the defenders of Paris.”1  So reflected Karl Marx in his The Civil War 
in France on the contributions made by the numerous Poles who served in the 
Communard ranks.  While the Paris Commune contained representatives from many 
European nations, no other nationality served revolutionary Paris in numbers comparable 
to the stateless Poles.  While several rose to prominence, none rose higher than the thirty-
five-year-old aristocrat and professional soldier Jaroslav Dombrowski, who served the 
Commune as a National Guard officer and eventually as the Commandant of the Paris 
defenses.  Widely considered the Commune’s most able commander, both 
contemporaries and scholars assert that his single-minded efforts commanding the city’s 
fortification allowed the Commune a much longer lease on life that it would have enjoyed 
otherwise.
2
  In explaining why Dombrowski served and, ultimately, died for the Paris 
Commune, most scholars describe his motivations as simple patriotism, arguing, as Stuart 
Edwards does, that he and his fellow Poles fought “against the Prussians and then for the 
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Commune in the hope that a regenerated France would go to the aid of an oppressed 
Poland.”3 
 While the cause of national liberation without question drove Dombrowski, he 
envisioned Poland gaining its freedom by means of a particular revolutionary formula.  
Thus Dombrowski’s unquestioned patriotism constituted patriotism of a particular sort, a 
patriotism aimed at establishing a Polish state based on popular participation and 
equitable approaches to social and labor questions.  In essence, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, Jaroslav Dombrowski viewed the Paris Commune not only as a means to 
achieve Polish liberation but also as a model of governance to be exported to his 
homeland.  Moreover, his experiences during both the siege and the Commune, driven (as 
was the case with Frankel and Dmitrieff) by his interactions and negotiations with his 
French and non-French comrades, aided in further shaping and refining the nature of this 
political vision.  Furthermore, his investment in the Commune as an exportable 
revolutionary model for Polish liberation inspired him to serve it loyally despite military 
incompetence and treasonous slanders until his death on the barricades during Semaine 
Sanglante. 
 Like Elisabeth Dmitrieff, Jaroslav Dombrowski’s origins contained little to 
indicate his eventual role as a revolutionary.  Dombrowski was born on November 12, 
1836, forty-one years after Poland’s extinction as an independent state, to a long-
established but impoverished Polish noble family.  His father, Wiktor, served in the 
Czar’s army and was stationed at the time in Zhitomir (formerly Żytomierz, Poland).4  
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Dombrowski spent his early years, along with his younger brother Theophile,
5
 in that 
city, before illness took his parents and relatives sent him to a military academy at the 
Brest-Litovsk Fortress.  Despite a slight build and the handicap of his Polish background, 
Dombrowski excelled at the military academy and won a position at the Artillery 
Academy in St. Petersburg in 1851.
6
  According to one source, Dombrowski developed a 
relationship with his mathematics professor, a Colonel Lavroff, who encouraged the 
young cadet to work for Polish liberation as part of the larger struggle against Czarist 
tyranny.
7
  His national resentments aside, Dombrowski received high marks in St. 
Petersburg and earned his commission in 1855.  Following graduation, he served in 
Russia’s campaigns in the Caucasus.  The four years he spent there further accelerated his 
military career, winning him a promotion and the Saint-Stanislas Medal for bravery.  
Dombrowski’s reputation led him next to the General Staff Academy in St. Petersburg in 
1859, an appointment usually reserved for young rising stars within the Czarist officer 
corps.
8
  However, his second stay in St. Petersburg proved transformative, as the young 
officer began his evolution from soldier to potential revolutionary. 
 At the time of Dombrowski’s arrival, the General Staff College constituted a 
hotbed of both nationalistic and anti-Czarist conspiracy.  Young Russian officers, 
influenced by the critics of Nikolay Chernyshevsky
9
 and others, pushed for political 
                                                 
5
Few records exist regarding Theophile Dombrowski between his youth, where it appears he also went into 
military service and his appearance in Paris during the Commune, where he also served as a military 
commander along with his brother. 
6
Raoul Dubois, A l'Assaut du Ciel--: la Commune Racontée (Paris: les éditions ouvrières, 1991), 257. 
7
Daniel Granine, Dombrowsky, trans. Georges Arout (Paris: Les Éditeurs Français Réunis, 1956), 106. 
8
Ibid, 107. 
9
Elisabeth Dmitrieff would draw similar inspiration from Chernyshevsky’s works.  See Chapter 3. 
235 
 
liberalization and land reform.  They also supported Polish and Ukrainian officers
10
 who, 
though they shared their Russian comrades’ general liberalism, drew inspiration from the 
growing struggle for Italian independence and thus pursued their own agendas of national 
liberation.  Dombrowski soon became deeply involved with Lieutenant Zygmut 
Sierakowski, seen as the leading figure among Polish patriots at the College.
11
  While 
some Polish officers believed independence could be realized incrementally through 
concessions on the part of Alexander II’s government, those within Dombrowski’s and 
Sierakowski’s circle felt that armed insurrection provided the only viable route to 
Poland’s freedom.  Assessing Dombrowski and his circle’s ideology beyond that of 
national liberation at this point is difficult.  Sierakowski, prior to meeting Dombrowski, 
operated within the same circles as both Chernyshevsky and Taras Shevchenko before the 
latter’s death in early 1861.  While politically engaged, this group, like other intellectual 
circles within St. Petersburg at the time, engaged with ideology only in the most general 
sense.  Rather, they adhered to a kind of vague liberalism, promoting a more rationalized 
system of government, greater political participation, land reform, and a vision of pan-
Slavism still heavily influenced by Romanticism.
12
  Thus, while likely influenced by 
these general principles, it appears Dombrowski’s primary focus at the time centered on 
the question of Poland’s emancipation. 
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 While Dombrowski deepened his dedication to the cause of Poland’s 
independence in St. Petersburg, events elsewhere, particularly within the Polish proper, 
began to accelerate.  Dormant since the failed uprisings in the early 1830s, Polish 
political activism began to spike in the late 1850s.  Influenced by Italy’s liberation 
struggle, particularly its victory with the aid of Napoleon III in 1859 against Austria, 
Polish students began organizing in the hopes that a combination of internal and external 
forces would aid them in throwing off the Russian (and, eventually Austrian and 
Prussian, yoke).  Though Polish university students organized in St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
Dorpat (now Tartu, Estonia), and Kiev, Warsaw rapidly developed as the epicenter of the 
growing national liberation movement.
13
  The Warsaw School of Fine Arts and the 
Medical School became the foci of political activity, with pro-independence activists 
dividing between Whites, who supported non-violent means, and Reds, who advocated 
conspiracy and armed insurrection to realize liberation.
14
  Initiated at the universities, the 
independence movement grew in strength by 1861, organizing a series of political 
marches and other manifestations.  This soon led to bloodshed, as Russian troops fired on 
protestors in February and April, leading to tensions that resulted by fall in martial law 
being instituted in Warsaw.  This violent response led to the independence movement’s 
radicalization, with the now-ascendant Reds establishing a City Committee to organize 
their efforts against the Russian government.
15
  Thus, by the end of 1861, Warsaw 
constituted a political tinderbox, capable of igniting the fires of Polish national 
aspirations at any moment. 
                                                 
13
Ibid, 159. 
14
The History of Poland Since 1863, ed. R.F. Leslie (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980), 11–12. 
15
Wandycz, 164–67. 
237 
 
 Following these developments from St. Petersburg, Dombrowski recognized that 
he needed to be in Warsaw if he wished to participate in this independence push.  Offered 
a position on the Russian General Staff, a high honor for a non-Russian, he astonished his 
superiors by refusing the post.  Instead, he asked to be sent to Warsaw, claiming relatives 
within the city needed his financial support.  Assigned to the 6
th
 Infantry Division in 
Warsaw, now Captain Dombrowski assumed the post of division quartermaster in early 
February 1862,
16
 arriving in a city becoming starkly divided between its Russian 
Government and its Polish population. 
 Upon arriving, Dombrowski’s new military assignment rapidly became a side 
note to his political activity.  Already well-known through his Polish connections at the 
General Staff College, he quickly established himself as the leading figure within the Red 
faction of the independence movement.
17
  His unique position as liaison between the 
Reds and the revolutionary officers serving in the Russian garrison (of which he was the 
head as well) accounted in part for his rapid rise to prominence.  Moreover, unlike 
previous figures within the Red faction who favored conspiracy, Dombrowski 
immediately began formulating a plan for a direct armed insurrection.  Drawing heavily 
upon Garibaldi’s successful “Expedition of the Thousand” in Sicily, he began identifying 
individuals who might serve as the vanguard of the uprising.  He asserted that while the 
initial force might seem small, popular support (as was the case with Garibaldi in Sicily) 
would result “in a rapid increase in strength like an avalanche.”18  However, drawing not 
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just on events in Italy but also the failures of the various 1848 uprisings, Dombrowski 
coupled his vision of mass mobilization with a detailed strategy to seize Warsaw rapidly 
and to prepare for the inevitable assault by the Russian Army. 
 To this end, he outlined a set of initial targets of importance for capturing the city.  
Key to his plan was the cooperation of the Russian officers in the city, whom he believed 
would neutralize Warsaw’s 16,000 man garrison, at least during the initial hours of the 
uprising.  With the Russian forces temporarily neutralized, Dombrowski’s plan called for 
the capture of several key points within the city, including the seat of Russian power at 
Warsaw Castle but particularly the Novogeorgevsk (Modlin) Fortress and its store of 
nearly 30,000 rifles.  Thus in control of these strategic points and equipped with arms for 
the population, he then intended that the Polish insurrectionists build barricades 
throughout the city and prepare for street fighting with the Russian Army when it 
arrived.
19
 
 While this constituted a sound military approach, Dombrowski’s plan could only 
succeed with unified political support among Warsaw’s independence movement.  While 
the Reds fully endorsed Dombrowski’s approach, appointing him head of the City 
Committee in May 1862, the Whites hesitated.  Not only did they fear a military 
confrontation, but they also questioned the political stance of the Reds on the peasantry.  
Dombrowski and his fellow Reds favored a plan that, for Poland in 1862, constituted an 
effective agrarian revolution.  Polish peasants would enjoy full emancipation and equal 
status as citizens, as well as benefiting from agrarian reform.  While certainly not radical 
by the standards of nineteenth-century Western Europe, particularly when contrasted later 
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with the Commune, the White ranks contained many Polish nobles who, though willing 
to accept gradual agrarian change, balked at supporting an insurrection plan tied to such a 
revolutionary premise.
20
  Hence, when Dombrowski presented his plan to the newly 
established National Central Committee (split between Whites and Reds) in June, they 
rejected it.  Dombrowski deeply resented this action, particularly the Polish nobility’s 
White members whom he viewed as placing their class and economic interests above 
those of the Polish nation.  The Reds, most of whom supported his plan, were drawn 
predominantly from students and other urban dwellers.  This reality led Dombrowski to 
focus primarily on the revolutionary potential of the cities, a lesson that would reassert 
itself in France eight years later. 
 Despite the National Central Committee’s rejection of his insurrection plan, 
Dombrowski continued to prepare for a possible uprising.  He still enjoyed the full 
support of the revolutionaries among the Warsaw Garrison’s officers, as a well as a 
substantial portion of the Reds.  In order to sustain support within the officer corps, 
wealthy Reds provided Dombrowski with 6,000 rubles to fund his efforts within the 
military.
21
  While sustaining sympathizers within the Warsaw garrison remained vital, 
Dombrowski and other Reds realized they needed to swell their ranks prior to attempting 
an armed insurrection.  To this end, Dombrowski organized a rally to be held outside of 
Warsaw Castle on July 14, 1862.  For the event’s apex, he planned a bombastic speech 
invoking the Bastille and the other popular mass actions of 1789 to inspire similar ardor 
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from Warsaw’s citizens against their Russian oppressors.22  While this scheme fizzled, 
Dombrowski’s turning to the French revolutionary tradition illustrates the power he 
viewed it as possessing as a mobilizing force for national liberation.  This would not be 
the last instance where he viewed Paris as a means to realize his ends for Poland. 
 The failed July 14 rally marked the beginning of a problematic period for 
Dombrowski.  Russian officials began unraveling the garrison’s officers’ involvement in 
Warsaw’s Polish liberation movement.  In late June, several junior officers of Polish and 
Ukrainian descent had been arrested and executed.   Though these fellow radicals had not 
given up Dombrowski, their arrest clearly indicated that the Russian government 
possessed informants among his circle of revolutionaries.  Regardless, Dombrowski 
pressed on, meeting with supporters throughout the city to prepare them for an uprising 
on August 20.  During a party held by some wealthy sympathizers, Dombrowski met 
Pelagia Zgliczyńska, a nineteen-year-old teacher with whom he soon began a 
relationship.  However, this budding romance, as well as Dombrowski’s efforts to 
engineer a Warsaw uprising, came to an end on August 14, 1862, with his arrest by the 
Russian authorities as part of a purging of revolutionary elements from the Russian 
garrison.
23
  For the next two years, the Russians held Dombrowski and hundreds of others 
in Warsaw Castle.  Deprived of experienced military leadership, the eventual January 
Uprising proved a horrific failure.  Faced with over 100,000 Russian soldiers and lacking 
any foreign support, the poorly organized and led Polish revolutionaries proved unable to 
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gain any military advantage in over a year of fighting.  Ultimately, this bid for Polish 
independence ended in early 1864 with over 20,000 Poles killed, 400 executed, and 
18,000 sent into exile.
24
 
 For Dombrowski in 1864, the question remained whether he would number 
among the executed or the exiled.  Despite being allowed to marry Pelagia Zgliczyńska 
while in prison, he was brought before a military court in early November 1864.  On 
November 10 Dombrowski received a sentence of fifteen years hard labor in Siberia, 
spared the firing squad largely due to his arrest before the Uprising.
25
  The failure of this 
effort provided him with several insights as he prepared for transportation east.  Without 
question, the Uprising’s failure stemmed in part from the lack of clear military planning, 
an omission largely the result of the rejection of his proposal.  Further, upper class Poles, 
such as those numbered among the Whites, failed to divorce themselves from their own 
economic interests for the sake of the nation.  Hence the popular masses appeared to be 
the only real mechanism for realizing Poland’s liberation.  Finally, the ease with which 
the Russian military had crushed the Uprising illustrated that Polish independence 
required outside support, likely in the form of another Great Power, to be a realistic 
proposition.  These conclusions would come to influence heavily Dombrowski’s actions 
in France during both Paris’s Siege and the Commune. 
 However, Dombrowski stood to gain little from these insights while laboring as 
an exile in Siberia.  Following his sentencing, Russian authorities shipped Dombrowski 
and other Polish prisoners to Moscow in preparation for transit eastward.  Fortunately for 
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Dombrowski, Polish revolutionaries, informed of his presence in Moscow, used their 
connections with Nicholas Ishutin and his circle to facilitate his escape from prison on 
December 1.
26
  Hidden until early January 1865, Dombrowski managed then to escape to 
St. Petersburg where former associates arranged for his passage to France.  With the aid 
of both Polish and Russian radicals, Dombrowski first attained passage across the Baltic 
to Stockholm, where he reunited with his wife before arriving in Paris sometime that 
June. 
 Between 1865 and 1870, Jaroslav Dombrowski, former Russian officer, Polish 
insurrectionist, and fugitive from Czarist justice, resided primarily within Paris and 
became immersed in both the native Parisian and foreign radical communities.  Arriving 
with thousands of other radical émigrés from Poland and the Russian lands, Dombrowski 
constituted part of a new wave of immigration to France.  Previous waves of Polish 
political refugees, particularly the 7500 Poles who had arrived following the failed 
November 1830 insurrection, primarily consisted of political, military, and intellectual 
elites drawn from noble families.  These immigrants largely enjoyed the welcome and 
sympathy of the French government and upper classes.
27
  However, this post-1863 wave, 
as Woodford McClellan notes, “represented in part the middle and even lower 
classes...These individuals, many of them political radicals, constituted a serious problem 
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for France.”28  Though noble by birth, Dombrowski’s involvement with the independence 
movement’s Red faction clearly placed him within this category.  This wave of foreign 
radicals corresponded with a resurgence of French radicalism as the French Branch of the 
First International, founded less than a year before, and temporarily enjoyed the limited 
toleration of Louis Napoleon’s “Liberal Empire.”  Over the next five years Dombrowski 
would engage with various elements within this diverse Parisian radical community and, 
as a result, his political thinking regarding the best means of achieving Polish liberation 
would evolve. 
 Soon after arriving in Paris, Dombrowski accepted a position on an aid committee 
for recent Polish immigrants to Paris, which appears to have provided him with income.
29
  
While this work continued his engagement with the Polish émigré community, it appears 
that soon after his arrival Dombrowski began engaging with a wide array of French 
radicals.  At the onset a shared opposition to Napoleon III’s Empire drove him to make 
these connections.  Dombrowski, like many other Poles, felt that France had failed to 
provide support during the January Uprising despite early overtures indicating Louis 
Napoleon’s support.30  This led him and his fellow Poles to conclude that regime change 
in Paris constituted the only means of gaining French support for an independent Poland.  
Thus, between 1865 and 1866, Dombrowski began corresponding and meeting with 
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representatives from different strains of Parisian radicalism, specifically Auguste 
Vermorel, Charles Delescluze, and Eugene Varlin.
31
 
 Vermorel, a young journalist from the Rhône region, presents a perfect example 
of the complex and fluctuating ideological situation Dombrowski encountered in his first 
forays into the Parisian radical community.  Arriving in Paris in 1861 to found a 
newspaper, Vermorel began as a political liberal.  However, his growing disillusionment 
with the Second Empire provoked a period of ideological evolution.  When Dombrowski 
first encountered him in 1865–66, his beliefs drew on a combination of classical 
Jacobinism and Proudhonian mutualism.  Given Dombrowski’s utilization of the 
revolutionary tradition in Warsaw, the two enjoyed some overlap in political philosophy, 
though where Dombrowski stood on labor and social questions at this point is unclear.  
As the decade wore on, Vermorel’s political shift continued as he moved toward a 
socialist republicanism, illustrated by his highly influential newspaper (at least in radical 
circles) Le Courrier Français.
32
  Dombrowski’s interactions with Vermorel exposed him 
both to contemporary radical currents in Paris and the fluidity of ideological adherence 
within those circles. 
 While Vermorel presented an up and coming figure within Parisian radical circles, 
Charles Delescluze stood as a giant on par with Auguste Blanqui and even Victor Hugo.  
A hero of 1848 described by Benoît Malon as a “distinguished and valiant republican 
propagandist,” Delescluze was an example of “a Jacobin in the old tradition, passionately 
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devoted to its abstract conception of liberty and to revolution as the proper means of 
attaining it.”33  This vague revolutionary sentiment closely mirrors that which 
Dombrowski and the Reds adhered to in Warsaw prior to the January Uprising.  More 
practically, despite spending nearly a decade in exile, Delescluze possessed connections 
with nearly every strand of Parisian radicalism, a network that Dombrowski hoped to 
access for the Polish independence movement’s benefit.  Furthermore, due to his middle 
class background and his participation in journalistic organizations and Freemasonry, 
Delescluze also possessed connections with more moderate elements within Parisian 
politics.  Dombrowski needed connections among mainstream republicans, who stood to 
play a prominent or even dominating role in whatever government followed the Second 
Empire.
34
  Delescluze, due to his prestige and associations, stood to be a significant asset 
to Dombrowski in his efforts to further his own Parisian network. 
 Eugene Varlin, Leo Frankel’s future close collaborator, stands in contrast to the 
other radicals Dombrowski contacted initially in Paris.  A book binder by profession, 
Varlin presented an actual working class radical, unlike the middle class Vermorel and 
Delescluze.  Indeed, he opposed even collaborating with middle class activists, believing 
“that the workers should keep clear of the bourgeoisie.”35  Given Dombrowski’s noble 
background, the potential for difficulty was apparent.  However, Dombrowski likely 
viewed establishing contact with Varlin as vital, given the latter’s status as one of the 
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founding members of the French Branch of the International.  Viewed by contemporaries 
as a revolutionary of “rare intelligence,” Varlin’s fierce and deepening opposition to the 
Second Empire obviously constituted one point of attraction for Dombrowski.  However, 
Varlin’s prominent position within the International promised even greater potential 
rewards, as he could connect Dombrowski and his fellow Polish revolutionaries with a 
European-wide network capable of facilitating their cause.  While no record exists of the 
early conversations between Varlin and Dombrowski, subsequent actions by the latter 
demonstrate that these conversations forged a connection between the recent Polish 
émigré community and the International.  Thus it appears Dombrowski’s initial forays 
into Paris’s radical circles bore fruit, as well as familiarized him with the city’s radical 
landscape. 
 Though establishing contact with Parisian radicals to support eventual regime 
change in France comprised a key element of Dombrowski’s agenda, he did not limit his 
efforts solely to radical circles within Paris.  In 1866, when Italy joined the Prussian war 
against Austria, Dombrowski and his fellow émigrés saw an opportunity to advance the 
cause of Polish independence.  Within days of the war’s outbreak, Dombrowski traveled 
with Józef Hauke-Bosak, a general during the 1863 Uprising, to a meeting with Garibaldi 
in Florence.  Seeing a weakened Austria and a friendly Italy to Poland’s advantage, the 
two men offered to raise a Polish army in southern France to serve eventually under 
Garibaldi’s command.  In a matter of weeks, Hauke-Bosak and Dombrowski established 
a camp outside Dijon and began training Polish volunteers.  However, the presence of 
these armed Poles proved embarrassing for Napoleon III’s government, prompting as it 
247 
 
did official protests from Russia.  Not wishing to antagonize the Czarist regime, the 
French government began pressuring the Polish émigré community to disband the force.  
Before tensions came to a head, the war ended and the Polish volunteers disbanded.  For 
Dombrowski, the experience further deepened his enmity toward the Second Empire, 
pushing him further toward forging alliances with political radicals.  It also demonstrated 
that his military experience might be of use in serving under a flag likely to provide 
support for Poland’s emancipation.36   
 Dombrowski’s Italian endeavor proved unsuccessful; nevertheless, it did succeed 
in informing the Czarist government of his presence in France.  While he continued his 
efforts among French radicals on Poland’s behalf, Russian agents repeatedly targeted him 
in the hopes of prompting his arrest and extradition.  These efforts began upon his return 
to Paris in early 1867 with a Polish émigré publically accusing him of forging bank notes 
to fund the Polish volunteer army for Italy.  Though Dombrowski possessed 45,000 
francs while in southern France, these had come from subscriptions by Polish and French 
supporters.  Angered by the accusation, he challenged his accuser to a duel, which 
prompted the dropping of the charge.
37
  In June, the Russian government tried once again 
to implicate Dombrowski, this time on the much more serious charge of plotting regicide.  
During the Exposition Universelle d’Art et d’Industrie de 1867, Czar Alexander II visited 
Paris at the invitation of Louis Napoleon.  During a parade held in the Czar’s honor, a 
young Polish immigrant named Antoni Berezowski fired on a carriage carrying the two 
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emperors and their wives.
38
  Though all escaped unharmed, the Czarist government 
loudly asserted that Berezowski’s attack was the product of larger conspiracy of which 
Dombrowski was the mastermind.  Though the French police investigated, they found no 
proof connecting him to the crime and refused to arrest him.  While these efforts met with 
failure, they served to harden Dombrowski’s resolve against the Czarist regime and the 
Empire, which he saw as all too willing to aid the Russians in their anti-Polish endeavors. 
 Following his fruitless efforts in the south, Dombrowski returned to the French 
capital and resumed his connections with various Parisian and émigré radical circles.  At 
this point it appears that Dombrowski, benefiting from his earlier interactions with 
Varlin, established an even closer relationship with the International.  While some 
scholars, such as Woodford McClellan, assert that Dombrowski simply “flittered around 
the fringes” of radicalism at this time, his relationship with the International seems to 
suggest more than “flittering.”39  As early as 1866, an unofficial Polish section of the 
International began operating within Paris and sending representatives to International 
Congresses, beginning with Geneva in September 1866.  Though some Poles participated 
from a strong adherence to Internationalist ideology, the pro-Polish independence 
position adopted by the organization likely drew many more.
40
  In a speech to the General 
Council in January 1867, Karl Marx called for a restored Polish state to allow for the 
historical progression of Western Europe and the German lands without the intervention 
of Czarist autocracy.  Ending this widely published speech in a manner that likely 
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warmed many a Polish patriot’s heart, Marx proclaimed, “There is but one 
alternative…either Asiatic barbarism, under Muscovite direction…or else it must re-
establish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes between (Europe) and Asia and 
gaining a breathing spell for the accomplishment of its social regeneration.”41  Inspired 
by this language, the Polish contingent from Paris grew at the Lausanne Congress in 
September 1867, drawing even greater interest among the French capital’s émigré 
community.  When the time came for the International Congress in Brussels the 
following year, Dombrowski, motivated by both an evolving personal ideology and the 
potential the International offered for the Polish cause, joined the delegation traveling to 
Belgium. 
 Though the Polish question barely registered during the Brussels Congress’s 
proceedings, which focused on growing French-Prussian tensions and the continuing 
struggle between Marxists and Proudhonians, Dombrowski’s limited participation sheds 
light upon his position on Internationalism, radicalism, and the Polish cause.  Though he 
did not formally join the International, Dombrowski participated in its debates with great 
vigor.  Perhaps his most telling statement came during a debate whether or not to 
condemn formally war in all circumstances between European powers.  Though he 
expressed sympathy with the sentiments, he asserted that his “political beliefs prevented 
him from protesting against war as long as a people needed it to free themselves.”42  
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Here, Dombrowski clearly established his position; while the goals of the International 
and like organizations appealed to his personal sensibilities, until Poland was liberated all 
ideology must be viewed and assessed in so far as it furthered that end.  Thus, rather than 
“flittering,” Dombrowski can be seen in his interactions with the International as 
supporting its efforts but not allowing it to distract from his ultimate goal. 
 Despite the fact that Dombrowski’s trip to Belgium failed to convert him 
wholeheartedly to the International, his experiences with that association exhibited a deep 
influence on his thinking, particularly in the organizational sense.  Thus within months of 
returning to Paris, Dombrowski played a dominant role in creating a group to bring 
together all Polish émigrés under one unified banner.  Based on a model similar to the 
International’s federal structure, a Central Committee of Polish Immigration was to be 
established in Paris as a guiding executive while different districts within the city and 
beyond would form their own local sections.  Each section would be required to elect 
representatives for the Central Committee and to assure the annual collection of 25 
centimes in membership dues.  Of greater significance for understanding the evolution of 
Dombrowski’s thinking regarding the relationship between political activism, radicalism, 
and the Polish independence cause is the organization’s mission statement.  While 
asserting that Polish liberation remains its most immediate goal, the statement continues 
that this Polish Committee “will take part in every armed conflict undertaken for the 
deliverance of any oppressed people” in order to demonstrate “its solidary with the 
republican ideal.”43   
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 This assertion of principles reveals how Dombrowski’s experiences within Paris 
and with the International affected his thinking by late 1868.  Previously, aiding other 
causes, such as Garibaldi in Italy, was viewed solely as a means of facilitating Poland’s 
emancipation through attaining new allies.  However, this new approach viewed the 
aiding of other national liberation efforts as a duty based on shared political beliefs.  
Clearly this constituted a much more revolutionary conception of the path to Polish 
emancipation, one that viewed the independence struggle as something that could be 
initiated through a struggle abroad and then spread to Poland.  This reconceptualization 
on Dombrowski’s part would come to play an important role in shaping how he 
responded to the French crisis that was now less than two years away. 
 In the meantime, this new Polish organization allowed Dombrowski to further his 
connections among both Parisian and foreign radicals.  The meetings, particularly in the   
Panthéon neighborhood, drew a number of prominent radical personages.  During these 
gatherings, Dombrowski met several labor union activists, such as Charles Armouroux
44
 
and Auguste Briosne, who later served the Commune.  Also at this time he first met the 
revolutionary student Raoul Rigault, a fixture among radical circles in the Latin Quarter.  
Despite a wealthy upbringing, Rigault became an early and ardent convert to Blanquism 
and would serve the Commune as a chief policeman with a cold and efficient 
revolutionary vigor.
45
  Another frequent attendee at these gatherings was Dombrowski’s 
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fellow Pole Paule Mink.  The daughter of an émigré officer who had fled following the 
1830 Uprising, Mink actively promoted women’s labor organizations and encouraged 
education reform, particularly for girls.  A speaker of “great energy,” she proved an 
ardent advocate of non-religious, scientifically-based education during the Commune.
46
  
Though created to facilitate the Polish independence cause, Dombrowski’s Polish 
Committees served to broaden his relationships within Paris and thus strengthen his 
bonds with the city’s radical community. 
 Unfortunately for Dombrowski, within less than a year of the Polish Committee’s 
foundation events conspired to prevent his active participation within both émigré and 
Parisian radical circles.  More specifically, the Russian Third Section presented the 
French government with a new set of charges against him.
47
  In combination with the 
Russian Embassy in Paris and representatives from the Finance Ministry, these agents 
painted Dombrowski as the mastermind behind an international counterfeiting ring based 
within Paris.  According to the Russian government, not only was he overseeing the 
printing of fake Russian rubles, but also Austrian gulden, Prussian thalers, and American 
hundred dollar bills.  Presented with these charges, the French government arrested 
Dombrowski in September 1869, along with several other Polish “co-conspirators.”  With 
the French police now possessing a record of his relationship with known Parisian and 
foreign radical organizations, the Second Empire’s police demonstrated a much greater 
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willingness to cooperate with the Russians than they had in 1867.
48
  Though spending 
nearly eight months in prison, Dombrowski managed to win acquittal on all charges in 
early summer 1870 and was freed, much to the chagrin of the Russian Embassy.
49
  There 
is little doubt that this incident further reinforced his disdain for the Second Empire, just 
as the latter faced a growing crisis with Prussia. 
 Dombrowski’s release from prison occurred as war clouds darkened over the 
Parisian horizon.  Napoleon III’s regime, fearing (correctly, it turns out) that a military 
crisis with Prussia might encourage radicals within the capital to take political advantage, 
began a crackdown in early summer 1870.  Many prominent radicals found themselves 
imprisoned in Saint Pelagia, including most of the leadership of the International’s 
French Branch.
50
  Recognizing that his politics and associations might lead to his re-
arrest, Dombrowski traveled to London in early June.  Upon arriving, he made contact 
with an old associate, Vladimir Ozerov, a former follower of Ishutin who had participated 
in Dombrowski’s rescue from exile in December 1865.  Though a close acolyte of 
Mikhail Bakunin, Ozerov enjoyed close connections with a wide variety of Russian 
émigrés in London.  Soon he introduced Dombrowski to Herman Lopatin, an exiled 
revolutionary from St. Petersburg known for his translation of the works of Marx and 
Engels into Russian.  Between June and early September, Dombrowski stayed with 
Lopatin, who hoped to put the former’s military experience to work for the revolutionary 
movement.
51
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 The timing of Dombrowski’s residence with Lopatin proves interesting, 
corresponding as it does with the origins of his professional and personal relationship 
with Marx.  Indeed, the primary reason for Lopatin’s presence in London that summer 
was to meet with Marx and coordinate with the International’s General Council.  The two 
first met on July 3 and immediately struck up a rapport, with Marx describing Lopatin as 
“a very wide-awake critical brain, cheerful character, stoical.”52  Within two months 
Marx, aided by Auguste Serraillier,
53
 oversaw Lopatin’s election to the International’s 
General Council.  Given the frequent contact between Marx and Lopatin over that 
summer, one can fairly assume Dombrowski also interacted with either Marx, other 
members of the General Council, or both.  Several pieces of evidence support this 
interpretation, including Dombrowski’s pre-existing relationship with Varlin (who 
corresponded with Marx and the General Council regularly), Marx’s glowing references 
to Dombrowski in his writings, and the manner in which Dombrowski is mentioned in 
communications with the General Council.
54
  While the content of such discussions is 
unknown, their likely occurrence shows that while Dombrowski remained a Polish patriot 
first, his perceptions of how his emancipatory ends could be achieved continued to 
broaden.  Based on his subsequent actions during the next ten months, it can be 
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concluded he now viewed Poland’s liberation as potentially being best realized through a 
much broader, international form of revolution.
55
 
 Ideological developments aside, events within France ended Dombrowski’s 
interlude in London in the first days of September 1870.  Word by then travelled across 
the Channel recounting Napoleon III’s crushing defeat at Sedan and the declaration on 
September 4 of a French Republic.  This proclamation transformed Dombrowski’s and 
his fellow Polish émigré’s attitudes toward France’s government.  Whereas, as Woodford 
McClellan notes, when war broke out with Prussia in July “the Polish émigrés showed 
their contempt for the government that had sheltered them” by refusing to offer their 
experienced services to Louis Napoleon, they flocked to the colors following the 
Republic’s foundation.56  Particularly for members of the Polish Committee, this new 
French government, still facing war with Prussia, presented a clear example of a struggle 
“by an oppressed people” fighting to preserve “the republican ideal.”57  Beyond these 
principles of course still lay their most fervent hope of a French Government, grateful for 
the service of Poland’s sons, embarking on a foreign policy leading to Polish liberation.  
Hence, for Jaroslav Dombrowski, the events of September 4 promised the potential 
fulfillment of his emancipatory goals in an ideological manner suitable to his political 
sensibilities. 
 Upon his return to Paris, Dombrowski, after consulting with his fellow Poles, 
drafted a message to the President of the Provisional Government of National Defense, 
                                                 
55For a discussions of London’s role in the international radical movement in relation to Paris, see Chapter 
1, . 
56
McClellan, 136. 
57
Swiatkowski, 33. 
256 
 
Louis Trochu, offering himself and his fellow émigrés for service.  In his appeal, he 
emphasized the vast military experience contained within the Polish immigrant 
community.  He drew particular attention to their possible utilization behind Prussian 
lines, asserting “[t]he Polish immigration offers France excellent material for the 
organization of partisan units…good horsemen, accustomed to wars of surprise and 
ambush…most of them knowing German.”  Dombrowski contended further that the 
impending siege of Paris would make such units vital, given their ability to disrupt 
Prussian supply lines.  In closing, he framed the Polish adherence to the struggle in 
ideological terms, stating “the Poles are ready to shed their blood for the French 
Republic.”58 
 Expecting an immediate assignment, Dombrowski soon learned, to his rage, that 
the Provisional Government had rejected his and his fellow Poles’ offer.  The 
Government of National Defense’s rebuff appears to have been the product of several 
factors, beginning with foreign policy.  Many conservative republicans, led by Adolphe 
Thiers, hoped to avoid a protracted war by reaching an accommodation with the 
Prussians quickly.  To achieve this, they intended to appeal to Great Britain, Austria, and 
Russia to mediate.
59
  An armed Polish legion, led by Dombrowski and other fugitives 
from Poland’s independence efforts, seemed highly unlikely to curry Russian favor in 
these negotiations.  Along with diplomacy, Dombrowski’s background and associations 
within Paris also played a role.  The Provisional Government deeply distrusted the 
political intentions of Parisian radicals in the aftermath of September 4, fearing they 
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would use the present conflict to push France further to the Left.  Keeping arms out of 
potential revolutionary hands played an important role in this, as illustrated by the 
Provisional Government’s attempts to stall the arming of National Guardsmen from 
Paris’s working-class neighborhoods.60  Dombrowski, as well as many other Polish 
émigrés, had long traveled in the same radical circles that now made the new French 
Government so wary.  Finally, there is some indication that Trochu suspected 
Dombrowski of being a Prussian agent, a false charge that reasserted itself several times 
during both the siege and the Commune.  Thus refusing Dombrowski’s offer constituted 
both a foreign policy measure and an act of internal security in the Provisional 
Government’s eyes. 
 Trochu’s and the Government’s refusal to accept Dombrowski’s and his fellow 
Poles’ service alienated him from the Provisional Government from the outset.  This 
tension and disdain only deepened with subsequent events.  Despite the Provisional 
Government’s efforts to block the raising of Polish volunteers, several such groups began 
organizing in the provinces with local governmental support.  In Lyon, Bronislaw 
Wolowski, an émigré of the 1830 generation, former member of the Polish Democratic 
Society during the 1848 revolutions, and a friend of Dombrowski’s, organized a Polish 
legion and sent a request to Paris for Dombrowski to be sent to lead it.
61
  Trochu and the 
Provisional Government immediately vetoed the measure, leaving Wolowski to find 
another commander.  A frustrated Dombrowski, in an early October letter via balloon 
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post to Wolowski, spoke of his growing harassment by French authorities and proposed 
an attempt to cross Prussian lines without authorization to assume command in Lyon.  
Referencing his escape from exile in December 1865, he asserted “I have escaped prison 
once and I am ready to run the risk of new adventures.”62  However, the tightening of the 
Prussian siege lines in mid-October seems to have prevented Dombrowski from making 
such an effort. 
 Trapped within Paris and denied a meaningful role in the war effort, Dombrowski 
became an active member of the opposition among Paris’s popular classes to the 
Provisional Government.  Having operated within such circles since arriving in Paris, his 
frustration with his own situation and the overall running of the war led to a greater 
degree of radicalization.  Symbolic of this was his active participation in the growing 
club movement within Paris.  Closed by the Second Empire with the outbreak of war, 
these political clubs proliferated through the city following September 4.  Most provided 
a venue for those on the Left to criticize the Provisional Government and its handling of 
the siege, as well as discussing its replacement with a popular Commune.  Dombrowski, 
according to police reports, began to frequent these clubs in October, particularly le Club 
de l’École de Médecine and le Club de la Reine-Blanche.63  The former, located in the 6th 
Arrondissement, served as a platform for the French Branch of the International.  Leo 
Frankel, Benoît Malon, and Eugène Varlin frequently spoke at its meetings, though non-
International radicals participated and gave speeches as well.
64
  While Dombrowski’s 
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existing relationship with Varlin and the International might have initially drawn him to 
these meetings, the rhetoric regarding the siege and Provisional Government likely held 
an even deeper attraction to him.  A running criticism of the Government’s handling of 
the war characterized most meetings, with calls for its replacement by a popular 
Commune dominating by December.
65
   
 The Club de la Reine-Blanche, which was located in the 18
th
 Arrondissement and 
dominated by Blanquists, offered Dombrowski a different ideological climate but similar 
sentiments.  The calls there very much echoed those presented at the de l’École de 
Médecine.  Participants called constantly for “prompt and decisive actions concerning the 
defense of Paris” and called on its members to prepare to march on the Provisional 
Government to force such actions.
66
  Records of speakers at these meetings are highly 
fragmentary, but given their highly participatory nature and Dombrowski’s already well-
established position among Parisian radicals, one can reasonably conclude he contributed 
to the discourse at these clubs.  Regardless, his attendance alone denotes that his 
dissatisfaction with the Provisional Government promoted a continued and broadening 
acceptance of a radicalized conception of just government.  While his vision of an 
independent Poland remained the same, the political form it would take appeared in 
transition. 
 As Dombrowski engaged himself within a Parisian radical milieu becoming more 
polarized by the siege, a new clash with the Provisional Government further galvanized 
him toward the opposition.  In mid-October, Giuseppe Garibaldi appeared in southern 
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France to offer his services to the new French Republic.  Despite the skepticism of many 
within the Provisional Government, Leon Gambetta prevailed upon it to take advantage 
of Garibaldi’s military experience and fame.  Given a command consisting primarily of 
foreign volunteers and French irregulars around Autun, Garibaldi christened this force the 
Army of the Vosges and began seeking experienced officers to prepare and lead it into 
combat.
67
 
 To this end, on November 9 Gambetta, now in command of the war effort in the 
provinces from his headquarters at Tours, received the following message from 
Garibaldi; “Jaroslav Dombrowski, 52 rue Vavin, is necessary to me.  Send me this 
intelligent Polish general by any means…if you could get him out (of Paris) via balloon, I 
would be very grateful.”68  Gambetta endorsed Garibaldi’s request and sent it in the next 
packet to reach Paris and the Provisional Government.  However, Trochu refused to send 
Dombrowski, citing his political unreliability and the instructions of the Government to 
avoid utilizing foreign, specifically Polish, soldiers against the Prussians.  Dombrowski, 
upon learning of this third rebuff, seethed with fury.  Writing to Wolowski on Trochu’s 
obstructionism several months later, Dombrowski exhibited a deep bitterness, charging 
that Trochu “dislikes Poles and did everything to move them aside from where they could 
have rendered service.”69  However, Dombrowski also crafted a more immediate 
response to Trochu following the incident with Garibaldi, a scathing public attack that 
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both harshly criticized Trochu’s defense of Paris and exhibited the influence of Parisian 
radicalism on Dombrowski’s thinking. 
 This critique manifested itself in the form of a pamphlet published in late 
December or early January with the support of the Club des Révolutionnaires.  Entitled 
“Trochu as Organizer and Commander in Chief,” this sixteen page document draws 
heavily on Dombrowski’s training as a professional military officer to attack Trochu’s 
strategic approach to breaking the Prussian siege.  However, key passages also illustrate 
Dombrowski viewing these military issues through a decidedly radical political lens.  
Indeed, in his first few words he presents Paris’s struggle within a broad internationalist 
context, emphasizing that the Revolution of September 4 possessed potentially 
transformative ideological consequences.  He thus contends that Trochu, “who held in his 
hands the destiny of Paris,” bears a responsibility for events that have “a huge influence 
on France, even the entire world, but particularly Europe.”70  Given these potential 
consequences, Dombrowski’s response emphasizes the need for a detailed assessment of 
his policies, while time still remained to chart another course. 
 Beginning his argument, he asserts that while the military defeat at Sedan 
prompted the Revolution of September 4, it was the French people, “with the intuition 
which belongs only to masses,” that understood it was necessary to give the nation “a 
new direction to its moral and material force.”  Prior to the Republic’s foundation, the 
Second Empire asked the French people to fight not for “fatherland, freedom and 
humanity,” but rather “in the name of the Emperor and conquest.”  Moreover, Napoleon 
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III’s generals depended almost exclusively upon a small professional army unsupported 
by an effective reserve system.  He contrasts this with the Prussian/German forces, which 
though led by “despotism and aristocracy,” drew upon an excellent system that integrated 
the professional army with trained reservists, thus facing France with a population fully 
mobilized.  Further and equally important for Dombrowski, the Prussians and Germans 
fought for a grand idea, the unification of Germany.  Though other military factors 
contributed, Dombrowski asserts that it was this matter of superior will that ultimately led 
to the ease of the Prussian victory.  This premise, of an armed people driven by duty to a 
higher cause, comprised a main theme that Dombrowski builds up throughout the 
document.
71
 
 Following this introduction, Dombrowski spends the next several pages using 
recent military history to demonstrate how only by fully deploying a nation’s population 
could a state achieve victory in the late nineteenth century.  He focuses particularly on the 
wars fought by the Second Empire in the Crimea and Italy, wars that ended without 
decisive decisions due to the combination of poor mobilization and a lack of mass 
support.  Dombrowski then contrasts these French failures with the Prussian wars against 
Denmark and particularly Austria, which resulted in major victories by mobilizing large 
portions of the population.  He then invokes the Revolution, arguing that the victories 
won under its banners, as well as those achieved under the First Empire, resulted from the 
levée en masse.  Dombrowski concludes this section by asserting that “results in modern 
war only come through a huge deployment of troops.”72 
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 With this point regarding mobilization made, Dombrowski then shifts his focus to 
Paris and the present Prussian conflict.  While he allows that Sedan left French forces in 
the field greatly reduced, particularly those defending Paris, this need not have resulted in 
a desperate siege.  Dombrowski contends that the day after the September 4 revolution, 
“no other country possessed the means” for waging war possessed by France but 
particularly by Paris.  The city, “possessing means more imposing than many kingdoms,” 
has over two million inhabitants supported by a massive industrial and financial base.  
Just as vital as numbers, Dombrowski contends that after September 4 the Government of 
National Defense possessed a cause capable of drawing tens of thousands to the colors.  
Although patriotism certainly played a role, the declaration of a Republic allowed 
Frenchmen to fight for international principles, to struggle against “despotism and 
aristocracy” in the name of “democracy” and particularly “la République Universelle.”73  
Dombrowski’s use of the last term provides strong evidence of his associations’ effect on 
his political thinking.  Condemnations of “despotism and aristocracy” constitute a 
generalized oppositional rhetoric used by liberals during earlier revolutionary moments in 
the nineteenth century.  “La République Universelle” refers to a discourse first utilized 
during 1848 but understood by 1870 to represent a revolutionary conception of 
government both democratic and social in nature that served the interests of the working 
majority rather than capital.  Moreover, drawing on the revolutionary tradition, advocates 
conceived of this republican form overcoming national boundaries and unifying workers 
under one banner.  Parisian radicals in the clubs and elsewhere used calls for the 
“République Universelle” interchangeably with calls for a Commune, a reality of which 
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Dombrowski was quite aware.  With the use of this language, Dombrowski’s critique 
moves beyond a simple military assessment and becomes a clarion call for revolutionary 
change as a means of realizing Paris’s deliverance. 
 Having crossed this rhetorical Rubicon, Dombrowski, the former professional 
soldier, viciously attacks the institution of standing armies.  He first contends, based on 
the French Army’s performance against the Prussians, that standing armies have proven 
themselves insufficient to protect the nation.  Taking his argument further, Dombrowski 
states that, “from a social point of view,” the emergence in Europe of standing armies 
corresponded with the entrenchment of despotism.  Events during the nineteenth century 
demonstrate this reality, since more often than not the people had had to fight these 
professional soldiers in the defense of their liberty.  Thus he concludes that rather than 
defending the nation and the people, standing armies exist in Europe primarily to defend 
“corporate parasites” and “establish new monarchies.”74  These assertions demonstrate an 
undeniable radical influence upon Dombrowski’s thinking and in fact correspond quite 
closely with those of both the Blanquists and the International.  Indeed, writing a few 
months later in his The Civil War in France Karl Marx echoes these sentiments, 
condemning the French standing army as a “a public force organized for social 
enslavement, of an engine of class despotism.”75  Dombrowski, dismissing the standing 
army as nothing more than an instrument of oppression, then provides his blueprint as to 
how Paris could effectively prosecute the war against Prussia. 
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 This answer unsurprisingly, given his earlier military observations, consists of a 
levée en masse within Paris and calls for the mobilization of all men between the ages of 
eighteen and fifty within the city.  Asserting that the selective mobilization of National 
Guard units has failed to tap into these manpower resources, Dombrowski holds that only 
by fully drawing on these human resources can the Prussian siege be broken.  Combined 
with a similar effort in the provinces, he states that the threat to the Prussian supply lines 
would necessitate their retreat from Paris and an end to the siege.  Optimistic to this point 
in his analysis, it is here that Dombrowski shifts toward his critique, arguing that had the 
Government of National Defense employed this strategy immediately following 
September 4, the Prussian threat was “was not insurmountable, nor even serious.”  
However, due to the Government’s failure to mobilize the French people, combined with 
its repeated strategic and tactical errors, the current situation in Paris, though still 
redeemable, teetered on the edge of disaster.
76
  This potentially disastrous state of affairs 
Dombrowski lies at the feet of the Provisional Government’s President and Commander 
in Chief, Louis Trochu. 
 In the last section of his critique, Dombrowski presents a point by point 
assessment of Trochu’s failures as commander in chief.  He begins by charging that 
Trochu, despite his title, did not see organizing Paris’s defense but rather the protection 
of “existing institutions” as his chief duty.  This charge specifically refers to his 
deference to the bourgeoisie and the Army in failing to mobilize Paris fully, due to what 
they viewed as the danger of arming the masses.  Playing off of the document’s title, 
Dombrowski deems Trochu a “de-organizer” given his propensity to turn down 
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volunteers (such as Dombrowski and his fellow Poles), disband irregulars, and, as already 
noted, not draw fully upon the city’s and the nation’s military potential.  Establishing 
these organizational failures, Dombrowski then engages in critiquing Trochu’s military 
moves between September and late December.  Throughout this chronicling of failed 
sorties and missed opportunities, Dombrowski relates Trochu’s repeated public 
pronouncements that “I have a plan.”  After presenting several pages of military failures, 
Dombrowski concludes, showing the anti-clericalism common among Parisian radicals 
that Trochu’s plan for Paris’s deliverance was to pray.77 
 Despite the grave military situation, which Dombrowski largely sets at Trochu’s 
feet, the pamphlet ends with a stirring and highly politicized call for the last full measure 
in Paris’s defense.  Though infected by the “germ of depression in their hearts” due to 
repeated military failures, he asserts that all is not yet lost.  Returning to one of his main 
themes, Dombrowski contends that victory cannot be attained by means of “Chassepots, 
machine guns or Greek fire” but through an ideal.  Invoking both 1792 and “La 
République Universelle,” he proclaims that a Paris fighting in the name of these 
principles and for the benefit of “progress, civilization and the freedom of Europe,” 
cannot be defeated.  Fired by these ideas, a Paris and a France, fully mobilized with every 
man armed, could still drive back the Prussians and provide the nation and Europe with a 
“happy result of the war.”  To illustrate these hopeful sentiments, he closes by invoking 
recent history, noting that the Union during the American Civil War suffered numerous 
defeats due to poor generalship before they found their Grant and won the war.
78
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 This pamphlet represents in many ways a synthesis of Dombrowski’s ideological 
evolution within Paris in relation to his long-term goals regarding Polish liberation.  
Without question, this critique displays political conceptions very much in line with the 
Parisian radicals with whom he enjoyed a long and deepening association.  The repeated 
citing of 1792, the appeals for a “République Universelle,” his attacks upon the political 
establishment and “corporate parasites,” and his critique of professional armies all 
represent ideas supported by some or all strains of Parisian revolutionary thought.  
Related to these ideological principles, a strong internationalist sentiment permeates the 
document, characterized by the recurrent theme that Paris’s and the new Republic’s 
ultimate fate would have significant consequences for the rest of Europe.  For 
Dombrowski, those consequences obviously applied to Poland, the future independence 
of which rested on a French republican government driven by its political tenets to adopt 
an interventionist policy.  However, this document indicates something further: that 
Dombrowski’s focus no longer centered solely on Poland’s independence itself but on 
how that independence would be legitimately achieved.  The fusion of his radicalization 
with his deep distrust of a government that operated solely for bourgeois interests (as 
exhibited by Trochu’s administration) thus produced in Dombrowski a vision of Polish 
emancipation that would originate in Paris but that would be more than a product of 
traditional foreign policy.  Rather, Polish liberation would come by virtue of the Parisian 
peoples’ realization of the “République Universelle” and its subsequent spread to all the 
corners of Europe. 
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 Despite this important political revelation on Dombrowski’s part, his capacity to 
participate in its realization faced a major obstacle in early January 1871.  His scathing 
attack on Trochu did not go unnoticed by its target or other members of the Provisional 
Government.  Already viewed as a liability due to both his radicalism and his potential to 
antagonize the Russian government, Dombrowski’s anti-government pamphlet proved 
the last straw.  Paris police, in addition to monitoring his activities in the clubs, also noted 
his repeated use of his foreign passport to travel freely through the Prussian lines.  
Despite his use of this ability to pass messages to his fellow Poles fighting the Prussians 
in the south, the Provisional Government used this as a cause to arrest Dombrowski as a 
Prussian spy.  Initially, according to his own account to Wolowski, the post commander 
to whom he was taken “wanted to shoot (him), despite his passport and identification.”79  
However, he was ultimately returned to the city and placed in a cell, an action that 
produced an outcry among several of Dombrowski’s radical associates.  Charles 
Delescluze decried his arrest in his journal Le Réveil, asserting that Dombrowski 
constituted “another victim of the tyranny of the Paris government.”80  These protests 
proved vain, as Dombrowski remained in prison when Paris capitulated on January 28, 
1871.  Despite Dombrowski’s fervent efforts to avoid this outcome, it ultimately proved 
fortuitous for him personally.  With contact reestablished with the rest of France, Leon 
Gambetta learned of his incarceration and ordered his release in early February.
81
  Fearful 
of further harassment by the Paris police, Dombrowski took his wife and their two sons 
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temporarily to Lyon, where he reestablished contact with his fellow Polish émigrés who 
fought the Prussians. 
 This stay proved short-lived.  Dombrowski, his personal finances like many other 
Parisians ruined by the siege, contacted Garibaldi in the hopes of securing a commission.  
With his recent election to the National Assembly
82
 Garibaldi exercised enough influence 
within France to aid Dombrowski.  On March 1, he received a letter from Garibaldi, 
endorsed by the French General Penhoat, stating that Dombrowski had been given a 
commission in the Army of the Vosges and was thus entitled to pay at the rank of 
colonel.  In order to receive his pay, Dombrowski would have to return to Paris and 
present this document to the War Ministry.
83
  Apparently unaware of the growing 
tensions between Paris and the Versailles Government following the peace treaty with 
Germany, Dombrowski and his family left in mid-March to return to the city and claim 
his commission. 
 As fate with have it, Jaroslav Dombrowski arrived in Paris on the evening of 
March 18, 1871, a day that began with a standoff between the Army and the National 
Guard in Montmartre and ended with the Parisian popular forces fully in command of the 
city.  Given his known military experience, the Central Committee of the National Guard, 
acting as the executive authority within Paris pending the Communal elections, requested 
a meeting that same night with Dombrowski.  Asked for his opinion regarding their next 
move, Dombrowski advised a rapid concentration of all National Guard units for an 
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immediate march on Versailles.  Arguing that the events of March 18 likely had left the 
Versailles Government in a disordered state, he suggested that a rapid assault would 
likely meet with success and allow for the dissolution of the monarchist dominated 
Assembly in preparation for new elections.
84
 
 This counsel by Dombrowski demonstrates that despite the end of the siege and 
his absence from Paris, his resolve to support a Parisian République Universelle as a 
means of realizing broader revolutionary change remained strong.  However, the Central 
Committee balked, at least initially, at this proposal, arguing that their goal at present 
centered only on securing municipal rights for Paris.  When Dombrowski responded 
(quite correctly) that the Versailles Government’s first act upon regaining its balance 
would be to deploy the army against Paris, they responded that their actions must remain 
defensive until after the elections.  Most assessments, both contemporary and modern, 
assert that the aggressive policies outlined by Dombrowski would have proven the correct 
course.  Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin agreed (shockingly!) that not marching upon 
Versailles immediately proved the Commune’s gravest error.85  However, Dombrowski, 
bowing to the authority of the Central Committee, let the matter drop and requested a 
command within the National Guard. 
 Valuing Dombrowski’s military reputation, the Central Committee commissioned 
him Colonel of the National Guard’s 13th Legion.  His presence appears to have drawn 
other Poles to the Commune cause, including his brother Theophile, whom Dombrowski 
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aided in getting a commission commanding the 21
st
 National Guard Legion.
86
  Wolowski 
in his account asserts that upon Dombrowski being given a commission dozens of Poles 
who had wished to serve during the siege but been denied by Trochu flocked to the 
National Guard.
87
  Among those drawn by Dombrowski’s presence was Auguste 
Okolowicz, a fellow 1863 émigré and member of the International whom he knew from 
his work on the Polish committee.  Okolowicz, enlisting with two younger brothers, 
achieved the rank of general by the Commune’s final days.88    
 However, of the Poles offering to serve Paris after the March 18 Revolution, 
Valery Wroblewski proved without question the greatest asset to both Dombrowski and 
the Commune.  Though no record exists of their interaction prior to the Commune, the 
two men must have known each other given their similar experiences and networks.  Like 
Dombrowski, Wroblewski had trained as a professional soldier and then fought against 
the Russians in 1863.  Fleeing to Paris in 1865, he taught piano while becoming deeply 
involved in émigré activities, particularly the Central Committee of Polish Immigration.  
Serving in a National Guard unit during the siege, Wroblewski shared Dombrowski’s 
political principles and chose to follow him in serving the Commune, rising also to the 
rank of general by its end.
89
  While each Polish volunteer had individual reasons for 
joining the Commune’s ranks, it is fair to conclude that most shared Dombrowski’s hope 
that a clear path lay between a successful revolution in Paris and Poland’s deliverance.  
                                                 
86
Swiatkowski, 102. 
87
Wolowski, 67–68. 
88V. A. Diakov, “Communications: La Commune de Paris et les Peuples Slaves” in Le Mouvement Social, 
No. 79, La Commune de 1871 Actes du colloque universitairepour la commémoration du centenaire Paris, 
les 21–22–23 mai 1971 (April/June 1972), 251–52; and Swiatkowski, 103. 
89
Swiatkowski, 101. 
272 
 
However, Okolowicz and Wroblewski also shared Dombrowski’s connections to several 
Parisian radical circles, allowing one to conclude that they potentially shared a similar 
ideological vision of Poland’s emancipation as well.90 
 While long-term emancipatory aspirations were all well and good, Dombrowski 
recognized that the road to Warsaw began with a Commune free of internal enemies and 
capable of projecting its principles throughout France.  Despite his warnings on March 
18, the newly elected Communal Council made few initial arrangements for the city’s 
defense.  As a result, the National Guard forces manning Paris’s northwestern defenses 
suffered a defeat at the hands of the Versailles Army on April 2.  Shocked that “despite 
the moderation of our attitude…the royalist conspirators have attacked,” the Communal 
Government ordered a sortie by the National Guard against Versailles the next day.
91
  
Rather than utilizing men like Dombrowski with military experience, the assault on 
Versailles, poorly planned and utilizing untrained troops, was led by prominent radicals 
with little to no military experience.  Unsurprisingly, the April 3 sortie resulted in a rout, 
with thousands of National Guardsmen taken prisoner.
92
  Given the scale of this disaster 
and the impending new siege facing Paris, the Commune began looking for new leaders 
with proven military talents. 
 These military changes began with the appointment of Gustave-Paul Cluseret, a 
former professional soldier, adventurer, and radical, to head the effort against Versailles 
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as the Commune’s War Delegate.93  Despite his pedigree Cluseret ultimately proved a 
disaster as commander in chief; however, he did possess an eye for military talent.  Upon 
assuming his duties on April 4, he appointed Louis Rossel, a talented former army 
officer, his chief of staff and asked that Jaroslav Dombrowski be appointed Commandant 
of Paris to oversee the city’s defenses.  Though only meeting for the first time on April 2, 
Cluseret later recounts that he requested Dombrowski due to both his professional 
military training and the high regard in which Garibaldi held the Polish officer.
94
  Events 
would cause him to rue these decisions, since Dombrowski and Rossel both played a 
prominent role in his removal a month later.  That, however, lay in the future and 
Dombrowski, given his ardent support of the Commune’s cause, eagerly accepted 
Cluseret’s offer. 
 However, Dombrowski’s possible appointment gave the Commune’s Executive 
Commission some pause, although not because of the Polish officer himself.  Charles 
Delescluze, who knew Dombrowski well, supported his nomination.  He also received 
the endorsement of the influential Félix Pyat, an 1848 Republican and newspaper editor 
who shared Delescluze’s Jacobin views.  The problem lay with how the public and the 
National Guard would react to receiving orders from a non-French officer.  Despite the 
Commune’s internationalist principles, many Parisians, after enduring the four month 
Prussian siege, viewed foreigners with great suspicion.  Further, Trochu’s false charge 
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during the siege that Dombrowski spied for the Prussian still resonated within some 
Parisian circles.  Though the Council ultimately voted for Dombrowski’s appointment on 
April 6, they decided to couple his selection with a public pronouncement explaining 
their choice.
95
  Lissagaray, writing from his own recollections, provides support for the 
Executive Commission’s decision, stating that from the time of his initial appointment in 
late March, certain members of the National Guard had “shown some distrust of the new 
general.”96  While the Commune claimed itself as the “République Universelle’s” 
vanguard, Dombrowski discovered, like Leo Frankel and Elisabeth Dmitrieff, that 
internationalist sentiments and radical credentials did not place them above xenophobic-
based suspicion. 
 This proactive approach on the Commune’s part produced an official statement 
addressed to the National Guard on April 9 on Dombrowski’s appointment.  Using a 
combination of appeals to internationalism and outright fabrication, the Executive 
Committee attempted to allay any concerns about Dombrowski’s qualifications or 
loyalty.  Acknowledging that some “reproach him for being a foreigner,” the statement, 
while recognizing that he is indeed Polish, asserted that Dombrowski possessed abilities 
essential to the Commune’s fight against Versailles.  Bolstering this claim with outright 
fabrication, the Executive Committee related that he led the last Polish uprising against 
the Russians, holding off the Czarist forces for several months before being taken.  In 
reality, as related earlier, Russian authorities arrested Dombrowski months before the 
January Uprising.  Along similar grandiose lines, the document cited Dombrowski’s 
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service in the Caucasus as demonstrating his ability to protect “a people’s independence 
menaced by an implacable enemy.”  The implication, of course, is that he fought against 
the Russian conquest of the region, when, in reality, he fought as a junior officer in the 
Czarist forces.
97
  While some poetic license is understandable, the degree to which 
exaggeration is used in this document indicates how concerned the Commune’s 
Executive Committee was about a possible nationalistic knee-jerk response to 
Dombrowski’s appointment. 
 While the statement utilized these Herculean claims to recommend Dombrowski, 
it also presented several endorsements well-grounded in fact.  The document related that 
Garibaldi, a military figure of mythical proportions to most common Parisians, personally 
requested that Dombrowski be sent to him during the siege to serve in the Army of the 
Vosges.  However, Trochu and the Provisional Government, well-established villains in 
most National Guardsmen’s eyes, denied Garibaldi’s request and, despite the cost to the 
war effort, arrested Dombrowski.  This fact served both to provide Dombrowski with 
radical credibility in popular eyes and to counter the charge that he was imprisoned as a 
Prussian spy.  Ultimately, the address closed with a final appeal combining 
Dombrowski’s military prowess as an “incontestable man of war” with his ideological 
purity as a “devoted soldier of the République Universelle.”98  Overall, this appeal by the 
Executive Commission on Dombrowski’s behalf appears well-crafted and takes account 
well of the audience.  On one hand, the claims regarding Dombrowski’s relationship with 
Garibaldi and his ideological principles could be verified by those who knew him through 
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the clubs and the International’s French Branch.  The claims regarding Poland and the 
Caucasus, in a city once again cut off from the rest of the world, would have to be 
accepted at face value.
99
 
 Despite the Executive Commission’s efforts, Dombrowski’s appointment still met 
with xenophobic resistance.  The evidence for this comes from two letters to the editor 
reprinted in Swiatkowski’s account.  The first, written by a Polish émigré, responds to 
charges made in La Vérité on April 9 that Dombrowski worked for the Czarist 
Government and was in fact Russian.  The respondent, one J. Odravonge, relates the 
circumstances of Dombrowski’s arrival and countercharges that such accusations insult 
all Polish immigrants currently fighting for the Commune.  In the second letter, written to 
an unnamed journal, another Polish émigré refutes the charge that Dombrowski is 
Russian, calling him a “good Pole” who suffered at the hands of a Czarist government 
that attempted to exile him in Siberia.
100
  Though indicating a general distrust of 
foreigners among some of the Commune’s supporters, the fracas surrounding 
Dombrowski’s appointment also serves to demonstrate further the depths of his Parisian 
connections.  On one hand, the address made by the Commune’s Executive Commission 
shows the willingness of established radical comrades like Delescluze to intervene 
publically on Dombrowski’s behalf.  On the other, the letters from his fellow Polish 
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émigrés shows his deep association with that community and its strong support of his 
service to the Commune. 
 Regardless of any lingering questions of his loyalty, Dombrowski, driven by his 
multi-faceted devotion to the Commune’s cause, immediately threw himself into his new 
position as Paris’s Commandant.  As the letters flew between his supporters and hostile 
journals, Dombrowski rapidly vindicated himself in the eyes of the National Guard by 
virtue of his aggressive leadership.  Prior to his appointment, a surprise assault by the 
Versailles soldiers established a dangerous bridgehead over the Marne River at Neuilly.  
This not only breached Paris’s outer line of defenses but also provided the French Army 
with a strategic position from which to shell the city’s inner line of forts.  This reversal 
left the National Guard units around this key position greatly demoralized and thus 
vulnerable to further assaults.  Receiving word of this situation upon his promotion, 
Dombrowski traveled to the endangered sector on April 8.  Lissagaray, describing his 
arrival, relates how the disheartened National Guardsmen around Neuilly:  
beheld a young man, small of stature, in a modest uniform, slowly inspecting the 
vanguards in the thick of the fire…it was Dombrowski…Instead of the explosive 
glowing French bravery, he demonstrated the cool, and, as it were, unconscious 
courage of the Slav…in a few hours the new chief had conquered all his men.101 
 
However, Dombrowski’s plan consisted of more than restoring morale through personal 
leadership.  The next night he ordered a night attack by two National Guard battalions 
against the Neuilly bridgehead.  This attack proved enormously successful, driving the 
French Army back over the Marne and stabilizing Paris’s eastern defenses.  By the 
morning of April 12, a representative from the War Commission reported to the 
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Commune that Dombrowski had complete command of the situation and anticipated 
further advances.
102
 
 This vigorous action on Dombrowski’s part further solidified his value in the eyes 
of the Commune’s Executive Commission.  Moreover, it removed any remaining 
questions among the National Guardsmen under his command regarding his loyalty or 
their willingness to serve under a Polish officer.  In terms of ending the public’s questions 
regarding Dombrowski, this victory proved less successful.  As Lissagaray points out, 
“this brilliant attack was the deed of one man… (but) Paris was ignorant of this 
success.”103  Neuilly, though constituting a vital military position, stood over five miles 
from Paris’s eastern edge.  As related in the previous chapters, most Parisian radicals 
focused their attention on internal reforms or attacking unpopular governmental 
measures, such as Cluseret’s effort to remove all men over the age of thirty-five from 
frontline National Guard battalions.
104
  Despite a stream of steady reports published in the 
Journal Officiel throughout mid-April relating further advances and the capture of enemy 
colors, Dombrowski’s vital contributions to the Commune’s war effort, though furthering 
his own goals, remained largely unknown within Paris.
105
 
 Moreover, the lack of awareness regarding Dombrowski’s military achievements 
opened him to attack from opponents who resented his rapid rise to command or 
preferred a different approach to Paris’s defense.  Division and petty back-biting proved 
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one of the greatest detriments to the Commune’s war effort in general, as various factions 
struggled for authority over the National Guard and overall military planning.  Some of 
this conflict had its origins in the divisions between the Commune’s ideological factions.  
However, personal ambitions and jealousies also drove these struggles among members 
of the Commune’s political and military leadership.  As a result, “the National Guard was 
never brought under any central control, maintaining its independence at the local 
level.”106  Though potentially fatal in the struggle against Versailles, the Commune’s 
leaders unfortunately preferred to attack each other over command, rather than 
establishing it to any effective degree. 
 In Dombrowski’s case, the first of these attacks focused unsurprisingly on the 
issue of his nationality, although institutional jealously constituted the real motive.  His 
assailant in this matter was Emile Eudes, a Blanquist student with a long history of 
political activism during the Second Empire and strong connections with the Parisian 
radical movement.  Following the March 26 Commune election, the new government 
promoted Eudes and several others to generals of the National Guard, despite a collective 
lack of any military experience.  Indeed, Lissagaray asserts that Eudes, “being a member 
of the so-called party of action, owed this post only to the patronage of his old 
cronies.”107   The resulting disaster on April 3, as discussed above, led to his and his 
fellow’s replacement by Dombrowski and other men with military experience, including 
several other Poles.   
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 Eudes, eager to reestablish his position with the National Guard, used the April 20 
meeting of the Commune to raise questions regarding so many foreigners serving in 
leadership roles.  Addressing the council, he contended that, in trying to ascertain why 
the war effort was faltering, the fact that one-fourth of the military commanders were 
foreigners needed to be considered and explained to the people of Paris.  He then began 
to list these foreigners, not surprisingly beginning with Dombrowski.  Though 
acknowledging Eudes’ point, several other representatives, including Dombrowski’s 
associate Delescluze, implied that the military experience possessed by these foreigners 
was needed.  Eudes, realizing his effort had failed, changed his target and focused the rest 
of his criticism indirectly on Cluseret, a much more acceptable target among his fellow 
Communards.
108
  Though unsuccessful, Eudes’ attack illustrates that Dombrowski, 
despite his continued service to the Commune, suffered from a political vulnerability due 
to his nationality, a vulnerability not shared by his French comrades.  While most 
Communards resisted utilizing this line of attack, the worsening military situation, 
combined with the growing strength of the neo-Jacobins, meant that this was not the last 
time Dombrowski experienced assaults of this sort. 
 Despite the doubts cast on his loyalty by some fellow radicals, his effective 
military service, despite being underreported, did further his connections among some 
groups and individuals within the Commune.  Louis Rossel, Cluseret’s chief of staff, had 
supported Dombrowski’s original appointment as Commandant and came to develop both 
a good working relationship with the Pole as a well as an admiration for his capacities.  
Rossel relates that as Cluseret “provided himself…inferior in his duties, in activity, in the 
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power of taking lead and in capacity for organization,” he and Dombrowski actively 
collaborated to keep the war effort from floundering further.
109
  Members of the 
International’s French Branch, with whom Dombrowski had long enjoyed amicable 
relations, also lauded his military efforts.  Benoît Malon, observing from his position at 
the Commission of Labor and Exchange, asserted that Dombrowski’s military service 
was proving him a “champion of the Revolution.”  Dismissing the charges by some neo-
Jacobins that Dombrowski and his fellow foreign fighters proved a liability, Malon 
asserts that Dombrowski’s and his comrades’ efforts constituted a “precursor of the future 
République Universelle,” which accepted “the assistance of all men…without concern 
about the nationality as citizens of world.”110  Elisabeth Dmitrieff, in her April 24 letter to 
Hermann Jung (a key member of the International’s London-based General Council), 
praises Dombrowski’s exertions, relating that he is “fighting well” despite the overall 
poor military leadership under the Commune.
111
  Clearly the issue of Dombrowski’s 
nationality, like those periodically raised against Leo Frankel and Elisabeth Dmitrieff, 
illustrate the still existing tension in Parisian radical circles between nationalist/patriotic 
conceptions inherited from 1792 and the universalistic/transnational principles first 
posited in 1789 and elaborated upon during the nineteenth century. 
 Despite these issues with some other Communard leaders, the strongest 
constituency Dombrowski developed under the Commune was that of the National 
Guard, particularly those units which served directly under him around Neuilly.  This can 
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be credited mostly to Dombrowski’s military capacity.  A representative of the 
Commune, sent to observe Dombrowski, reported back to the council on April 25 that the 
Polish offer enjoyed the “adoration” of his men, who viewed him as one of the few 
leaders invested in both victory and their well-being.
112
  The depth of these soldiers’ 
devotion was demonstrated by the so-called “105th Battalion Affair.”  As pressure 
increased on the Communard position at Neuilly in mid-April, Dombrowski required a 
constant stream of reinforcements.  One of the units that he summoned to the front was 
the National Guard’s 105th Battalion, which up to that point had remained within Paris 
proper.  Despite receipt of repeated orders by Dombrowski to march to the front, the 
officers of this unit refused to obey.  Finally, Dombrowski, along with a body of soldiers, 
travelled to the city and ordered the arrest and court martial of the 105
th’s officers.  As 
mentioned above, the Commune’s National Guard units repeatedly demonstrated their 
unwillingness to comply with orders in general and military discipline in particular.  
However, Dombrowski’s status among the National Guard led to a rare instance of 
obedience, with the charged officers led off by their comrades to prison.  Reporting to the 
Commune on April 25 Dombrowski, recognizing the likelihood of objections to a court 
martial, presented his case for the action.  He argued that “if you do not take the 
necessary measures, all is lost,” since discipline is necessary for a military to function.  
With an eye perhaps to his own popularity, he exonerated the soldiers themselves, stating 
“it is not against the guards that we must act, but against officers who do not want to fight 
and who prevent their men from fighting.”113  Rossel supported Dombrowski in this 
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assessment, asserting “wild acts of indiscipline and rebellion” occur daily, thus it is 
necessary “to have recourse to energetic measures of coercion.”  Though several 
members of the Commune objected to such a court martial, the trial was held and Rossel, 
acting as the judge, cashiered the 105
th’s officers and disbanded the unit due to its 
soldiers’ “collective cowardice.”114  Dombrowski’s capacity to inspire normally 
undisciplined and highly independent National Guardsmen to accept such an outcome 
indicates the degree of regard they held for him. 
 Regardless of his men’s esteem, Dombrowski’s experiences on the front as April 
waned led to his growing questioning of the Commune’s military leadership, specifically 
that of Cluseret.  Many shared the Polish general’s growing skepticism of the War 
Delegate.  Rossel, in his capacity as chief of staff, believed by late April that events had 
overcome Cluseret and his lack of coordination of the Commune’s forces placed Paris in 
grave danger.
115
  The Commune itself developed a deepening suspicion both of 
Cluseret’s capacity and his political intentions.  On April 23, the Commune called him 
before a committee of inquiry to account for his handling of the war effort.  One area in 
which they vigorously questioned him was on the requests by Dombrowski for 
reinforcements for Neuilly sent on both April 19 and April 20.
116
  Though first assuring 
the committee that he “never once had the intention to refuse anything to General 
Dombrowski,” Cluseret then offered an account that strongly implied that Dombrowski’s 
requests were the product of unnecessary panic.
117
  In his memoirs, he reinforced that 
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point, asserting that Dombrowski’s demands for reinforcements were an exaggeration on 
the Polish officer’s part and failed to account for the overall military situation.118 
 Dombrowski, when apprised of Cluseret’s views, expressed understandable 
resentment and became further convinced of the War Delegate’s inability to command.  
Aware of the Commune’s skepticism of Cluseret’s assessment of events on the 
battlefield, Dombrowski continued to send the council a steady stream of dispatches 
describing the difficult military situation and requesting reinforcements.  His report on 
April 28 presents a good example, emphasizing that while his soldiers continue to 
“persevere with courage and energy,” unless his frequent calls for support were met, their 
bravery would come to naught.
119
  Though still operating from Neuilly, associates within 
the city, as well as Rossel, clearly kept him abreast of the growing chorus within the 
Commune calling for Cluseret’s removal.  Moreover, these same sources would have 
informed him of the growing calls within the Commune for a new executive body, a 
Committee of Public Safety modeled upon the body granted near dictatorial powers to 
face the great revolutionary crisis in 1792.  Nearly every discussion of this potential 
committee placed Dombrowski’s comrade Delescluze at its head.   
 In assessing Dombrowski’s motivations for joining those pressing for Cluseret’s 
removal as War Delegate, there is no evidence to indicate that political jockeying drove 
his actions.  Events would show that after Cluseret’s removal, Dombrowski made no 
attempts to push for higher command and remained focused primarily on the Commune’s 
military effort.  Following his appointment as Commandant of Paris in early April, he 
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remained primarily at the front, making only an occasional appearance in the city itself at 
the Ministry of War.  Given these circumstances, Dombrowski’s involvement in 
Cluseret’s removal must be seen as primarily driven by his devotion to the Commune’s 
ultimate success on the battlefield.  For without Paris’s deliverance, the hope of a Poland 
liberated by the armies of the République Universelle stood little chance of being 
realized. 
 Ultimately, Dombrowski’s dispatch of April 28 corresponded with a series of 
events that accelerated Cluseret’s dismissal.  His plea for reinforcements arrived at the 
Commune during a stormy session focused on the ineptitude of Cluseret’s leadership and 
a growing fear regarding his political intentions.  Several Commune members accused 
Cluseret of plotting to emulate Bonaparte and establish a military dictatorship. 
120
  On the 
following evening, the Commune summoned Rossel to their meeting and made it very 
clear to the chief of staff that Cluseret’s days were numbered.  However, a final military 
crisis on April 30 prompted the final drop of the axe, as Fort d’Issy, the linchpin of the 
Commune’s southwestern defenses, was abandoned that morning in the face of a heavy 
Versailles bombardment.  Ironically, Cluseret, unaware of the level of discontent within 
the Commune’s leadership, moved rapidly to the fortress with reinforcements and 
managed to recapture it that evening.  However, Cluseret’s final act as the Commune’s 
War Delegate occurred as the Commune itself met and decided, based on the dire 
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military situation, both to establish a Committee of Public Safety and to order Cluseret’s 
removal from command and his arrest.
121
 
 Dombrowski viewed Cluseret’s dismissal with optimism, believing that his 
inability to coordinate the Commune’s war effort had greatly hindered its cause.  He was 
equally optimistic, at least initially, with the appointment of Rossel as the new War 
Delegate on April 30.  Speaking to Wolowski, who crossed the battle lines briefly in 
early May, Dombrowski stated that of all the Commune’s French generals, “only Rossel 
is capable.”122  The next day Rossel summoned his commanders, including Dombrowski, 
to the War Ministry.  There he proposed a reorganization of the National Guard, aimed at 
providing a cadre of trained and disciplined soldiers for offensive operations.  
Dombrowski, Wroblewski, and several other experienced officers would lead this new 
unit of 2,000 men as it operated a sort of military fire brigade, stabilizing problematic 
areas in the Communard lines and, more importantly, identifying weak positions within 
the enemy lines to assault.  Recognizing that a completely defensive posture meant 
inevitable defeat, Rossel felt this new initiative was vital to the Commune’s future.  
Dombrowski, for his part, enthusiastically supported this rationalization of the war effort, 
recognizing that the previous approach had produced only steady gains for the Versailles 
Army.
123
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 However, the political discord among the Commune’s higher echelons proved a 
great hindrance to these military reform efforts.  Dombrowski, Rossel, and other military 
leaders initially favored the Committee of Public Safety’s creation, not due to any 
ideological approval but rather because they hoped it would bring greater centralization 
and support to the war effort.  This proved anything but the case as the Commune’s 
council, the Committee of Public Safety, and the various National Guard committees all 
attempted to participate in directing military policy.  This created a state of affairs that 
unsurprisingly resulted in not the greater focus Dombrowski had hoped for but chaos.
124
 
 Another crisis at Fort d’Issy illustrated the consequences of the Commune’s 
divided authority.  Upon assuming command Rossel dispatched the revolutionary 
blowhard Eudes to take command of the vital fortress.  Having become the central point 
of the Versailles thrust to break Paris’s defense line, Fort d’Issy experienced nearly 
constant bombardment.  Faced with this intensity, Eudes, on the pretense of seeking 
reinforcement at the War Ministry, set out for Paris, leaving the fort in his chief of staff’s 
command.
125
  Made aware of this threat, the Committee of Public Safety sent a message 
to Dombrowski at Neuilly on May 3, vesting him with command of all the Commune’s 
field forces.  Rushing to take control of the situation at Fort d’Issy, Dombrowski 
encountered Rossel, who, according to the latter, “was as astonished by my arrival as I 
had been by his presence.”  Dombrowski, who had been informed by the Committee that 
Rossel’s future role as War Delegate would be purely administrative, discovered that 
Rossel possessed no knowledge of the change.  The two men, being, in Rossel’s words, 
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“on the most amicable terms,” shared a piece of bread in the fort’s dugout and agreed to 
cooperate in their efforts.
126
 
 However, Rossel, upon returning to the War Ministry, immediately sent a letter to 
Charles Gérardin, a close friend and member of the Committee of Public Safety, and 
demanded that the lines of command be clarified.  Rossel, writing later, asserts that 
despite admiring Dombrowski’s tactical abilities greatly, he believed that the Polish 
General lacked the capacity to control all parts of the front.  However, in an address to 
the Commune the following day, he framed his argument differently by emphasizing how 
overall command drew Dombrowski’s essential leadership away from the threatened 
sector at Neuilly.  Pyat, addressing the Commune on the behalf of the Committee of 
Public Safety, responded that no order beyond sending Dombrowski to d’Issy to deal 
with the immediate crisis had been issued.  Despite this denial, Pyat’s subsequent actions 
toward Rossel, coupled with his and Delescluze’s established support of Dombrowski, 
strongly indicate that the Committee did indeed issue the Polish officer’s promotion on 
May 3.  However, Rossel’s spirited response, coupled with the Commune’s reaction, 
caused them to backpedal and reconfirm Rossel’s overall command.127 
 Informed on May 5 that Rossel retained overall control of the Commune’s field 
forces, Dombrowski, though cooling somewhat toward Rossel, resumed his focus on the 
fighting west of Paris.  However, this experience robbed him of much of his enthusiasm 
that Cluseret’s removal would lead to a more unified and well-directed war effort.  
Lissagaray relates that “Dombrowski, weary of struggling against the inertness of the 
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War Office, was discouraged,” a condition that likely worsened as new calls for the 
Neuilly sector’s reinforcement produced only a trickle of National Guardsmen.128  
Speaking to Wolowski on the matter, he related that every intervention by the Commune 
resulted in “a new chaos.”129  While these constituted reasons for questioning the 
Commune’s military planning, the government’s treatment of Dombrowski’s 
commander-in-chief Rossel only gave rise to greater doubts.  Unable to get the various 
National Guard committees to agree to his reorganization effort and faced with various 
intrigues from the Committee of Public Safety, Rossel tendered his resignation on May 9, 
just as Fort d’Issy fell to Versailles.  That evening Dombrowski dined with Rossel.  
During the meal they received a proposal from the National Guard committee asking that 
the two men take control of its battalions to overthrow both the Commune and 
Committee of Public Safety.  Arguing that drastic action was needed to save Paris, these 
agents contended that “nothing of worth could be expected any more from those talkers 
on the Commune.”130  Despite their disillusionment with the government, both men 
refused the offer.  The next day Rossel was summoned before the Commune and 
threatened with court martial; however, he disappeared that evening before he could be 
arrested.
131
  Given his already declining view of the Commune’s political leadership, the 
treatment of Rossel, coupled with the National Guard’s proposed coup, likely did little to 
reassure Dombrowski. 
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 Nevertheless, he continued to serve the Commune in the field, accepting from 
Delescluze, who replaced Rossel as War Delegate, command of all forces on the right 
bank of the Seine.  His fellow Pole Wroblewski was to control those forces on the left 
bank.
132
  While dealing with this new military obligation, Dombrowski took some time 
on May 10 or 11 to speak with Wolowski, who had recently crossed the lines from 
Versailles.  This conversation, which Wolowski recorded, provides vital insight into 
Dombrowski’s thinking regarding the war effort, the Commune, and his broader political 
goals as the military crisis facing Paris worsened. 
 Unsurprisingly, given his experiences, Dombrowski spends a substantial amount 
of time offering Wolowski a stinging critique of the Commune’s war effort.  Though he 
acknowledges the hard fighting done by most National Guardsmen, he bemoans the utter 
lack of discipline and his inability to instill it due to the constant interference of the 
Commune.  He relates that every attempt to “punish cowards in his army” comes to 
naught because each of them “has a friend or a cousin in the Commune” who refutes the 
charges and reproaches Dombrowski for making attacks on “such great patriots.”  
Moving on to the Commune itself, he asserts that they “do not have a penny for 
practicality or any military knowledge,” which routinely resulted in contradictory orders 
that produce military chaos.  He further adds that since he is Polish, he must suffer this 
since his criticism will be perceived highly critically or even as a sign of treason.  
However, though offering this biting critique, Dombrowski does assure Wolowski that 
the Commune’s actions are a result of “ignorance rather than ill will.”133 
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 However, when asked by Wolowski why he continued to serve in the face of this 
incompetence, Dombrowski offered a response that demonstrates his continued devotion 
to the Commune and the larger implications of its struggle.  Questioned about why a Pole 
should participate in this French Civil War, Dombrowski responded that his and his 
fellow émigrés’ service showed Europe’s great powers that “an alliance of poor nations” 
can indeed resist any one of them, illustrated by the Commune and its Polish volunteers’ 
resistance to the French Army for the past two months.  Building upon this, he argued 
that Paris presents the ideal point to challenge the established order.  Drawing on the case 
he developed months before against Trochu, Dombrowski asserted that Paris is not 
Bucharest or Madrid; here “we have everything we need to make war.”  Moreover, 
Paris’s war against Versailles, unlike a conflict on Europe’s periphery, possessed a much 
higher probability of spurring similar uprisings elsewhere.  Dombrowski, invoking both 
the French Revolution and 1848, notes that history demonstrates Paris’s capacity to 
export revolution.  Ultimately though, Dombrowski’s continued loyalty and willingness 
to die for the Commune’s cause stem from his belief in its principles.  He closes his 
discussion with Wolowski by asserting that “the Parisians want for themselves communal 
freedoms which will be the basis of all future liberties within Europe.”134  Dombrowski’s 
discussion with Wolowski shows that despite his disillusionment with the Commune’s 
war effort, even at this late date the Polish officer still viewed a victory at Paris as the 
best means of achieving a revolutionary tide that would realize his goal of a free Poland 
beneath the République Universelle’s banner. 
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 While Dombrowski’s support of the Commune’s cause largely manifested itself 
on the battlefield, another event in early May allowed him to demonstrate his fidelity in a 
different arena.  Though early May brought steadily military gains, the Versailles 
Government began examining different means of accelerating Paris’s fall.  Subversion 
offered one potential avenue, and the Versailles government employed agents offering 
bribes to various National Guard officers in the hopes of attaining an unopposed entry 
through the city’s defenses.  Given his prominence among the Commune’s field officers 
and his foreign background, Dombrowski made an obvious target.  To this end, Thiers’s 
chief of staff, Jules Barthelemy-Saint-Hilaire, hired Georges Veysset to approach the 
Polish officer about arranging for Paris’s fall.  The plan called either for purchasing 
Dombrowski’s cooperation or creating enough suspicion around him to turn the 
Commune against him, thus removing its best officer from the field.
135
 
 Veysset first contacted one of Dombrowski’s adjutants, who passed the offer to 
meet and discuss conditions to the general.  Upon receiving this information, he went 
immediately to the Committee of Public Safety, which ordered him to set up a 
rendezvous with the agent.  Dombrowski, agreeing to their request, also suggested 
allowing some portion of the Versailles Army into the city so that an ambush could be 
arranged.  Given the potential for disaster, the Committee refused his request.  Following 
Dombrowski’s reply, Veysset set up a meeting for the night of May 12 in Montmartre.  
Trailed by Raoul Rigault’s police agents, Dombrowski rendezvoused with Veysset, who 
offered him full amnesty and one million francs in exchange for his cooperation.  
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Signaled by Dombrowski, the Commune’s agents then moved in and arrested Veysset, 
who was subsequently shot and thrown into the Seine on May 22.
136
  For most members 
of the Committee of Public Safety and the Communal Council Dombrowski’s prompt 
reporting and cooperation in capturing this Versailles spy further validated his loyalty.  
However, among those neo-Jacobins who already viewed him with suspicion, this event 
served to reignite questions surrounding Dombrowski’s nationality and thus his loyalty to 
the Commune’s cause.  Thus, despite once again acting in the Commune’s best interest, 
Dombrowski found himself under a cloud that lingered in the minds of some Parisians 
even beyond his death.
137
  
 The thwarting of Versailles’ attempt to enter the city by subterfuge unfortunately 
provided Paris only a short respite, as the French Army drove closer and closer to the city 
itself.  In order to address this growing catastrophe, Delescluze called the Commune’s 
leading generals to a Council of War on May 17.  Despite the dire military situation, 
Dombrowski, the most senior officer present, presented a plan to renew the war effort and 
reverse the gains made by Versailles.  Once again drawing on the blueprint he had 
devised during the Prussian siege, Dombrowski called for an emergency mass 
mobilization of the city’s entire male population.  Hoping to draw 100,000 men, he 
argued that by throwing these forces at the most heavily threatened points in Paris’s 
defenses (which, since the fall of Fort d’Issy, lay mainly in the south) the situation could 
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be stabilized long enough to develop a long-term plan to break the siege.  Though this 
plan bore the hallmarks of desperation, it demonstrates Dombrowski’s continued 
commitment to the Commune’s cause even when faced with a military situation he surely 
recognized as nearly impossible.  Ultimately, the logistics involved with such a 
mobilization led the Council to dismiss Dombrowski’s suggestion.  After debating a few 
other proposals and reaching no agreement, Dombrowski and his fellow returned to their 
units with orders to preserve the situation as best they could.
138
 
 Unfortunately, the odds arrayed against the Commune by late May assured that 
Dombrowski and his comrades’ capacity to preserve the situation would be brief.  Only 
four days after their Council of War, the Versailles Army discovered an unguarded gate 
into Paris at the Porte de Saint-Cloud and began advancing into the city.  Learning of the 
breech, Dombrowski sent a message to the Committee of Public Safety, which was in 
mid-session, reporting on the situation.  This document, though recognizing the 
breakthrough as a “serious event,” demonstrated a coolness and even optimism on 
Dombrowski’s part.  Encouraging the Committee to “keep their composure,” he assured 
them that “nothing is yet lost” and if reinforcements were rapidly dispatched, “everything 
will be saved.”139 
 The Committee and the Commune’s reaction to Dombrowski call was largely 
paralysis; no reinforcements would be forthcoming and, following the pattern of 
leadership Dombrowski had experienced since the war’s beginning, all authority 
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fragmented.  Despite this reality, the Polish general, still committed to both the Commune 
and the larger cause it represented, attempted to plug the breech on the morning of May 
22.  However, the 1500 or so National Guardsmen he assembled rapidly broke, leaving 
Dombrowski to flee in order to avoid capture.  Attempting to make his way to the Hôtel 
de Ville, the Polish officer found himself arrested by a National Guard staff officer (who 
was shot only a day later for cowardice) and charged with treason for trying to flee.  
When Dombrowski was brought before a horrified Committee of Public Safety, its 
members ordered his immediate release.  Delescluze and others attempted to assuage the 
general; however, the damage had been done.  Lissagaray relates that Dombrowski kept 
repeating in “bitter despair” that “the Committee of Public Safety takes me for a traitor!  
My life belongs to the Commune!”140  Having devoted himself to the Commune’s cause 
in the hopes that its promise of a République Universelle would liberate Poland and the 
rest of Europe, Jaroslav Dombrowski, shattered by the false perception of his betrayal of 
those values, nevertheless prepared himself to offer his last measure of devotion to that 
cause.  
 The next morning, his old comrade Delescluze suggested he “do his best” in 
Montmartre, by then the scene of intense fighting.   Lissagaray, describing the Polish 
soldier as he left the Hôtel de Ville, saw him leave “without hope, without soldiers, 
suspected since the entry of the Versaillese, all Dombrowski could do was die.”141  
Arriving in Montmartre, he moved toward the most intense fighting around Rue Myrrha.  
Elisabeth Dmitrieff and Louise Michel, commanding a group of women manning the 
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barricades, saw him as he advanced toward the front line.  Michel relates as she 
approached him, he held out both his hands to her and said “[i]t’s over.”  Moments later, 
he fell, mortally wounded.
142
  Taken to Lariboisière Hospital, he expired two hours later.  
According to Wolowski, his last words to the attending doctor were “and they dare 
believe me a traitor.”143  Despite the battle raging throughout the city, a group of National 
Guardsmen bore his body to the Place de Bastille where a brief service was held.  
Afterward, the Guardsmen wrapped Dombrowski’s body in a red flag and conveyed it to 
Père Lachaise for burial.
144
 
 For Jaroslav Dombrowski, the road to a free Poland must begin with the victory 
of the Paris Commune.  Devoted to the cause of Polish liberation, his time as an exile in 
Paris during the 1860s brought him into contact with the French capital’s diverse 
transnational radical community, an interaction that led him to a gradual reconception of 
his vision of national liberation.  By the Commune’s founding in March 1871, 
Dombrowski, by virtue of his experiences and exchanges with the different ideological 
perspective found in Paris, viewed Polish liberation as best achieved through the 
Commune’s success and the export of its model of a democratic and social republic.  To 
this end, he offered his military services to the Communard cause.   
 During his time as one of the Commune’s highest ranking officers, Dombrowski 
experienced ineffectiveness and outright incompetence prompted in large part by political 
infighting that undercut Paris’s war effort.  His position as a foreign national was utilized 
by some military rivals to criticize both his fitness to command and his loyalty to the 
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Communard cause.  However, his effective leadership, his established connections with 
other radicals, and the loyalty of his soldiers undercut most of these criticisms until the 
Commune’s final days.  During those last frantic hours opponents once again asserted the 
charges against Dombrowski’s loyalty, leading him to seek acquittal by personal 
sacrifice, at which he succeeded.  Jaroslav Dombrowski, like his non-French comrades 
Leo Frankel and Elisabeth Dmitrieff, came to view Paris and its Commune as a point of 
departure, a site where a victorious revolution could provide the means of achieving not 
only a free Paris but also a free, democratic, and social Poland as well.
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Epilogue: A Parisian Sunset 
The Revolutionary Capital Falls 
After surveying Paris’s fire-gutted buildings and corpse-strewn streets in the Commune’s 
immediate aftermath, the writer and art critic Edmond de Goncourt attempted to place the 
enormous loss of life in perspective.  No friend of the Commune, he characterized its 
violent suppression by the Army as a necessary evil, asserting that “the bloodletting was 
a bleeding white” which would “by killing off the combative part of the population defer 
the next revolution by a whole generation.”1  His bourgeois callousness aside, these 
words proved prophetic.  The Commune’s brutal defeat ended Paris’s reign as the 
Continent’s crucible of revolutionary thought and action, extinguishing in the eyes of 
international radicals that Promethean flame they had hoped would set Europe and the 
world ablaze.  Though Paris’s boulevards and cafés soon echoed again with the different 
tongues of new generations of expatriates, exiles, and sojourners, including political 
refugees of various stripes, few, if any, viewed the French capital as the revolutionary 
means of realizing their own ideological ends.   
 The utter devastation wrought by the French Army during the Commune’s last 
week, coupled with the witch hunt that followed, shattered both Paris’s national and 
transnational radical communities.  Estimates vary, but somewhere between 20,000 and 
30,000 Communards died or were executed as the French Army recaptured and secured 
the capital.
2
  This constituted, in little more than a week, the bloodiest civil violence 
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experienced by any European state during the long nineteenth century.  Stuart Edwards 
places these figures in even starker relief, noting that they eclipse those recorded 
executed throughout all of France during the entirety of the Great Revolution’s “Terror,” 
a span of eighteen months.
3
  A massive wave of arrests compounded the casualties list, 
with over 40,000 “suspects” being hauled off to makeshift prison camps, coastal 
fortresses, and prison barges by the end of June.  Over the next two years military 
tribunals convicted 10,000 men and women in what Jacques Rougerie deemed the 
greatest repressive enterprise in French history.  While most faced various prison 
sentences within France, 4,000 deemed the most politically dangerous, including the 
“Red Virgin” Louise Michel, found themselves shipped to a South Pacific penal colony 
on New Caledonia.  Given the bloody work already conducted during the Commune’s 
fall, French tribunals sentenced only ninety-eight to death, of which twenty-three were 
actually executed.
4
   
 Those radicals fortunate enough to escape the Versailles Government’s vengeance 
found themselves political refugees, dogged not just by French authorities but those of 
other hostile governments, particularly Russia.  Only England and Switzerland offered 
truly safe harbor.  In the months following the Commune’s defeat, hundreds gathered in 
London, assured by the Gladstone government’s stated unwillingness to extradite former 
Communards to France.  Equally important was the presence of the International in the 
English capital, which held the promise of material and financial aid.  The demands of 
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these exiled Communards soon overwhelmed the General Council’s limited resources, 
prompting Marx to ask for aid from Internationalists as far away as Washington, D.C., to 
contend with the “great distress among the refugees here…without the means of 
subsistence…there is to be an appeal issued to your workingmen which we trust will be 
liberally responded to.”5  However, this initial solidarity faded as the exiles began trading 
barbs over the Commune’s failures.  Some, disillusioned and traumatized, dropped out of 
politics completely and focused on more mundane pursuits, such as offering London’s 
elites private tutoring in French.
6
  The Parisian radical diaspora produced by the 
Commune’s defeat, rather than preserving a unity of purpose based on shared 
experiences, was largely atomized over the course of the 1870s.  For surviving non-
French Communards, this meant the dissolution of many networks that had tied them to 
Paris’s revolutionary community and traditions. 
 Meanwhile Paris, under the ultraconservative Versailles Government, found itself 
subjected to a massive attempt to purge the revolutionary tradition that had drawn so 
many international radicals since 1789.  The National Guard, which had provided the 
Commune’s main source of military strength and had its origins in 1789, was dissolved in 
favor of a large regular army garrison and a military governor.  Several new laws limited 
any radical political activities within the city, including the 1872 Dufaure Law that 
banned the International.  Foreigners, regardless of political ties, found themselves 
subjected to intense police scrutiny.  Given the prominence of non-French radicals in the 
Commune, any hint of connection with the Left brought about rapid deportation.  Paris 
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also found itself stripped of self-government, and the office of mayor was abolished.  
This state of affairs continued while the city remained under martial law, which was not 
lifted until April 1876.
7
  These conditions, coupled with the deaths, arrests, and exiles 
that followed the Commune, caused nearly all existing Parisian radical networks, with 
their French and non-French components, to atrophy rapidly. 
 The scope of these efforts to efface Paris’s revolutionary legacy went far beyond 
mere political repression.  The conservative order also attempted to erase physical spaces 
associated with the Commune and other moments from Paris’s revolutionary past.   
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this process came with the decision to erect Sacré-
Cœur on the heights of Montmartre, the site universally identified with the Revolution of 
March 18 and the Commune’s birth.  Proposed initially as a memorial to Archbishop 
Georges Darboy, shot along with seventy-two other hostages (including forty-four 
members of the clergy) during the Commune’s final hours, the monarchist-dominated 
Assembly enthusiastically gave its support, seeing a basilica dedicated “in witness of 
repentance”8 as the perfect means to render Montmartre unhallowed for radicals.  Though 
construction began in 1875, fierce opposition from both radicals and republicans slowed 
the process to a crawl.  However, the basilica was ultimately completed in 1919, an idol 
to the conservative-clerical alliance opposed by the Communards and nearly all Parisian 
radicals movements back to 1789.
9
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 However, repression alone did not quench the revolutionary fire that had driven 
Paris’s French and international radicals.  By 1875, France appeared in danger of being 
returned to monarchy of one shade or another by the deeply conservative Versailles 
Government.  Faced with this threat, many former Communards not in exile made 
common cause with the Republicans in their ultimately successful effort to establish the 
Third Republic.  This willingness of many former Parisian radicals to work with the 
Republicans became more apparent after the latter oversaw the passage of an Amnesty 
Bill for former Communards in June 1880.
10
  While some radicals returning from exile, 
such as Louis Michel, remained unrepentantly hostile to the French government, most 
prominent former Communards, as Robert Tombs notes, “took their places on the Left of 
the republican spectrum: they neither shunned it, nor were shunned by it.”11  Benoît 
Malon, who collaborated closely with both Leo Frankel and Elisabeth Dmitrieff during 
the Commune, presents a notable example.  Amnestied in 1880, by the end of that decade 
Malon became a leading figure among the Possibilists, whose emphasis on promoting 
socialist reform through the ballot box garnered huge support among the Parisian 
working class.
12
  Though largely still committed to Leftist politics of some sort, most 
former French Communards concluded that they could live with the new Republic and 
work within the political parameters it established.  This new political reality further 
limited the revolutionary appeal that had so long drawn the Continent’s disillusioned 
radicals to the city. 
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 Developments within Europe’s transnational radical movement also contributed to 
Paris’s post-Commune decline as a revolutionary center.  At the outbreak of the Franco-
Prussian War, Marx wrote a lengthy letter to Engels, asserting that: 
If the Prussians win, then centralization of the state power will be beneficial for 
the centralization of the German working class.  German predominance would 
then shift the center of gravity of the West European workers’ movement from 
France to Germany, and you need only compare developments in the two 
countries from 1866 to the present day to realize that the German working class is 
superior to the French both in theory and organization.  Its predominance over the 
French on the international stage would also mean the predominance of our theory 
over Proudhon’s, etc.13 
 
The destruction of Paris’s radical movement during the Commune greatly accelerated this 
process.  As Stuart Edwards notes, “the period from the Commune to the Russian 
Revolution was marked by the predominance of the German social democratic ideology, 
which paralleled the political and economic domination of Germany in Europe.”14  
Though most transnational socialists joined Marx in hailing the Communards as martyrs, 
invoking their memory as a rallying cry for radicals everywhere, most post-1871 
international radicals had very little use for France’s remaining Leftist leaders.  The real 
giants of European transnational radicalism, as Edwards further contends, were almost 
exclusively German: Marx; Engels; August Bebel; Wilhelm Liebknecht; and (later) Karl 
Kautsky.
15
  While the Kaiserreich’s repressive nature prevented Berlin from physically 
replacing Paris as Europe’s revolutionary capital, there is little doubt that by the late 
1870s most transnational radicals looked to Germany as the best means of facilitating 
their ideological visions.  This state of affairs continued until Europe’s revolutionary 
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centrum took its final eastward shift in 1917, with the Bolsheviks and their successors 
establishing Moscow as the transnational capital of the twentieth century’s truly global 
radical movement.  For the Communists, Paris, with its Great Revolution and Commune, 
constituted only two key historical steps in the great march toward socialism. 
After the Commune: Jaroslav Dombrowski, Elisabeth Dmitrieff, and Leo Frankel 
Though the Commune’s defeat largely marked the end of Paris’s active role as Europe’s 
revolutionary center, this does not mean that the city’s revolutionary legacy disappeared 
from French and non-French radical collective memory.  Indeed, Jaroslav Dombrowski’s 
death during the Commune’s final days contributed to the sanctification of a radical site 
of commemoration that would in the decades following 1871 present an ideological rival 
to Sacré-Cœur.  On May 24, as fierce fighting raged throughout Paris, a solemn 
procession bearing Dombrowski’s body moved through the city’s eastern districts.  As it 
passed through the Place de la Bastille, it halted so that dozens of National Guardsmen 
bearing torches could pay tribute to the fallen General before returning to battle.  Prior to 
Dombrowski’s burial in Père Lachaise, Auguste Vermorel, who had known Dombrowski 
since the mid-1860s and had been beside him as he died, delivered a defiant funeral 
oration, declaring “this is he whom they accused of treachery!  He has been one of the 
first to give his life for the Commune…let us swear to leave this place only to die!”16 
 However, as the fighting continued, Père Lachaise became a site where many of 
Paris’s defenders came or were taken to meet their fate.  On May 28, the final day of 
organized resistance, a group of National Guardsmen made their last stand among its 
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tombs and monuments.  Ultimately overcome by superior numbers, those who 
surrendered were taken by French army soldiers to the eastern wall of the cemetery and 
shot.  This wall was used repeatedly as a site of execution by the Versaillaise soldiers 
over the ensuing days, with hundreds shot at the site and then buried where they fell.
17
 
 This bloody legacy, within less than a decade, transformed Père Lachaise into a 
site of pilgrimage and remembrance that in part provided a radical response to Sacré-
Cœur.  In 1880, following the Third Republic’s passage of a general amnesty, Paris 
radicals organized a march in the Commune’s memory to Père Lachaise, ending at the 
wall where the mass shootings had occurred.  Much to the discomfort of the police, over 
25,000 Parisian radicals turned out for the May 23 demonstration, which ended with a 
solemn ceremony at what was christened (and remains) the Mur des Fédérés.
18
   
 This procession became a yearly ritual for the French Left, drawing crowds in the 
tens of thousands well into the mid twentieth century.  Initially undertaken as an act of 
defiance by survivors of the barricades, the processions to Père Lachaise in the immediate 
post-Commune period served to illustrate that revolutionary memory still constituted a 
contested ground even in Paris’s post-revolutionary era.  However, over the ensuing 
decades the ritual became more an act of remembrance as Paris’s revolutionary fires 
further cooled.  Since the late 1980s the yearly marches to the Wall draw only a few 
dozen radicals,
19
 usually greatly outnumbered by tourists pausing to snap a photograph of 
the procession before setting off in search of the Doors’ lead singer Jim Morrison’s 
grave. 
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 Remembrance of Dombrowski has followed a similar historical pattern.  Soon 
after the Commune’s defeat, several of his former soldiers gathering to honor their 
general discovered that no marker had been left at his burial site.  Indeed, Dombrowski’s 
grave has never been identified or discovered.  However, a small monument was erected 
near the Mur des Fédérés in the early 1880s and his memory figured prominently in the 
yearly ceremonies at the site for several decades afterward.
20
  His name apparently 
remained current enough in French radical circles for a battalion of French socialists and 
Communists volunteering for the Republican cause during the Spanish Civil War to name 
their unit in his honor.
21
  However, with the decline of Communism, the Commune, as 
Tombs notes, “is no longer politically contentious,” rendering most its participants 
ideologically inert.
22
  In this environment Dombrowski’s name has largely faded from 
Paris’s collective historical memory, only making brief appearances during moments of 
historical commemoration, such as during the Commune 140
th
 Anniversary in 2011.
23
   
 The post-1871 lives of Elisabeth Dmitrieff and Leo Frankel, survivors of the 
Commune’s violent suppression, reflect in many ways the ideological shifts and 
disillusionment that more immediately followed Paris’s demise as Europe’s revolutionary 
capital.  Despite being wounded on the barricades, the two managed together to slip out 
of Paris.  Employing their fluency in German, the two posed as bourgeois Prussians and 
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thus managed to slip into Switzerland by late June.
24
  Welcomed along with other fleeing 
Communards by Geneva’s radical community, Frankel and Dmitrieff recovered from 
their wounds while avoiding Swiss authorities, who had been formally asked by the 
French government in early July to arrest and extradite both Frankel and “a woman 
named Elise.”25  Their paths ultimately diverged in August 1871, when a still deeply 
distraught Dmitrieff refused Frankel’s request to accompany him back to London and the 
International’s General Council.26 
 The failure of the Commune appeared to limit greatly Dmitrieff’s further interest 
in transnational radicalism.  Several scholars, including Eichner, Braibant, Singer-
Lecocq, and McClellan, suggest that Dmitrieff resented the lack of support provided by 
the International’s General Council and other radicals to the Communards, leading her to 
turn her back on non-Russian politics.
27
  The evidence seems to support this conclusion, 
as Dmitrieff, once again Tomonovskaya, arrived back in Russia in October 1871 and 
remained there for the rest of her life.
28
  While attempting to reintegrate into the Russian 
radical community in 1872, she met Ivan Mikhailovitch Davidovsky, an employee of her 
former husband who combined elite radicalism with various criminal enterprises.  The 
two fell in love and married, eventually having two children.  Davidovsky’s political and 
criminal schemes led to him being charged with murder, fraud, embezzlement, and other 
crimes in 1876.  Found guilty on all accounts, the Russian government sentenced 
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Davidovsky to permanent exile in Siberia.  Dmitrieff joined him, along with their 
children, in Atchinsk.
29
 
 Since Dmitrieff hid her political past and her husband’s sentence deemed him a 
common criminal, the political exile community in Siberia refused any contact with the 
two.  While her relationships with other male radicals during the Commune had 
facilitated her work and allowed her to overcome the constraints placed upon her gender, 
ironically in this situation it was her relationship with a male that prevented her from 
establishing ties to Siberia’s radical networks.   Faced with this new reality, Dmitrieff 
during the 1880s became deeply committed to the Orthodox faith as well as the study of 
astronomy, tutoring local children in the latter.
30
  Sources become scarce by the 1890s, 
but seem to indicate Dmitrieff left her husband with her daughters around 1900 for 
Moscow.  However, though several addresses for the three have been found, no evidence 
exists of her further involvement in radical politics during either the Revolutions of 1905 
or 1917.  Indeed, even Soviet sources fail to establish her specific date of death, 
estimating it to be 1918.
31
  It appears that for Elisabeth Dmitrieff the failure of Paris’s 
transnational revolutionary promise led to an abandonment of her radical project, a state 
of affairs that in many ways mirrors the French capital itself post-1871.   As Carolyn 
Eichner concludes, the Commune’s defeat “pushed Dmitrieff to a point where she 
released her political self, and looked instead to less concrete, less earthly pursuits…both 
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faith and the stars stood outside of…her control…she made no effort to influence or 
reorder either one.”32 
 If Dmitrieff’s post-Commune life parallels Paris’s post-1871 move away from its 
revolutionary mission, Leo Frankel’s reflects the continued vibrancy of European 
transnational radicalism in post-Parisian focused era.  Frankel, soon after his arrival in 
London in August 1871, found himself elected to the International’s General Council as a 
representative of the Austrian-Hungarian workers.
33
  Frankel proved extremely loyal to 
Marx and Engels during their struggle with Bakunin and his faction during the Hague 
Conference in September 1872.  Beginning in 1875, Frankel began a decade-long effort 
to organize workers in both Austria and Hungary.  Arrested after his initial arrival in 
Austria, in 1876 Frankel returned to his home city of Budapest and began establishing the 
ideological and organization groundwork for what became the Magyarországi Általános 
Munkáspárt (General Workers’ Party of Hungary).  As part of these efforts, Frankel 
edited the Munkás Heti Krónika (Workers’ Weekly Chronicle) from 1876–1876 and then 
the Arbeiter Wochen-Kronik.  His work for these journals brought him into conflict with 
the Habsburg authorities, who arrested him in 1881 for violating the press laws.  Frankel 
spent over two years in jail before his release in 1884.
34
 
 Following his release, Frankel divided his time between doing organizational 
work for various socialist groups in Vienna, Budapest, and Paris.  In June 1885 in Paris 
Frankel met Theodor Herzl through a common acquaintance.  Though Herzl had not yet 
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developed his ideas of Zionism, his views on nationality and nationalism held little 
appeal to the deeply internationalist Frankel, and the two did not get along.
35
  Frankel 
settled permanently in Paris in 1889, aiding Engels with the organization of the Second 
International.  His renewed activities in Paris illustrate that while it no longer constituted 
a revolutionary center, the French capital’s revolutionary legacy combined with its status 
as one of Europe’s great cities still marked it as an important site for radical organizing.  
Between 1890 and 1895 Frankel represented the Hungarian workers at several 
Congresses.  However, in 1895 his health began to fail, leading him to retire from his 
activities for the International.  Even in his retirement Frankel still participated actively in 
commemorations of the Commune, organizing a rally on March 18, 1895, in honor of its 
24
th
 anniversary.  This fittingly proved his last major political act; in January 1896 he fell 
ill and, after lingering several weeks, died on March 29.  His funeral drew thousands on 
April 2, as he was carried to Père Lachaise and interred wrapped in a red flag.  Though 
laid to rest in Paris, in 1968 for reasons not readily clear his body was removed to 
Budapest and buried by the Communist government in the Workers’ Pantheon.36 
 The intent of this project has been to demonstrate how Paris, beginning with the 
French Revolution, became a site of revolutionary pilgrimage for international radicals 
drawn by its promise of facilitating their own political and ideological aspirations.  
Inaugurated by the Great Revolution, this process greatly accelerated between 1830 and 
1848 as the city’s community of foreign radicals, spurred by the growth of transnational 
discourse such as socialism, began to perceive Paris’s revolutionary portent as 
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transnational and exportable.  Though the efforts of 1848 proved a failure, they served to 
illustrate to the non-French radical community in Paris that a truly transnational 
revolutionary effort could only be facilitated by first consolidating revolution in Paris.  
This, combined with the deepening of transnational radical ties through the establishment 
of the International, produced the conditions whereby Paris’s transnational potential 
reached its apex with the Paris Commune.  The experiences of Leo Frankel, Elisabeth 
Dmitrieff, and Jaroslav Dombrowski illustrate how foreign radicals came to view the 
Commune as the historical moment capable of carrying Paris’s revolutionary promise to 
its final fulfilment.  Although the Herculean efforts to realize this new world proved 
unable to overcome the forces arrayed against them, they still created, if only for a 
moment, a vision of the possible; a pathway beginning in Paris to an emancipatory future 
for Europe and beyond. 
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